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(New York:William Morrow & Co., 1988), chap. 2, and in Sally Banes, “Twentieth Century
Dance,” in The Great Ideas Today: 1991 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1991), pp. 65“68.
43. Narratives of this sort would seem to be the most straightforward way of representing the
“heuristic pathways” that are so crucial in Gregory Currie™s An Ontology of Art (New York:
St. Martin™s Press, 1989); see esp. chap. 3.
44. For further discussion of the idea of associated values, see No«l Carroll, “Post-modern
Dance and Expression,” in Philosophical Essays on Dance, ed. Gordon Fancher and Gerald
Myers (Brooklyn: Dance Horizons Press, 1981).
45. It has been asserted above that the assessments in question be intelligible.This allows that
the assessments might be wrong, especially in the hindsight of historical research. For
example, Isadora Duncan supposed that the art of the Greeks was natural. Her assessment
might not stand up to the scrutiny of classical scholars today. Nevertheless, her view was
intelligible for someone in her situation.That is, we can see how a reasonable person in her
situation could, in a perfectly reasonable way, come to develop her view of Greek art even
if, when all the research is in, it turns out that her view was incorrect. In terms of our his-
torical narratives, we require that the artists make the assessments we claim they make, but
those assessments need only be intelligible “ reasonable conclusions reached in a reasonable
way “ and need not be art-historically correct according to retrospective historical research.
This notion of intelligibility is analogous to the way in which Amelie Rorty thinks that the
principle of charity should be employed in explaining certain emotions. See Amelie
Oksenberg Rorty,“Explaining Emotions,” The Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978): 139“61.
46. “Generally” has been added here to allow for the possibility that an identifying narrative
might be told with reference to a work that is not disputed “ for example, a “repetition,” to
use the language of my essay “Art, Practice and Narrative.”
47. “Or reenact” has been added in order to allow for resolutions that do not involve changing the
artworld.This adjustment is meant to accommodate the option of repetition (see note 46).
48. Compare my account of the complication with accounts of the logic of the situation
in Alan Donagan,“The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered,” in Philosophical Analysis and
History, ed.William Dray (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); and Michael Martin, “Situa-
tional Logic and Covering Law Explanations in History,” Inquiry 11 (1968): 394.
49. For more information on embedding and enchainment, see Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, Narra-
tive Fiction (New York: Methuen, 1983); Claude Bremond,“La logique des possibles narratifs,”
Communications 8 (1966): 60“76; and Claude Bremond, Logique du recit (Paris: Seuil, 1973).
50. By including the constraint that identifying narratives track activities localized in art-
presentational systems, I think I can provide the kind of framework whose absence from
my “Art, Practice and Narrative” Stephen Davies criticizes in his recent Definitions of
Art. Also, Davies seems too quick to assimilate my notion of repetition with the family
resemblance approach™s notion of similarity. For, on my account, the similarities in ques-
tion must be the result of real historical processes: that is to say, similarities which are not
rooted in real historical relations are not enough. For a statement of Davies™s criticisms
of the narrative approach, see his Definitions of Art (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1991), pp. 167“69.
51. See Jerrold Levinson, “Defining Art Historically” and “Refining Art Historically,” in his
Music,Art & Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
52. Ibid., p. 15.
53. In his “The Boundaries of Art,” Robert Stecker suggests that my narrational approach may be
open to the same objections to which Levinson™s approach is open.This conjecture is undoubt-
edly owing to my remark, in “Art, Practice and Narrative,” that in certain ways the narrative
approach is compatible with Levinson™s view.What I had in mind there, but did not fully expli-
cate, was that my notions of repetition, amplification, and repudiation could serve as the basis of
some of the art regards that might be relevant to Levinson™s theory.That is, artists might create
NOTES 407

works with the intention that they be regarded as repetitions, amplifications, and repudiations.
Still, I do not think the narrational approach falls with Levinson™s in the face of the kinds of
objections that Stecker advances, if only because the narrative approach does not propose a defin-
ition of art. See Stecker,“The Boundaries of Art,” British Journal of Aesthetics 30 (1990).
54. I have derived this interpretation of Danto™s theory from his book The Transfiguration of the
Commonplace. I have also presented a less restrictive interpretation of Danto™s theory in my
review of his art theory in the journal History and Theory. The less restrictive definition was
produced in order to avoid certain of the difficulties with Danto™s view that I rehearse
above. Nevertheless, though a more charitable version of Danto™s theory can be produced,
I think that the version of Danto™s theory that I attack here is his official theory. See my
review in History and Theory 29 (1990): 113.
55. See Annette Barnes, On Interpretation (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

