. 48
( 115 .)


destruction of the Stalinist empire. Typically, during the ¬rst year of the war in
the East, Germans shot Russian and Jewish hostages in retaliation for partisan
attacks on German soldiers, but not Ukrainians.139

Walter Kempowski, Das Echolot: Barbarossa ˜41: Ein kollektives Tagebuch (Munich: Knaus,

2002), 216; Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment
in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 96“
9; Bogdan Musial, “Konterrevolutionare Elemente sind zu erschießen”: Die Brutalisierung
des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941 (Berlin: Propylaen, 2000), 172“99, 249“
55; Frank Golczewski, “Die Ukraine im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Geschichte der Ukraine, ed.
Frank Golszewski (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 246“52.
Weiner, 156“7; Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front, 270“9; Martin Dean, Collaboration in the

Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941“1944 (New York:
St. Martin™s Press, 2000), 21; Robert G. Waite, “Kollaboration und deutsche Besatzungspoli-
tik in Lettland 1941 bis 1945,” in Okkupation und Kollaboration (1938“1945): Beitrage
zu Konzepten und Praxis der Kollaboration in der deutschen Okkupationspolitik, ed. Werner
Rohr (Berlin: Huthig, 1994), 217“37; Tanja Penter, “Die lokale Gesellschaft im Donbass unter
¨ ¨
The Quest for Order and the Pursuit of Terror 221

The German occupation regime was not only excessively terroristic; it also
exacerbated existing interethnic tensions within occupied territories. Ukrainian
partisans of the nationalistic OUN, the Polish Armia Krajowa, the Latvian and
Lithuanian resistance movements, and Soviet partisans not only fought the
German occupation; they fought each other. During the spring of 1944, the
Polish Armia Krajowa in Volhynia destroyed a dozen Ukrainian villages and
killed more than 1,000 Ukrainians “ allegedly as a result of combat opera-
tions. It is estimated that between 1942 and 1944 100,000 Poles and 20,000
Ukrainians in the region were killed as a result of interethnic con¬‚ict.140 In the
Ukraine, violence against Jews continued even after German armies evacuated
the region. Indeed, interethnic violence raged in the Ukraine, Eastern Poland,
and the Baltic republics into the late 1940s.141
In this war, the concept of a person™s social identity lost all meaning. All that
mattered were “race” and “ethnicity.” And because people came to identify
themselves and others in categories provided by the German occupiers, Bol-
shevik leaders identi¬ed German-occupied territories as arenas of interethnic
con¬‚ict. Thus, when the Red Army brie¬‚y occupied the city Rostov in Decem-
ber 1941, the NKVD arrested all ethnic Germans and Armenians, and when
the Wehrmacht reoccupied the city in early 1942, SS-Einsatzgruppen murdered
all remaining Jews.142
The Bolsheviks conducted war not only against an external enemy, but
against internal enemies, as well: deserters, collaborators, nationalist partisans,
and hostile nationalities, all of whom allegedly cooperated with the Germans
in the destruction of the Soviet Union. In this war, essentialist nationalism
triumphed over the social revolution that legitimated the Bolsheviks.

deutscher Okkupation 1941“1943,” in Kooperation und Verbrechen: Formen der “Kollabo-
ration” im ostlichen Europa 1939“1945, eds. Christoph Dieckmann, Babette Quinkert, and
Tatjana Tonsmeyer (Gottingen: Wallstein, 2003), 201; Golczewski, Die Ukraine, 251“60; Carl
¨ ¨
¨ ¨
Schuddekopf, Krieg: Erzahlungen aus dem Schweigen: Deutsche Soldaten uber den Zweiten
Weltkrieg (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1997), 232; Dieter Pohl, “Russian, Ukrainians,
and German Occupational Policy, 1941“43,” in Kappeler, Culture, Nation and Identity, 277“
97. On the reversal of hierarchies, see Petersen, 135.
Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front; Waldemar Bednarski, “Das Gesicht des Krieges in der Gemeinde

