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36. Roman Biek et al., Recent Common Ancestry of Ebola Zaire Virus Found in a Bat
Reservoir, PLoS Pathogens, Vol. 2, No. 10, p. 885 (October, 2006).
37. Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses as Biological Weapons: Medical and Public Health Man-
agement, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 287, No. 18 (May 8,
2002).
38. Marburg Haemorrhagic Fever: Fact Sheet, World Health Organization
(March, 2005), available at www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs marburg/en/
print.html.
39. In a reported case of Bolivian hemorrhagic fever, where students observing a nurse
instructor changing bed sheets of an infected individual contracted the disease
even though the students did not physically touch the person or any contaminated
object and stood at a distance of 6 feet or greater from the patient at all times.
See Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses as Biological Weapons: Medical and Public Health
Management, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 287, No. 18
(May 8, 2002).
40. Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism, National Academies Press, p. 67 (2002).
41. See Henry S. Heine et al., Determination of Antibiotic Efficacy Against Bacillus
Anthracis in a Mouse Aerosol Challenge Model, Report prepared for the United States
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Division of Bacteriology,
Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy, doi:10.1128/AAC.01050-06 (2007).
42. Anthrax as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management, Journal
of the American Medical Association, Vol. 281, No. 18 (May 12, 1999).
43. Anthrax as a Biological Weapon, 2002: Updated Recommendations for Manage-
ment, The Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 287, No.17, p. 2237
(May 2002); See also, Rick Weiss, A Terrorist™s Fragile Footprint; Letter™s Anthrax
Spores Pose Many Obstacles to Analysis, Washington Post (November 29, 2001);
See also, Gary Matsumoto, Anthrax Powder “ State of the Art? Science, Vol. 302,
No. 5650 (November 28, 2003) available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/
summary/302/5650/1492.
44. Statement of Dr. Kenneth Alibek, Russia, Iraq, and Other Potential Sources of Anthrax,
Smallpox, and other Bioterrorist Weapons, Hearing before the Committee on Inter-
national Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 1st Session, p. 34
(December 5, 2001), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/
hfa76481.000/hfa76481 0.HTM.
45. Statement of Dr. Kenneth Alibek, Russia, Iraq, and Other Potential Sources of
Anthrax, Smallpox, and Other Bioterrorist Weapons, Hearing before the Committee
on International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 1st Session,
p. 34 (December 5, 2001), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/
intlrel/hfa76481.000/hfa76481 0.HTM.
46. Steven Malloy, “The Threat of Anthrax Has Been Exaggerated,” cited in, William
Dudley (ed.), Biological Warfare: Opposing Viewpoints, Greenhaven Press (2004).
251
NOTES TO PAGES 36“40

47. See generally, Malcolm Dando, The Impact of the Development of Modern Biology and
Medicine on the Evolution of Offensive Biological Warfare Programs in the Twentieth
Century, Defense Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 43“62 (1999).
48. See Douglas Beecher, Forensic Application of Microbiological Culture Analysis to
Identify Mail Intentionally Contaminated with Bacillus Anthracis Spores, Applied
and Environmental Microbiology, Vol. 72, No. 8 (August 2006).
49. See Statement of Dr. George Painter, Chief Executive Of¬cer Chimerix, Inc.,
Biodefense: Next Steps, before the Senate Committee on Health Education, Labor and
Pensions (February 8, 2005); See also, Lawrence O. Gostin, When Terrorism Threat-
ens Health: How Far Are Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?
Vol. 55, Fla. L. Rev. 1105 (December, 2003).
50. See Sharon Begley, Unmasking Bioterror, Newsweek (October 8, 2001), describing
efforts by the DoE to install biodetectors in stadiums and other large areas in order
to reduce the threat posed by possible bioterror attacks at these venues.
51. See IAS Dust Collectors website describing negative air pressure technology:
“With negative pressure systems, airborne bacteria, viruses, and mould spores are
con¬ned by air¬‚ow patterns that circulate into and not out of these restricted
areas.” See the IAS Dust Collectors website available at http://www.mist-dust-
collection.com/Cleanroom-Filtration/negative-pressure-systems.html.
