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distortion, which I suppose that someone like Clark would want to call an “incongruity.” In
another vein, Scruton™s claim that humor cannot be an emotion because it involves an
attentive stance of demolition rather than a formal object would appear to run afoul of the-
ories of the emotions like Amelie Rorty™s which take fixed patterns of attention as marks of
436 NOTES
emotions. See Roger Scruton,“Laughter,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1982), and
Amelie Rorty,“Explaining Emotions,” Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978).
24. See note 1.
25. Raskin, Semantic Mechanisms of Humor.
26. A. Koestler, The Act of Creation (New York, 1964).
27. Swabey, Comic Laughter, 103“26.
28. Monro, Argument of Laughter.
29. Henri Bergson, Laughter in Comedy, edited by Wylie Sypher (Baltimore, Md., 1984).
30. From Barbara C. Bowen, editor, One Hundred Renaissance Jokes:An Anthology (Birmingham,
Ala., 1988), 9.This joke was first brought to my attention by John Morreall as a counterex-
ample to my theory.The discussion above should indicate why I do not regard it as such.
31. Some incongruity theorists claim the non sequitur as part of their domain. See, for example,
Swabey, Comic Laughter, 120“21. As indicated, I believe that this makes the often otherwise
useful concept of incongruity vacuous.
32. The notion that the punch line of a joke subverts our expectations may be misleading since
it suggests that we already have some positive view of how the joke will conclude “ that is,
a determinate, rival hypothesis to the conclusion that actually eventuates. But often “ most
of the time? “ I think that we have no definite idea of how the joke will end.Thus, if we
wish to persevere in speaking of our expectations being subverted, I think that it is best to
think of our expectations here as the continuation of our normal modes of thought “
though this needs a bit of qualification since we may also bring to a given joke certain
“joke expectations” due to the internal structure of the joke (e.g., the expectation of con-
tinued regularities in jokes told in “threes”), or “joke expectations” due to the recognition
of the genre to which the joke belongs (e.g., light-bulb jokes).
33. The notion of cognitive state transitions derives from Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and
Cognition (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 74“80 and chap. 5. An interesting project for future
research would be to try to fill out Goldman™s format with some example of typical joke-
interpretations.
34. Ted Cohen, “Jokes,” in Pleasure, Preference and Value, edited by Eva Schaper (Cambridge,
1983), 124“26.
35. Although we can incorporate Freud™s findings into our theory by noting that sometimes
the errors in joke-interpretations, along with the attractiveness of said interpretations, may
be a result of the operation of infantile thinking.
36. Aristotle, Rhetoric (2, 22“25).
37. See Robert Fogelin, Speaking Figuratively (New Haven, Conn., 1988), 13“18.
38. Though I do not want to endorse Davidson™s theory of metaphor, something like it may
apply to hyperbole, though, of course, an hyperbole does contain certain instructions about
the way in which to move from it to its literal counterpart. See Donald Davidson, “What
Metaphors Mean,” Critical Inquiry 1 (1978).
39. Christopher P. Wilson, Jokes: Form, Content, Use and Function (London, 1979), 217“18; R.
Middleton and J. Moland, “Humor in Negro and White Subcultures,” American Sociological
Review 24 (1959); A.M. O™Donnell,“The mouth that bites itself; Irish humour,” address to
the Institute of Education, University of London, 1975 (cited in Wilson).
40. Forms of figuration other than hyperbole can be in play in such jokes.
41. I have the impression that the view here conflicts with that of Ronald DeSousa in his The
Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 289“93. He appears to believe that when a
certain kind of wit “ which, following Plato, he calls phthonic “ induces laughter, this implicates
us in wickedness, such as sexism, because it shows that we possess an evil attitude. Such atti-
tudes, he maintains, cannot be adopted hypothetically for the purposes of “getting a joke” in
the way we entertain the idea that Scots are cheap in order to appreciate certain jokes about
them. I am not sure that I follow all of DeSousa™s arguments here; indeed, I would want to chal-
lenge the thought-experiments that he offers in defense of his thesis.Also, he does not seem to
take into account the view that the interpretations that we supply to jokes are recognized to be
NOTES 437
involved in error. However, DeSousa™s position really deserves to be addressed in a separate arti-
cle rather than to be hastily engaged in a brief rebuttal here. Nevertheless, one reservation
about his position that can be stated briefly now is that his claims that certain presuppositions
of jokes cannot be entertained hypothetically does not seem obviously consistent with his
admission that anthropologists can entertain attitudes that are alien to them in order to appre-
ciate the jokes of other cultures (DeSousa, 293).