HISTORICAL NARRATIVES P H I LO S O P H Y A RT
AND THE OF

1. See, for example, the section entitled “I. The Nature of Art” in Art and Philosophy, ed.
William Kennick (New York: St. Martin™s Press, 1979, 2nd edition).
Throughout this essay, I should emphasize that I am using the phrase “philosophy of art”
somewhat stipulatively to refer to the philosophical concern with the question “What is art?”
This essay, furthermore, is a substantial variation on a longer piece of mine,“Identify-
ing Art,” in Institutions of Art: Reconsiderations of George Dickie™s Philosophy, ed. Robert Yanal
(Penn State University Press, 1993).
2. See Stephen Davies, Definitions of Art (Cornell University Press, 1991), Ch. 2.
3. Ibid., p. 218.
4. See, for example, Benjamin Tilghman™s arguments in “Reflections on Aesthetic Theory,” in
Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, eds. George Dickie, Richard Sclafani, and Richard Roblin
(New York: St. Martin™s Press, 1989), most notably p. 161.
5. The qualification “most” in the sentence above is introduced in order to admit that some
philosophers of art “ often proponents of aesthetic theories of art “ are sometimes engaged
in the somewhat rear-guard action of attempting to impugn the artistic credentials of the
avant-garde. However, given the course of art history and the inexpugnable influence of
the avant-garde, such maneuvers at this late date strike me as almost quaint.
6. I have previously defended a version of the narrative approach in my “Art, Practice and
Narrative,” The Monist 71 (1988): 57“68.The view of art as a practice is also advanced by
Nicholas Wolterstorff in his “Philosophy of Art after Analysis and Romanticism,” in Analytic
Aesthetics, ed. Richard Shusterman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
7. In his “Style Theory of Art,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, No. 72 (1991), pp. 277“89, James
Carney attempts to develop certain of the insights in my “Art, Practice and Narrative” into
a definitional approach, whereas I am prone to extend those earlier views in a way that is
alternative to the definitional approach.
8. See, for example, Morris Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” in The Journal of Aes-
thetics and Art Criticism 15 (1956): 27“35.
9. See: Maurice Mandelbaum, “Family Resemblances and Generalizations Concerning the
Art,” American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965): 219“28;Anthony Manser,“Games and Fam-
ily Resemblance,” Philosophy 42 (1967): 210“25; George Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Pegasus, 1971), pp. 95“98; Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the
Commonplace (Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 57“66; George Dickie, The Art Circle
(New York: Haven Publications, 1984), Ch. III; and Stephen Davies, Definitions of Art, Ch. I.
10. In terms of what are called exhibited properties.
11. For older accounts of the evolutionary nature of art, see: Henri Focillon, The Life of Forms
in Art, tr. Charles Beecher Hogan and George Kubler (New York: Zone, 1989); and George
Kubler, The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things (Yale University Press, 1962).
408 NOTES
12. Quoted in Claude Schumacher, Alfred Jarry and Guillaume Apollinaire (New York: Grove
Press, 1985), p. 75.
13. R. A. Sharpe, Contemporary Aesthetics: A Philosophical Analysis (New York: St. Martin™s Press,
1983), p. 171.
14. See Kwame Anthony Appiah,“The Postcolonial and the Postmodern,” in his In My Father™s
House (Oxford University Press, 1992), Ch. 7, notably pp. 150“55.
15. Roman Jakobson,“The Dominant,” in Readings in Russian Poetics: Formalist and Structuralist
Views, eds. Ladislav Matejka and Krystyna Pomorska (University of Michigan Press, 1978),
p. 83. In the same volume, see also: Boris Ejxenbaum, “Literary Environment;” Jurij Tyn-
janov,“On Literary Evolution;” and Jurij Tynjanov and Roman Jakobson,“Problems in the
Study of Literature and Language.” For an overview of the work of the Prague Structural-
ists concerning literary evolution, see: Historical Structures: The Prague School Project,
1928“1946, by F.W. Galan (University of Texas Press, 1984). For contemporary theorizing
in this vein see: David Bordwell, “Historical Poetics of Cinema,” in The Cinematic Text:
Methods and Approaches, ed. R. Barton Palmer (New York:AMS Press, 1989).
16. Jeffrey Wieand,“Putting Forward a Work of Art,” in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
41 (1983): 618.
17. Ibid.
18. Insofar as identifying narratives emphasize real genetic linkages between past art and con-
tested works, the narrative approach, pace critics like Davies and Carney, cannot be dis-
missed in the manner of the family resemblance approach.
19. This is not to deny that such narratives may also involve, so to speak, a coda in which the
consequences of the work in question are also cited.
20. Aristotle, Poetics, in Classical Literary Criticism, tr.T. S. Dorsch (New York:Viking Penguin,
1984), p. 41.
21. Though typically the relevant context for initiating an identifying narrative is an artworld
state of affairs immediately prior to the introduction of the avant-garde work in question,
this, of course, is not always the case. Sometimes the narrative will begin further back in
history. However, whenever the narrative begins, it must start with a context of practices
about which there is consensus concerning its artistic legitimacy.
22. Schumacher, Alfred Jarry and Guillaume Apollinaire, p. 98.
23. Alfred Jarry in Ubu, ed. Noel Arnaud (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), pp. 412“13.The above trans-
lation comes from Schumacher, p. 105.
24. See Jerrold Levinson,“Defining Art Historically,” The British Journal of Aesthetics 19 (1979):
232“350; Levinson,“Refining Art Historically,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 47
(1988): 21“33; and Levinson,“A Refiner™s Fire: Reply to Sartwell and Kolak,” The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48 (1990): 231“35. For further criticism of Levinson™s position,
see my “Identifying Art.”
25. Davies, Definitions of Art, p. 221.
26. Ibid.
27. For a suggestive discussion of the relation of narration and practical reasoning, see Paul
Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, tr. Kathleen McLaughin and David Pellauer (University of
Chicago Press, 1984), vol. 1.
28. Davies, Definitions of Art, p. 221.
29. This argument is developed at greater length in my “Art, Intention and Conversation,” in
Intention and Interpretation, ed. Gary Iseminger (Temple University Press, 1992).
30. Quoted in Beaumont Newhall™s The History of Photography (New York: The Museum of
Modern Art, 1964), p. 106.
31. For a more developed account of the introduction of an artworld presentational system, see
my “Performance,” Formations 1 (1986): 63“82.
32. See Carroll,“Performance.”
33. An identifying narrative is not a necessary condition for art status because there may be art-
works for which no identifying narrative can be produced. Certain fossil finds may be rel-
NOTES 409