52. See Penny Hitchcock, Improving Performance of HVAC Systems to Reduce Expo-
sure to Aerosolized Infectious Agents in Buildings; Recommendations to Reduce Risks
Posed by Biological Agents, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy,
Practice, and Science, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2006).
53. Scott Shane, Clean up of Anthrax Will Cost Hundreds of Millions of Dollars, Baltimore
Sun, December 18, 2002. The Postal Service says decontaminating Brentwood and
another sorting center in Hamilton Township, N. J., will cost “in excess of $100
million.” The bill for decontaminating the Hart Senate Of¬ce Building and other
Capitol Hill of¬ces cost the EPA and its contractors about $42 million, according
to ¬gures provided by the EPA to Iowa Republican Sen. Charles E. Grassley. Many
millions more have been spent testing and cleaning other government and postal
buildings.
54. Botulinum Toxin as a Biological Weapon, Medical and Public Health Management,
Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 285, No. 8 (February 28, 2001).
55. Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities on the Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders, Senate Report No. 94“465, 94th Congress, 1st Session, p. 80 (November 20,
1975).
56. Botulinum Toxin as a Biological Weapon, Medical and Public Health Management,
Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 285, No. 8 (February 28, 2001).
57. Botulinum Toxin as a Biological Weapon, Medical and Public Health Management,
Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 285, No. 8 (February 28, 2001).
58. Lawrence M. Wein & Yifan Liu, Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply:
The Case of Botulinum Toxin in Milk, Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 102, p. 9984 (July 12, 2005).
59. J. Kaiser, ScienceScope, Science, Vol. 309, p. 31 (July 1, 2005); See also, Alison McCook,
PNAS Publishes Bioterror Paper, After All, The Scientist (June 29, 2005).
60. Mad Cow Watch Goes Blind, USA Today (August 4, 2006), available at http://www.
commondreams.org/views06/0804-24.htm.
252 NOTES TO PAGES 41“47

61. Mark Wheelis, Rocco Casagrande, & Laurence V. Madden, Biological Attack on
Agriculture: Low-Tech, High-Impact Bioterrorism, Bioscience, Vol. 52, No. 7, pp. 569“
576 (July 2002).
62. Mark Wheelis, Rocco Casagrande, & Laurence V. Madden, Biological Attack on
Agriculture: Low-Tech, High-Impact Bioterrorism, Bioscience, Vol. 52, No. 7, pp. 569“
576 (July 2002).
63. For a comprehensive list of animal diseases, see the World Organization for
Animal Health (OIE) website, available at http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/en
classi¬cation.htm?e1d7.
64. Mark Wheelis, Rocco Casagrande, & Laurence V. Madden, Biological Attack on
Agriculture: Low-Tech, High-Impact Bioterrorism, bioscience, Vol. 52, No. 7, pp. 569“
576 (July 2002).
65. Michael Gips, The First Link in the Food Chain, Security Management Online
(February 2003), available at http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/
001379.html.
66. David A. Ashford et al., Biological Terrorism and Veterinary Medicine in the U.S,
Journal for the American Veterinary Association,Vol. 217, No. 5, pp. 664“667
(September 1, 2000).
67. See Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition,
and Forester (Wednesday, July 20, 2005).
68. Michael Balter, Prions: A Lone Killer or a Vital Accomplice? Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease;
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, Science,Vol. 286, p. 660 (October 22, 1999).
69. International Plant Protection Convention, TIAS 7465, (December 6, 1951), (entered
into force April 3, 1952).
70. Animal Health at the Crossroads: Preventing, Detecting, and Diagnosing Animal
Diseases, Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources, The National Academies
Press, p. 256 (2005), citing Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism, NRC Report
(2003).
71. Plague as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management: Consensus
Statement, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 283, No. 17, p. 2282
(May 3, 2002).
72. Plague as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management: Consensus
Statement, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 283, No. 17, p. 2282
(May 3, 2002).