In retrospect, I should also note that the type of “why-did-the-chicken-cross-the-road”
joke that I analyzed as a meta-joke in my section entitled “An Alternative Account of the
Nature of Jokes” could be analyzed in a way that is more in keeping with my overall approach.
We could, for example, analyze it as eliciting a mistaken framework. See, for instance, Alan
Garfinkel™s account of the Willy Sutton joke in Chapter 1 of his Forms of Explanation (New
Haven, Conn., 1981). However, even if this is the right way to go with such jokes, I still think
that we need the category of meta-jokes in order to accommodate shaggy-dog stories.

T H E PARADOX JUNK FICTION
OF

1. In Thomas J. Roberts, An Aesthetics of Junk Fiction (Athens: University of Georgia Press,
1990).
2. John Cawelti, The Six-Gun Mystique (Bowling Green: Bowling Green University Popular
Press, 1971).
3. Here it is important to note that the paradox of junk fiction is not a creature of idle inven-
tion on my part.The quandary can frequently be heard with reference to this or that par-
ticular junk fiction genre at cocktail parties. Often, for example, people tell me that they see
no sense in reading horror novels because the stories are always the same. Similarly, defend-
ers of high culture often deride junk fiction by stigmatizing its formulaic nature.Thus, in
framing the paradox of junk fiction, I have not discovered a new problem, but rather merely
have sharpened up logically some criticisms of junk fiction that have been voiced for a long
time now both in common speech and by modernists.
4. Sigmund Freud,“The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming,” in Character and Culture, ed.
Philip Rieff (New York: Collier Books, 1963), pp. 39“40.
5. Ibid.
6. On slash lit, see Constance Penley, “Feminism, Psychoanalysis and the Study of Popular
Culture,” in Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler
(New York: Routledge, 1992).
7. Roberts, pp. 150“151.
8. For an analysis of North by Northwest in terms of the differential knowledge of characters
and audiences, see David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, Film Art: An Introduction (New
York: MacGraw Hill, 1993), pp. 75“79 and 370“75.
9. For an influential statement of this view, see Clement Greenberg, “Avant-garde and
Kitsch,” in Clement Greenberg:The Collected Essays and Criticism,Volume I: Perceptions and Judg-
ments, 1934“1944, ed. John O™Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1986).
10. For a theory of some of these processes with respect to film, see David Bordwell, Narration
and the Fiction Film (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).
11. John Fiske, Understanding Popular Culture (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 25. For further
objections to Fiske™s approach, see No«l Carroll, “The Nature of Mass Art,” In Philosophic
Exchange 23 (1992).

VISUAL M E TA P H O R
1. The notion of depiction here derives from Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the
Philosophy of Criticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1958), Chapter 6, section 16.
See also: Goran Hemeren, Representation and Meaning in the Visual Arts (Lund: Scandinavian
Books, 1969), especially Chapter 2.
438 NOTES
2. See Arthur Danto, “Description and the Phenomenology of Perception,” in Norman
Bryson, Michael AnnHolly and Keith Moxey (eds.), Visual Theory: Painting and Interpretation
(New York: Harper Collins, 1988), pp. 201“15.
3. This name for the phenomenon in question was suggested to me by Albert Rothenberg™s
notion of homospatial thinking. However, I use the idea of homospatiality far more nar-
rowly than does Rothenberg as will become apparent in this article. He applies the term to
music, literature, and all sorts of visual art, whereas I use the term to refer only to certain
forms of visual imagery. For Rothenberg™s wider conception, see Albert Rothenberg, The
Emerging Goddess:The Creative Process in Art, Science and Other Fields (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 268“328.
4. In Francoise Gilet and Carlton Lake, Life with Picasso (New York: Signet Books/ McGraw
Hill, 1964), pp. 296“97.
5. Though I agree that this issue would be an appropriate topic of discussion in another sort
of essay.
6. This illustration can be found in Claes Oldenburg, Notes in Hand (London: Petersburg
Press, 1972).
7. See II Kings 23:10 and Jeremiah 32:35.
8. The distinction between source domains and target domains derives from George Lakoff
and Mark Turner. See: George Lakoff and Mark Turner, More than Cool Reason (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 38.
9. See, for example, Hollis Frampton, Circles of Confusion (Rochester, N.Y.: Visual Studies
Workshop, 1983), pp. 166“67.
10. See the interpretation of this figure in Carl Linfert, Hieronymus Bosch (New York: Harry N.
Abrams, Inc., 1989), p. 74.
11. Obviously, the language here is adapted from Max Black™s classic article ˜Metaphor,™ from
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S. 55 (1954“55), pp. 273“94.
12. I have added the qualification “generally” since some commentators have claimed that
some metaphors are true. One example that has been proposed is “Business is business.”