Kotlice (Kreis Zamosc) 1939“1945,” in Chiari, Die polnische Heimatarmee, 421“3; Frank Gol-
czewski, “Die Heimatarmee und die Juden,” in Chiari, Die polnische Heimatarmee, 635“76;
Piotr Niwinski, “Die nationale Frage im Wilnagebiet,” in Chiari, Die polnische Heimatarmee,
617“64; Grzegorz Motyka, “Der polnisch-ukrainische Gegensatz in Wolhynien und Ostgal-
izien,” in Chiari, Die polnische Heimatarmee, 531“47; Oleg A. Zarubinsky, “The ˜Red™ Par-
tisan Movement in Ukraine during World War II. A Contemporary Assessment,” Journal of
Slavic Military Studies 9 (1996): 399“416.
RGASPI, Fond 82, opis™ 897, ll 106“23, 135“9, 143“5; E. Laasi, “Der Untergrundkrieg in Est-

land, 1945“1953,” in Auch wir sind Europa: zur jungeren Geschichte und aktuellen Entwick-
lung des Baltikums: baltische Pressestimmen und Dokumente, ed. Ruth Kibelka (Berlin:
Aufbau-Verlag, 1991), 70“82.
Andrej Angrick, Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord: Die Einsatzgruppe D in der sudlichen

Sowjetunion 1941“1943 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003), 640“1.
Jorg Baberowski and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel

As soon as German troops had invaded the Soviet Union, Bolshevik leaders
took revenge on Germans residing there. In late summer 1941, the Republic
of Volga Germans was dissolved. All Germans living in the republic were reg-
istered and, shortly thereafter, deported to Kazakhstan. The Supreme Soviet™s
decree legitimizing this act spoke of the need to eliminate “saboteurs and spies”
before they had the opportunity to collaborate with the invading Germans.
Between November 1943 and December 1944, when the German Wehrmacht
no longer posed a signi¬cant threat to the region, Stalin and Beria deported
the Crimean Tatars and the various nationalities of the Caucasus “ Chechens,
Ingush, Karachai, Balkars, Kalmyks, and Meskhetians “ to Central Asia. Those
Finns and Germans remaining in Leningrad “ 60,000 people “ were similarly
arrested and deported to Central Asia in the spring and summer of 1942. In the
second half of 1944, additional “suspicious” nations were deported: Greeks,
Bulgarians, and Armenians from the Crimea; Turkish Meskhetians and Kurds
from the Caucasus. More than 3 million people were evicted from their home-
lands in this manner, among them more than 1 million Germans and 470,000
Chechens and Ingush.143 For the Bolsheviks, these deportations were not a side
issue. Indeed, it appears that the resettlement of ethnicities was more important
than victory in battle. After all, how is one to explain why the regime diverted
10,000 trucks and wagons, 100,000 NKVD soldiers, and three entire armies
into the Caucasus when they were desperately needed at the front?144
Molotov admitted years later, in an interview with the journalist Feliks
Chuev, that he and Stalin were not concerned with individual guilt or responsi-
bility of the deported. People who belonged to an enemy nation, he maintained,
represented a potential danger to the Soviet order. As such, they had to be
deported. “During the war, we were confronted with mass treason. Battalions

Jorg Ganzenmuller, “Das belagerte Leningrad 1941“1944: Eine Großstadt in den Strategien
¨ ¨