73. Plague as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management: Consensus
Statement, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 283, No. 17, p. 2281
(May 3, 2002).
74. Tularemia as a Biological Weapon, Medical and Public Health Management, Con-
sensus Statement, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 285, No. 1,
p. 2766 (June 6, 2001).
75. Tularemia as a Biological Weapon, Medical and Public Health Management, Con-
sensus Statement, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 285, No. 1,
p. 2764 (June 6, 2001).
76. Coxiella Burnetii, Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, available at http://www.
enh.org/healthandwellness/bioterrorism/bi001000.aspx?lid=1093.
77. Q Fever Caused by Coxiella Burnetii, The Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, available at www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/qfever/index.htm.
78. Ricin and the Umbrella Murder, CNN.com (October 23, 2003), available at www.
cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/01/07/terror.poison.bulgarian; See also, Nick P .
253
NOTES TO PAGES 47“53

Walsh, Markov™s Umbrella Assassination Revealed, Guardian (June 6, 2005), avail-
able at www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,5208940-103681,00.html.
79. Jeronimo Cello, Aniko V. Paul, & Eckhard Wimmer, Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus
cDNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template, Science,
pp. 1016“1018 (August 9, 2002); See also, Rick Weiss, Polio-Causing Virus Created in
N.Y. Lab: Made-from-Scratch Pathogen Prompts Concerns about Bioethics, Terror-
ism, Washington Post (July 12, 2002).
80. The National Academies of Science have just recently addressed this very topic. See
Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, Committee on
Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their Application to Next Genera-
tion Biowarfare Threats, National Research Council of the National Academies
(2006), Executive Summary available at http://books.nap.edu/execsumm pdf/
11567.pdf.
81. Malcolm Dando, The Impact of Modern Biology and Medicine on the Evolution of
Offensive Biological Warfare Programs in the Twentieth Century, Defense Analysis,
Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 43“62 (1999); Brian Rappert, Biological Weapons, Genetics, and
Social Analysis: Emerging Responses, Emerging Issues, New Genetics and Society,
Vol. 22, No. 2 (August 2003).
82. Malcolm Dando, The Impact of the Development of Modern Biology and Medicine
on the Evolution of Offensive Biological Warfare Programs in the Twentieth Century,
Defense Analysis,Vol. 13, No. 3 (1999).
83. Emerging Technologies: Genetic Engineering and Biological Weapons, The Sunshine
Project, Background Paper, No. 12 (November, 2003).
84. Mark Wheelis, Will the New Biology Lead to New Weapons? Arms Control Today
(July 2004).
85. Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, Committee on
Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation
Biowarfare Threats, National Research Council of the National Academies, p. 48
(2006).
86. Emerging Technologies: Genetic Engineering and Biological Weapons, The Sunshine
Project, Background Paper, No. 12 (November, 2003).
87. Emerging Technologies: Genetic Engineering and Biological Weapons, The Sunshine
Project, Background Paper, No. 12 (November, 2003).
88. See generally, Jonathan B. Tucker & Raymond A. Zilinskas, The Promise and Perils of
Synthetic Biology, The New Atlantis: A Journal of Technology & Society, No. 12
(Spring 2006).
89. Claire M. Fraser & Malcolm R. Dando, Genomics and Future Biological Weapons: The
Need for Preventive Action by the Biomedical Community, Nature Genetics, Vol. 29,
p. 253 (2001).
90. Testimony of Dr. Craig Venter, before the Senate Health Education, Labor and
Pension Committee, Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness Subcommittee
(May 11 2005).
91. Gigi Kwik Gronvall et al., Biosecurity: Responsible Stewardship of Bioscience, Biose-
curity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Vol. 1, No. 1
(2003).
92. See generally, Joseph G. Perpich, The Recombinant-DNA Debate and Bioterrorism,
Chronicle of Higher Education (March 15, 2002).
93. Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, Committee on
Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation
254 NOTES TO PAGES 53“59

Biowarfare Threats, National Research Council of the National Academies, p. 49
(2006).