Similarly, there may be borderline cases of visual metaphors in which the disparate elements
in question are not strictly physically incompossible. For instance, in Horatio Greenough™s
famous, patriotic statue George Washington, our first president is dressed in the garb of an
Olympian god. The statue invites the thought “George Washington is Zeus.” However,
strictly speaking, it is not impossible that Washington wears drapery, though it is impossible,
given the facts of his life, that Washington be an ancient anything. Physical noncompossi-
bility, it seems to me, tracks the core cases of visual metaphor, though in certain compelling
borderline cases, it may be that the incongruity involved falls short of physical noncompos-
sibility and depends on historical or social impossibility or even unlikelihood.
13. Such an attitude toward film images is often attributed to Siegfried Kracauer. See his Theory of
Film:The Redemption of Physical Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960). For discussions
of this position see: Calvin B. Pryluck,“The Film Metaphor Metaphor:The Use of Language-
Based Models in Film Study,” in Literature/Film Quarterly 3, no. 2 (Spring 1975); Pryluck, Sources
of Meaning in Motion Pictures and Television (New York:Arno Press, 1976); Louis Giannetti,“Cin-
ematic Metaphors,” in Journal of Aesthetic Education 6, no. 4 (October, 1972);Trevor Whittock,
Metaphor and Film (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Chapter I.
14. Clearly the case of Typewriter-pie also blocks the suspicion that all visual metaphors
merely illustrate commonplace, preexisting linguistic metaphors. For to my knowledge
there is no preexisting, commonplace verbal metaphor to the effect that “typewriters
are pies.”That is, whereas in certain anti-clerical circles “priests are pigs” may be a com-
monplace metaphor, ˜typewriters are pies™ is not a commonplace linguistic metaphor
among any group of English speakers. Moreover, the advent of Oldenburg™s sketch did
not make it a commonplace among any group of English speakers. Also, it is the case
that many of what I am calling visual metaphors do trade in commonplace metaphors.
In this respect some visual metaphors fall into the class that I have elsewhere called ver-
NOTES 439
bal images “ images that are predicated not only on commonplace metaphors, but also
on commonplace idioms, phrases, sayings and so on. The visual metaphors that rely on
homospatiality and that illustrate commonplace metaphors fall into the class of verbal
images. On the other hand, verbal images that illustrate commonplace metaphors but
which do not do it by means of homospatiality count only as verbal images and not as
visual metaphors. For an account of verbal images, see: Noel Carroll, ˜Language and
Cinema: Preliminary Notes for a Theory of Verbal Images™, in Millennium Film Journal,
nos. 7/8/9 (Fall/Winter, 1980“1981).
15. W. Bedell Stanford. Greek Metaphor (Oxford: Basil, Blackwell, 1936), p. 95.
16. See Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Metaphorical Twist,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 22, no. 3 (1962).
17. Moreover, I would want to reject the view that if an image “ verbal or visual “ only mobi-
lizes object comparisons, then it is not a genuine metaphor. Some metaphors may involve
more than object comparisons, but that does not compel us to consign those that only
evoke object comparisons to the status of the non-metaphorical.
18. See Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1981); and A. L. Cothey, The Nature of Art (New York: Routledge, 1990). See
also Carl R. Huasman, Metaphor and Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). In
a somewhat different vein, Michael Baxandall maintains that art criticism is fundamentally
metaphorical. See his “The Language of Art Criticism,” in The Language of Art History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
19. This objection, first and foremost, is aimed at Danto™s view of art as metaphor in his Trans-
figuration of the Commonplace.
20. This position is advanced in:Virgil Aldrich,“Visual Metaphor,” Journal of Aesthetic Education
2 (1968); and Virgil Aldrich,“Form in the Visual Arts,” British Journal of Aesthetics 11 (1971).
Aldrich™s position is somewhat difficult to follow. It has been usefully recounted by Carl
Hausman in his Metaphor and Art, pp. 149“50. I have benefited a great deal from Hausman™s
helpful synopsis.
