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Homer, 157, 162 reasons, 73“74
characters in, and divine Williams™ argument for, 73“102
intervention, 165 intuitionism, and morality, 84
217
Index


judgment, involving thick ethical Knowledge and the State of Nature
(Craig), 185
concepts, 32
kradie (heart), 167
justice, origins of (Hume), 326 to 13
justi¬cation, 94
Lear, Jonathan, 57
kalokagathia (beauty and nobility), Legacy of Greece, The: A New Appraisal
141 (Williams), 156
Kant, Immanuel, 61, 84“85, 89, 98, Leviathan (Hobbes), 192
100, 107, 113 Lewis, Helen Block, 146, 153
Karenina, Anna, 178 “Liberation of Antiquity, The”
Kierkegaard, Soren, 107 (Williams), 161“164
knowledge Lovibond, Sabina, 58
answering to reality, 33 luck, moral, 175“179
concepts of, 35, 37
ethical, 25 malum prohibita (wrong solely because
admitting legitimate and prohibited), 138
compatible alternatives, 42, 59 Marxism, 156
best re¬‚ective explanation of, 25, Mason, Marilyn J., 151
34 McDowell, John, 28, 29, 48, 49, 51, 53,
de¬ned, 26 55
indicating what makes knowledge Menelaus, 145
true, 35 Merit and Responsibility: A Study in
moral, more accessible than scienti¬c Greek Values (Adkins), 162“163
truth, 67 Metaphysics of Morals (Kant), 114, 117,
non-additive nature of (Williams), 38 126
pluralism in, 64 metis (intelligence), 167
as a reality independent of being Mill, John Stuart, 106
known (Williams), 24, 29 mind, as unitary locus of action, 166
scienti¬c Miss Lonelyhearts (West), 144“145
best re¬‚ective explanation of, 26, Moore, Adrian, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57,
34 59“60, 61, 62
contrasted to ethical knowledge, moral agency
53 de¬ned, 98
shape of, 195 Kantian “high” conception of, 100
as a state-of-nature narrative, subjective freedom of, 98
190“192 moral considerations, reason giving
tensed, 39“40. See also tense force of, 92
and thick ethical concepts, 61“63 moral error, supporting cognitivism
as “what is there anyway” (Williams), (Timmons), 67“69
24, 36 Moral Law
218 Index


necessity, 175“179
moral obligation, and reason, 93“97
ethical practical, 105, 109“110,
“moral point of view,” 98“99
121“122, 127
moral self, as characterless, 174
practical, 105, 107“109, 110,
Moralit¨ t (abstract morality, Hegel)
a
118“121, 127
morality
Kantian, 119
categorical, 95
“supernatural”, 175, 176“178
challenges to, in Greek philosophical
and universality, 120
ethics, 159“161
Neoptolemus, 173
cognitive internalism™s implication
Nietzsche, Frederick, 73, 99, 100, 101,
for, 97“102
102, 182, 185, 186“187, 192,
distinguished from ethics, 104“130
197
in Greek ethics, 158
Nozick, Robert, 66, 182, 190
imperative of (Kant), 119
role of democratic nation-states in
objectivism. See also secondary property
promoting, 125
realism
and self-governance, 74
and hypertraditionalism, 59
“Morality, Our Peculiar Institution”
and re¬‚ection, 50
(Williams), 105, 135
Williams™ critique of, 47“70
morality system
objectivist cognitivism, 48. See also
consequences of, 126“130
sensibility theory.
de¬ned, 104“112
obligation
deliberative priority and the, 49
de¬ned, 105“107, 114
features of, 105“112
and desire, 129
Kantian, 113“126
and inclination, 123
Williams™ critique of, 69
Kantian, 116
morals, metaphysics of (metaphysica
moral, 110, 115
pura), 126
morality, 159
motivation
as one kind of ethical output, 108
desire/belief theory of (Hume), 80
as one type of ethical consideration,
other-regarding, 168
105
motive
plurality of different kinds of (Kant),
affective element in, 82
121
based on false factual belief, 83
and speci¬c acts, 115
and desire, 81“82
Odysseus, 145, 167“168
operative, 81
Oedipus, 169“170
two kinds of, 167
On Certainty (Wittgenstein), 66
Origin of Species, The (Darwin), 183
Murdoch, Iris, 48, 49
other, the internalized, 149, 171, 175
nakedness, 148, 150“151
ought, moral (Kant), 115
Natural History of Religion, The (Hume),
ought implies can, 106, 172
182, 187“188, 193“194, 197
219
Index