evant to consider here. Such cases, however, do not compromise the efficacy of the narra-
tive approach as a reliable method for identifying art “ particularly innovative art “ in our
own tradition. Moreover, I suspect that Carney™s style theory of art may falter as a real def-
inition because there is no reason to believe that every genuine work of art “ such as cer-
tain exotic finds “ can be connected to the kind of historical styles his view requires.
34. This is one of the worries that Richard Shusterman raises in his Pragmatist Aesthetics
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), especially p. 44.

ON THE NARRATIVE CONNECTION
1. Morton White, Foundations of Historical Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).
2. A number of theorists, including Benedetto Croce, Arthur Danto, and William Dray, have
used this term. I am using it in the way Morton White does in Foundations of Historical
Knowledge, p. 222.
3. See Gerald Prince, Narratology:The Form and Functioning of Narrative (Amsterdam: Mouton
Publishers, 1982), 145.
4. Dray extrapolates the notion of a causal input from Narration and Knowledge by Arthur
Danto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), Chapter 11. Dray discusses the causal
input in the second edition of his book Philosophy of History (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Pren-
tice-Hall, Inc., 1993), pp. 93“94.
5. This example comes from Danto and Dray, although it has been modified for my own pur-
poses. For references, see the preceding footnote.
6. W. B. Gallie first proposed that the earlier events in narratives might be construed as neces-
sary conditions for later events, though his comments are very laconic and undeveloped. I
have refined his approach by talking about causally necessary conditions as well as by
attempting to support the hypothesis argumentatively and developing it in greater detail. I
have also profited greatly from Gallie™s discussion of following a narrative, though I hope
that I have extended it and clarified it somewhat. For Gallie™s views, see:W. B. Gallie, Philos-
ophy and the Historical Understanding (London: Chatto & Windus, 1964), Chapter 2.
7. An INUS condition is an insufficient but necessary part of a condition that itself is unnec-
essary but sufficient for an effect event.Throughout this essay, when I refer to the causally
necessary conditions in the narrative connection, I have INUS conditions in mind inas-
much as they are necessary ingredients in the relevant causal networks under discussion.
For J. L. Mackie™s discussion of INUS conditions, see his “Causes and Conditions” in
The Nature of Causation, edited by Myles Brand (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976)
and his The Cement of the Universe (Oxford:The Clarendon Press, 1980).
8. Mackie,“Causes and Conditions” and The Cement of the Universe.
9. Of course, you may not be persuaded by this, in which case you may prefer to conjecture
that the earlier event in the narrative connection is only a necessary condition of the later
events rather than that it is a causally necessary condition, However, I predictably feel that
this formulation is too loose.
10. For discussions of the syuzhet/fabula distinction see: Seymour Chatman, Coming to Terms:
The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press,
1990), and David Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film (Madison: University of Wis-
consin Press, 1985).
11. I owe my recognition of the need to acknowledge the forward-looking aspect of narration
to comments made by audience participants at the University of Leeds.
12. Danto would appear to hold to such a view in his Narration and Knowledge.
13. I owe this objection to Gregory Currie.
14. I would like to thank Gregory Currie, Elliot Sober, Berent Enc, Ellery Eels, James Phelan,
David Bordwell, Susan Friedman, Sally Banes, Graham McFee, Matthew Kieran, and my
audiences at the University of Leeds and the University of Sussex for their helpful com-
ments and criticisms.
410 NOTES