21. The requirement here is that the physically noncompossible elements be literally co-present
in the same object. This precludes certain cases that people may be prone to call visual
metaphors. For example, in the film The Gold Rush, Charlie Chaplin as The Tramp treats the
nail of a boot as if it were a turkey-bone (specifically as if it were a wishbone). Due to Chap-
lin™s miming, on seeing Chaplin™s performance, one is inclined to entertain the thought that
the nail is a wishbone. However, since the nail elements and the wishbone elements are not
literally co-present in a single object, the image does not count as a visual metaphor.That is,
the wishbone is only a suggestion, conjured up by Chaplin™s gestures. No wishbone elements
are literally fused with nail elements. Nevertheless, there is a relation between Chaplin™s mim-
ing and what I call visual metaphors. In both cases, two or more objects are “superimposed;”
but in visual metaphor, the fusion is literal, whereas in the Chaplin case it is not. Rather,
Chaplin™s miming induces the audience to use their imaginations in order to grasp the super-
imposition.The audience imagines the coincidence of the nail and the wishbone rather than
seeing elements that are literally co-present in the object. Due to this difference, I am disposed
to categorize the Chaplin case, as well as comparable exercises in pantomime, as an instance of
mimed metaphor, rather than visual metaphor. For a discussion of mimed metaphor, see Noel
Carroll,“Notes on the Sight Gag,” in Andrew S. Horton (ed.), comedy/cinema/ theory (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1991).
22. It should be noted that this condition entails that nonobjective art is not metaphorical.
For insofar as the art in question is nonobjective, it is not perceptually recognizable.This
may seem problematic to some since often critics let on that this or that piece of
nonobjective are is a metaphor for something or other. But I think that there is a prob-
lem here. If a painting is truly nonobjective, then it would appear to me that we have no
way of divining the relevant categories whose interplay yields metaphorical insight.
Nonobjective paintings can certainly be expressive, they can be moving, they can sym-
440 NOTES
bolize things in a noniconic way. But if they are not perceptually recognizable wholes
and if they have no perceptually recognizable parts, it is difficult to see how they can
enlist metaphorical thinking.
23. The creature in the movie Alien would appear to be an example of this sort.
24. Ina Loewenberg, “Identifying Metaphors,” in Mark Johnson (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives
on Metaphor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 175“76. This entire
section of this paper has been heavily influenced by Loewenberg™s article.
25. This, of course, is a general principle of communication. See, for example, Edward H. Ben-
dix,“The Data of Semantic Description,” in D. Steinberg and L. Jokobovits (eds.), Semantics:
An Interdisciplinary Reader (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
26. Lakoff and Turner, More Than Cool Reason, p. 63.
27. Donald Davidson,“What Metaphors Mean,” in Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, p. 217.
28. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, translated by J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Pub-
lishing Company, 1972), p. 158.
29. Robert Fogelin, Figuratively Speaking (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 52“67.
30. It may be the case that some of Arcimboldo™s fantastic images are to be deciphered as allegories.
However, in the case of The Librarian, it seems more accurate to regard it as a representation of
a librarian cleverly composed out of books rather than as a visual metaphor. Similarly, though
perhaps controversially, I am inclined to regard Picasso™s Bull™s Head as a representation of a bull™s
head, cleverly composed out of a bicycle, rather than as a metaphor.

O N B E I N G M OV E D B Y NATURE : BET W E E N RELIGION
A N D NATURAL HISTORY

1. R.W. Hepburn,“Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty,” in his Won-
der and Other Essays (Edinburgh University Press, 1984). This essay appeared earlier in
British Analytical Philosophy, eds. B. Williams and A. Montefiore (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1966).
2. See especially:Allen Carlson,“Appreciation and the Natural Environment,” in the Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 37 (spring, 1979); “Formal Qualities in the Natural Environ-
ment,” Journal of Aesthetic Education 13 (July, 1979);“Nature,Aesthetic Judgment and Objec-
tivity,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 40 (autumn, 1981); “Saito on the Correct
Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature,” Journal of Aesthetic Education 20 (summer, 1986); “On
Appreciating Agricultural Landscapes,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (spring, 1985);
“Appreciating Art and Appreciating Nature,” in this volume; Barry Sadler and Allen Carl-
son,“Environmental Aesthetics in Interdisciplinary Perspective,” in Environmental Aesthetics:
Essays in Interpretation, eds. Barry Sadler and Allen Carlson (Victoria, British Columbia:
University of Victoria, 1982); and Allen Carlson and Barry Sadler, “Towards Models of
Environmental Appreciation,” in Environmental Aesthetics.
3. See Carlson,“Appreciating Agricultural Landscapes.”
4. Carlson, “Appreciating Art,” Landscape, natural beauty and the arts (Cambridge University
Press, 1993).
5. Carlson,“Appreciation and the Natural Environment,” p. 274.
6. Carlson,“Nature,Aesthetic Judgment,” p. 25.
7. See, for example,William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge University Press, 1980), especially ch. 4.
8. T. J. Diffey, “Natural Beauty without Metaphysics,” in Landscape, natural beauty and the arts
(Cambridge University Press, 1993).
9. Ibid.
10. Carlson,“Appreciation and the Natural Environment,” p. 276.

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