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BIOVIOLENCE: PREVENTING BIOLOGICAL TERROR
AND CRIME

Bioviolence is the hostile in¬‚iction of disease. Terrorists or criminals could
use disease to cause catastrophic consequences and panic, making everyone
vulnerable. Too little is being done to prevent bioviolence, and accelerating
advances of bioscience open new threat potential. While bio-offenders are
becoming more focused and organized, prevention policies are vague, gap-
ridden, and unsupervised. No other threat presents such severe danger yet
such a failure of leadership to reduce risks. This book explores how global gov-
ernance should evolve to address bioviolence challenges. Law enforcers, sci-
entists, and public health of¬cials should coordinate their prevention efforts.
Nations and international organizations, especially the United Nations, need
to cooperatively improve humanity™s security. Altogether, the strategy for pre-
venting bioviolence requires a global covenant to promote bioscience while
understanding its inherent and unavoidable dangers.

Barry Kellman is professor of international law and Director of the Interna-
tional Weapons Control Center at DePaul University College of Law. He is Spe-
cial Advisor to the Interpol Program on Prevention of Bio-Crimes and senior
chair of the American Bar Association Committee on International Law and
Security. Professor Kellman served on the National Academies of Sciences
Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive
Application of Biotechnology (2003). He was Legal Advisor to the National
Commission on Terrorism and was later commissioned by the Memorial Insti-
tute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) to draft Managing Terrorism™s Con-
sequences, which reviews legal authorities for responding to terrorism in the
United States. He has published widely on weapons proliferation and smug-
gling, the laws of armed con¬‚ict, Middle East arms control, and nuclear non-
proliferation.
BIOVIOLENCE
Preventing Biological Terror
and Crime

BARRY KELLMAN
DePaul University College of Law
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521883252

© Barry Kellman 2007


This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of
relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place
without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published in print format 2007

eBook (EBL)
ISBN-13 978-0-511-34163-2
ISBN-10 0-511-34163-6 eBook (EBL)
hardback
ISBN-13 978-0-521-88325-2
hardback
ISBN-10 0-521-88325-3

paperback
ISBN-13 978-0-521-70969-9
paperback
ISBN-10 0-521-70969-5

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls
for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
For



Aly, Bobby, and Shannon
and Theirs and Theirs and Theirs




May This Book™s Fears Prove Illusory
Contents




Prologue page xiii
Foreword, by Ronald K. Noble, Interpol Secretary General xvii
Acknowledgments xxvii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Bioviolence Policy Failure 2
Thematic Foundations 3
Three Crossroads 3
Law for Humanity 4
Terminology 5
Presentation of the Argument 7

PART I. THE BIOVIOLENCE CONDITION AND HOW IT
CAME TO BE

1 Why Worry? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Why Bioviolence Is Different 11
Delayed Anonymity 12
Concealable Devastation 15
Contagious Panic!!! 17
Evaluating Risks 18

2 Methods of Bioviolence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Interwoven Choices 21
Smallpox 24
Eradication? 24
The Challenge: Getting the Virus 25

vii
viii CONTENTS

In¬‚uenza and Hemorrhagic Fevers 28
Influenza 28
Reasons for Concern 28
Limits of Protection 29
Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses 31
Acquiring the Agent: Initiating the Attack 31
Disseminating the Virus 32
Anthrax 33
Getting and Cultivating Seed Stock 35
Disseminating the Agent 36
Botulinum in Food 38
Agroviolence 40
Motivations and Feasibility 41
Attacks of Grave Concern 42
Livestock Diseases 42
Crop Diseases 43
International Prevention Systems 44
Agents Historically Used as Bioweapons 45
Plague 45
Tularemia 46
Q Fever 47
Ricin 47
Emerging Micro-Sciences and Bioviolence 47
Molecular Biology™s Emerging Risk 49
Modi¬cation of Weapons Agents 49
Improving Target Speci¬city 51
Synthetic Genomics 51
Re-Creation of Diseases 51
Synthetic Viruses 52
RNA Inhibitors and Bioregulators 52
Nanotechnologies 53