der Angreifer und der Angegriffenen” (Diss. Universitat Freiburg 2003), 289“300; Viktor N.
Zemskov, “Zakliuchennye, spetsposelentsy, ssyl™noposelentsy, ssyl™nye i vyslannye: Statistiko-
geogra¬cheskii aspekt,” Istoriia SSSR 5 (1991): 151“65, esp. 162; Naimark, 85“107; Weitz,
A Century of Genocide, 79“82; Benjamin Pinkus, “Die Deportation der deutschen Minderheit
in der Sowjetunion 1941“1945,” in Zwei Wege nach Moskau: Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt bis zum
“Unternehmen Barbarossa,” ed. Bernd Wegner (Munich: Piper, 1991), 464“79; Nikolai F.
Bugai, “K voprosu o deportatsii narody SSSR v 30“40-kh godakh,” Istoriia SSSR 6 (1989):
135“44; Nikolai F. Bugai and Askarbi M. Gonov, Kavkaz: narody v eshelonakh: 20“60-gody
(Moscow: INSAN, 1998), 118“222; Nakazannyi narod: Repressii protiv rossiiskikh nemtsev
(Moscow: Zven™ja, 1999); Aleksander M. Nekrich, Punished Peoples: The Deportation and
Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War (New York: Norton, 1978); Vera
Tolz, “New Information about the Deportation of Ethnic Groups in the USSR during World
War 2,” in World War 2 and the Soviet People, eds. John Garrard and Carol Garrard (New
York: St. Martin™s Press, 1993), 161“79; “˜Pogruzheny v eshelony i otpravleny k mestam
poeselenii . . . ™ L. Beriia “ I. Stalinu,” Istoriia SSSR 1 (1991): 143“60; Nikolai F. Bugai, L.
Beriia “ I. Stalinu: “Soglasno vashemu ukazaniiu . . . ” (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1995), 104“5,
128; Robert Conquest, Stalins Volkermord: Wolgadeutsche, Krimtataren, Kaukasier (Vienna:
Europa-Verlag, 1970).
Nekrich, 108“9; Nikolai F. Bugai, Iosif Stalin “ Lavrentiiu Berii: “ikh nado deportirovat™™:

Dokumenty, fakty, kommentarii (Moscow: Druzba narodov, 1992), 106.
The Quest for Order and the Pursuit of Terror 223

of Caucasians stood opposite us on the front lines; they were in our rear. Of
course, innocents suffered, as well. But I think that the right thing was done at
the time.”145 Molotov merely expressed what the Bolshevik leadership believed:
namely, that the enemy surrounded them. Germans and Crimean Tatars were
enemies that had to be rid from the world: the former because they belonged to
the aggressor nation, the latter because many of them had served the German
occupiers. Chechens, Ingush, and Balkars represented armed thieves and ene-
mies of the kolkhoz order. From the 1920s, the regime continually waged war
against rebellious populations in the Caucasus.146 With the German invasion
of the Soviet Union, the hour of revenge had struck for the potential enemies
of Soviet power. An investigative commission of the NKVD, which traveled
to the region in October 1943, determined that Chechens and Ingush were
religious fanatics and bandits, a constant threat to Soviet order. Accordingly,
Beria hammered this message into his minions in charge of the February 1944
deportations from the Caucasus: “Not a single one is to escape.”147
Deportations of Chechens and Ingush began on 23 February 1944. Already
on 29 February, Stalin received from Beria, on location in the Caucasus, the
¬nal report: 478,479 people had been “loaded onto railway wagons,” 91,250
Ingush and 387,229 Chechens.148 For victims, the action came as a surprise.
Only a few weeks prior to the action, units of the Red Army and the NKVD were
moved into the region. Not even the soldiers knew the purpose of their deploy-
ment to the Caucasus. The night before the deportations began, Beria informed
the local head of government, Mollaev, what the next days would entail. Mol-
laev “broke into tears,” Beria told Stalin. He then “pulled himself together”
and executed all orders without any resistance. Beria then called together
local Party members, Muslim notables, and Su¬ sheiks and forced them,
under the threat of violence, to cooperate with the NKVD. They were to ensure
that deportations, beginning during the night of 22 February, ran smoothly.
Nothing remained to chance. Tanks blocked side streets; soldiers occupied
Chechen and Ingush villages. Before villagers were loaded onto trucks and
driven to railway stations, Mullahs and local Communists disclosed to them
the contents of Stalin™s deportation order. And, with the ¬nal train, the mullahs
and local Communists joined their compatriots in exile.149
Evidently there was only limited resistance to these deportations; where
resistance did emerge, Beria™s henchmen executed those responsible. In one
village, the entire population “ more than seven hundred, in total “ was locked
in a barn and burned alive. Of course, such events were not mentioned in Beria™s

Feliks I. Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 277. In the 1960s,

Kaganovich also expressed this view: S. Parfenov, “˜Zheleznyi Lazar™: Konets kar™ery,” Rodina,
no. 2 (1990): 74.
“Vtoroe pokorenie Kavkaza: bol™sheviki i chechenskie povstantsy,” Rodina, no. 6 (1995):

43“8; Dunlop, 44“58; Avtorkhanov, “Chechens and Ingush,” 156“83; Nekrich, 43“50.
GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 64, l. 161; Dunlop, 62.

GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 64, l. 161.

GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 64, l. 166; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 183, l. 41.
Jorg Baberowski and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel

report to Stalin. He telegraphed Moscow indicating that the deportations went
as “normal,” that resistance was nicked in the bud, and that more than 20,000
weapons were con¬scated.150
Nobody stayed behind; not even the local Communists were able to avoid
the terror. Absolutely nothing remained that alluded to those exiled. The
autonomous republics of the Chechens and Ingush disappeared just as the
republics of the Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans had. Russian immigrants
moved into the homes of those deported; villages and settlements received
Slavic names; Chechen signs were replaced with Russian signs. Stalin himself
gave the order to destroy places of worship, monuments, and cemeteries that
were reminders of the exiled. It appeared as if the Chechens, the Crimean
Tatars, and Germans had never lived in their own homeland. The regime eter-
nalized this stigmatization at the end of the 1940s when it decreed that the
exiled were never to return to their former homeland. Germans, Chechens, and
Crimean Tatars carried the mark of Cain; they were second-class humans and
remained so for decades.151
Nearly a quarter of all Chechens and Ingush died between 1944 and 1948.
Many of the young and the old froze to death during the trek into exile. In
Kazakhstan, thousands more succumbed to hunger, cold, and typhus. Once at
their ¬nal destination, there was neither housing nor care for those deported;
the impoverished local population refused to include Chechens in their kolkhoz.
In December 1944, the Director of the “Cherepovetsles” Trust, Ol™khovnikov,
reported that exiled Chechens were not able to take on their forced labor
duties. Without clothing and shoes, without suf¬cient nourishment, they were
dying like ¬‚ies. Whoever survived was too weak to work.152 The fact that
the Soviets were never able to overcome the refractoriness of the deported
illustrates the absurdity of Soviet resettlement schemes. Already in July 1944,
Beria reported to Stalin that unrest had broken out among Chechen “special
settlers” in Kazakhstan. To bring “saboteurs, shirkers, and malingerers” to
account, NKVD units were sent to the region and more than 2,000 “bandit
elements” and thieves were arrested.153
The Bolsheviks raised xenophobia to the level of state ideology; they contam-
inated their own multinational empire with a poisonous hatred of foreigners
and otherness. And, for this reason, ethnic cleansing did not stop with the end

GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 64, l. 161; “Krovavyi pepel Khaibakha,” in Tak eto bylo: Nat-

sional™nye repressii v SSSR 1919“1952 gody, vol. 2, ed. Svetlana Alieva (Moscow: Insan,
1993), 170“9; Naimark, 96“7.
Bugai, “K voprosu o deportatsii,” 135“44; Dunlop, 73“4; Naimark, 98“99; Wolfgang Leon-

hard, Die Revolution entlaßt ihre Kinder, 3rd ed. (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1981),
GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 177, ll. 1“6; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 153, ll. 42“3; Dunlop, 70“1;

Naimark, 97; Tolz, 165“9; Nekrich, 124“6; Viktor N. Zemskov, “Spetsposelentsy (po doku-
mentatsii NKVD-MVD SSSR),” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia 11 (1990), 3“17; Zemskov,
“Zakliuchennye,” 151“65.
GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 65, ll. 311“14.
The Quest for Order and the Pursuit of Terror 225

of the Second World War. Interethnic wars raged in the Ukraine until the late
1940s: the Bolshevik regime incited an unprecedented hate campaign against
Germans and Ukrainians. In nearly all regions Ukrainians were removed from
leading state and Party apparatuses and replaced with Russians from the cen-
tral government. More than 150,000 Ukrainian rebels were killed; thousands of


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