INTERPRETATION, HISTORY, NARRATIVE
AND

1. See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, translated by
Peter Preuss (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980). Speaking of “monu-
mental history,” for example, Nietzsche claims that this venture risks distorting the past by
reinterpreting it according to aesthetic criteria and, thereby, brings it closer to fiction (p.
17). Nietzsche™s specific reason for this belief is that insofar as monumental history func-
tions to provide models for emulation, it will occlude attention to sufficient causes in order
to produce representations available for imitation.
2. Roland Barthes,“The Discourse of History,” in Comparative Criticism:A Yearbook, edited by
E. S. Shaffer; translated by Stephen Bann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
pp. 7“20.
3. Louis Mink, “Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument,” in his Historical Understanding,
edited by Brian Fay, Eugene Golob and Richard Vann (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1987), pp. 183“203.
4. See Hayden White, Metahistory:The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Bal-
timore, MD:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973);White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in
Cultural Criticism (Baltimore, MD:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978);White, The
Content of Form (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); White, in
“Figuring the Nature of Times Deceased,” Future Literary Theory, edited by Ralph Cohen
(New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 19“43.
5. For its impact on literary critics and historians see the essays by K. Egan, L. Gossman and R.
Reinitz in The Writing of History: Literary Form and Historical Understanding, edited by Robert H.
Canary and Henry Kozicki (Madison,WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). For an exam-
ple of a philosopher of history influenced by this view, see F. R.Ankersmit,“The Dilemma of
Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of History,” in the journal History and Theory, Beiheft
25 (1986), 1“27.The view is also endorsed in Stephen Bann,“Toward a Critical Historiogra-
phy: Recent Work in Philosophy of History,” Philosophy, 56 (1981), 365“85.
6. See White, “Interpretation in History,” in Tropics, pp. 51“80. The interrelation between
these different interpretive registers is also discussed in the “Introduction” to Metahistory
(pp. 1“42), among other places.That White continues to regard historical narrative as inter-
pretive is evident in his recent “˜Figuring the Nature of Times Deceased™; Literary Theory
and Historical Writing;” see, for example, p. 21.
7. Here it is important to note that our reservations about White have less to do with his view
that historical narratives are interpretative and more to do with his claims that such inter-
pretive narratives are, in decisive respects, fictional.
8. See White, “Historicism, History and the Figurative Imagination,” in Tropics, for example,
pp. 111“12.
9. Claude L©vi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
10. See, for example, Fernand Braudel, “The Situation of History in 1950,” in his On History
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), and Fran§ois Furet,“From Narrative History
to History as a Problem,” Diogenes, Spring 1975.W. H. Dray criticizes the latter article in his
“Narrative Versus Analysis in History,” in Rationality, Relativism and the Human Sciences,
edited by Joseph Margolis, Michael Krausz and R. M. Burian (Dordrecht, Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1986).
11. White, “˜Figuring the Nature of Times Deceased,™” p. 27. I take the gnomic, rhetorical
question at the end of this quotation to signify that narratives as metaphors (in virtue of
their generic plot structures) are true in the way analogies are true”do they provide an
insightful fit; are they true enough?
12. Paul Ricoeur, The Reality of the Historical Past (Milwaukee,WI: Marquette University Press,
1984), pp. 33“34.
13. Joseph Margolis, Art and Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980), p. 158.
14. White,“˜Figuring the Nature of the Times Deceased,™” p. 18.

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