3 Who Did Bioviolence? Who Wants to Do It? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
The Biological Weapons Experience 55
The Road to Geneva 56
Mid-20th -Century Bioweapons Programs 56
Unit 731 57
The U.S. Offensive Bioweapons Program 57
The Soviet Biological Weapons Program 59
Iraq™s Biological Weapons Program 61
ix
CONTENTS

South Africa™s Project Coast 63
Egypt 64
Israel 65
Current (Alleged) State Biological Weapons Programs 66
Questions about Military Efficacy 67
Suspected State Bioweapons Programs 68
North Korea 69
Iran 70
Syria 71
Terrorist and Fanatic Interest in Bioviolence 71
Islamic Fundamentalist Interest in Bioviolence 72
Al Qaeda™s Intentions 73
Religious and “Legal” Justi¬cation 74
Acquisition of Agents and Expertise 77
Production 78
Concluding Observations 82

PART II. THE GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING
BIOVIOLENCE

4 Strategic Foundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
The Indictment 88
Obstacles to Policy Progress 92
Bioviolence Is a Crime! 94
Overview of the Prevention Strategy 95
Complication 96
Resistance 96
Preparedness 97
Nonproliferation 98
Guiding Principles 98

5 Complication: What Law Enforcers Should Stop . . . . . . . . . 101
Irresponsible Gaps 102
The Logic of Complication 103
Denial + Interdiction 104
Bioscience™s Anxieties 105
Registration and Census 108
Denial Tactics 109
Denying Access to Pathogens 109
Pathogen Census 111
x CONTENTS

Pathogen Marking 111
Denying Access to Laboratories 112
Denying Access to Equipment 114
Interdiction 116
Legislating the Crime 117
The Dilemma of Pre-Attack Interdiction 118
Clues of Bioviolence 119
Pattern Recognition 121
Transport Security and Counter-Smuggling 124
Packaging and Labeling 126
Shipping Security 127
Intrusive Counter-Smuggling 129

6 Improving Resistance through Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Dual-Implication Research 133
The Challenge of Overseeing Bioresearch 134
Constraining Science? 137
Virtues and Limitations of Codes of Ethics and
Self-Regulation 139
The Need for Translucency 142
Bioscientists as the First Line of Defense 144
Bioresearch Education and Training 144
Professional Certi¬cation 145
Whistleblowers 146
Development of Vaccines and Medicines 147
Financial Barriers 149
Liability Barriers 152
Patent Barriers 155

7 Public Health Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Preparedness vs. Complication “ The False Debate 161
Hardening Targets 164
Protecting Air Circulation Systems 165
Protecting Water Supplies 165
Sensors 166
Response Interventions 168
Detecting and Analyzing a Bioviolence Attack 169
Law Enforcement “ Public Health Cooperation 171
Biosurveillance 171
Microbial Forensics 172
xi
CONTENTS

Containing Contagion 173
Compulsory Vaccination for First Responders 175
Placement of Victims 178
Stockpiling and Distribution of Medical Resources 179
Compulsory Medical Interventions 181
Maintaining Public Confidence 184
Quarantines 185
Considerations of a Quarantine™s Efficacy 186
Quarantines and the World Health Organization™s
Authority 188

8 International Nonproliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
De¬ning Biological Weapons 196
The General Purpose Criterion 196
“Nonlethal” Bioagents 197
Arguments For and Against Nonlethal Bioagents 198
Types of NLBAs 200
U.S. Military Nonlethal Programs 202
Implications for the Biological Weapons Convention 204
Compliance, Veri¬cation, and Con¬dence Building 205
The Biodefense Dilemma 207
The Problem of Secrecy Reprised 209
Biodefense Projects of Concern 211

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