perspectival ascent, 63 internal, de¬ned, 51
Philoctetes (Sophocles), 173 rejected but not denied, 37
Plato, 156, 157, 178“179 relative to subject matter, 24
unity in (Williams), 38“39
Plato: The Invention of Philosophy
(Williams), 179 without relativization, 24“27
pluralism. See also realism Realism and Imagination in Ethics
advocated by Goodman, 39“42 (Lovibond), 58
ethical, 64“65 reality
inherent, 57 concepts of, 37
within knowledge, 64 in idealism, 38
objective value, 64 and knowledge, 33
radical, 64 non-idealistic variants of, 38“43
reasonable objective, 67 unitary, 52
“Practical Necessity” (Williams), 108 reason
prehistory, 188 de¬ned, 108
principles and emotion, 118
pure non-empirical foundational, external, 75
127 external moral, 99
of the will, 119 ¬‚exibility in describing, 77“79
Progressivism Humean model of, 79“80
critique of, 161“164 internal, 74“79
and psychological explanations, internal versus external, 74“79
164“168 internalist view of, 75“102
projectivism, 54 and moral obligation, 93“97
punishment, 148 Nozick™s perspective on, 66
purity, 110“112, 125 practical, 73“74, 129
Putnam, Hilary, 51 as slave of the passions, 110
statements, intelligibility of external,
Quine, W. V., 29, 32 79
and empiricism/ecumenism, universal, 90
unrecognized as reason, 89“93
and naturalism/sectarianism, 30
reasoning
Quinn, Warren, 51
practical, 56
theoretical, 56
racism, 25, 60“63
“Recognizing Responsibility”
realism. See also pluralism
(Williams), 168“175
about ethics, Williams™ opposition
reconstruction, 148
to, 24
reductionism,
advantages of, over Goodman™s
re¬‚ection
pluralism, 42“43
destroying ethical knowledge, 59,
external, 51
60“62
and moral knowledge, 52
220 Index


super¬ciality of (Williams), 55
re¬‚ection (cont.)
and thick concepts, 48
and judgment, 65
sectarianism, 30
undermining knowledge, 50
self
religion, 107. See also Christianity.
as bad, 152
Religion (Kant), 125, 129
nothing but the, 151
reparations, 148
self-deception, 197
representations, absolute, 63“64
self-government, as central feature of
Republic (Plato), 156, 175
human moral experience, 116
responsibility
self-improvement, 148
elements necessary to the conception
sensibility theory, 48
of, 169
“shaken realists” (Stevens), 43
identi¬catory, 142“143
shame, 156
moral, 168
of agents, 137
and the archaic Greeks, 169
and audiences, 148“150
and free will, 127“130
connected would acts, 137“140
and moral agency, 98
diminishing one™s whole being, 142,
as responsiveness to moral reasons,
151“152
101
and disgrace, ridicule, and loss of
Ricoeur, Paul, 101“102
prestige, 156
Rorty, Richard, 61
distinguished from guilt, 146“153,
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 178
173
in early Greek literature, 171
Scanlon, T.M., 79, 92
and guilt, 145“146
Schafer, Roy, 152
identi¬catory, 141“144
Schiller, Friedrich, 123
infantile, 151
science
like moral luck, 145
de¬ning characteristic of, 27
and relations to others, 135“153
uni¬ed conception of the world in,
self regarding and indecorous,
52
140“141
scienti¬c enquiry
situation arousing, 147
and ethical views, 52
without guilt, 139
point of, 52
without responsibility, 144“145
secondary property realism. See also
“Shame and Autonomy” (Williams),
objectivism; sensibility theory
135, 168“175
and cognitivism, 50
Shame and Guilt in Neuroses (Lewis),
and ethical thought, 50, 57
146
and evaluative concepts, 56
Shame and Necessity (Williams), 64, 135,
Hegelian interpretation of,
155“156
58
Sittlichkeit (ethical life, Hegel)

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