94. Bill Joy, Why the Future Doesn™t Need Us, Wired, Issue 8.04. (April 2000), available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy pr.html.


Chapter 3. Who Did Bioviolence? Who Wants To Do It?
1. The dying Tartars, stunned and stupe¬ed by the immensity of the disaster brought
about by the disease, and realizing that they had no hope of escape, lost interest in the
siege. However, they ordered corpses to be placed in catapults and lobbed into the
city in the hope that the intolerable stench would kill everyone inside. What seemed
like mountains of dead were thrown into the city, and the Christians could not hide,
¬‚ee, or escape from them, although they dumped as many of the bodies as they could
in the sea. Soon the rotting corpses tainted the air and poisoned the water supply, and
the stench was so overwhelming that hardly one in several thousand was in a position
to ¬‚ee the remains of the Tartar army. Moreover, one infected man could carry the
poison to others, and infect people and places with the disease by look alone. Mark
Wheelis, Biological Warfare at the 1346 Siege of Caffa, Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (September, 2002), quoting Gabriele De Mussi, a fourteenth-
century notary public in Piacenza, Italy, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
EID/vol8no9/01-0536.htm.
2. Referring to a written correspondence: Amherst to Sir William Johnson, Superin-
tendent of the Northern Indian Department, (July 9, 1793), British manuscripts
project, a checklist of the micro¬lms prepared in England and Wales for the
American Council of Learned Societies, 1941“1945. Library of Congress Call No.:
Z6620.G7 U5 1968, micro¬lm reel 34/38, item 244, compiled by Lester K. Born,
Greenwood Press (1968).
3. The Rapport presente a la Conference des Preliminaires de Paix par la Commission
des Responsabilites des Auteurs de la Guerre et Sanctions, cited in, The Problem of
Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (1971).
4. See Eric Croddy, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for
the Concerned Citizen, Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., p. 222“223 (2002).
5. Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored
Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism, Columbia University Press, pp. 6, 24
(2005).
6. Robert Gomer et al., Japan™s Biological Weapons: 1930“1945“A Hidden Chapter in
History, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (October, 1981).
7. Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored
Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism, Columbia University Press, p. 88 (2005).
8. See Ira Baldwin, Special BW Operations, Memorandum for Executive Secretary,
Research and Development Board, Unclassi¬ed, The National Military Establish-
ment Research and Development Board (October 5, 1948).
9. Nevin v. United States, 696 F.2d 1229 (1983).
10. Biological Weapons, Federation of American Scientists, available at http://
fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/cbw/bw.htm; See also, David R. Franz, et al., The U.S.
Biological Warfare and Biological Defense Programs, in Medical Aspects of Chem-
ical and Biological Warfare, Textbook of Military Medicine, pg. 431 (1997).
11. Statement by the President, Of¬ce of the White House Press Secretary, p. 2
(November 25, 1969); See also, Jonathan B. Tucker, A Farewell to Germs: The U.S.
255
NOTES TO PAGES 59“65

Renunciation of Biological and Toxin Warfare, 1969“1970, International Security
(Summer 2002).
12. See Tom Mangold & Jeff Goldberg, “Incident at Sverdlovsk,” in Plague Wars: A True
Story of Biological Warfare, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., Chapter 9 (1999).
13. According to Dr. Ken Alibek:
The Russians have steadfastly refused to open their military biological weapons
facilities to international inspection. Pursuant to agreements between Russia,
the U.S. and Britain, a series of trilateral inspections was begun in 1991. How-
ever, the facilities visited in Russia were those managed by the civilian arm
of the Soviet/Russian biological weapons program, Biopreparat. The facilities
of the Ministry of Defense, most notably those at Sergiyev Posad (formerly
Zagorsk), Kirov, Yekaterinburg, and Strizhi, have never been inspected. Further-
more, according to the On-Site Inspection Agency, the last visits to Russian civilian
facilities took place in early 1994.
Statement by Dr. Ken Alibek, Terrorist and Intelligence Operations: Potential Impact
on the U.S. Economy, before the Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress
(May 20, 1998); See also, Richard G. Lugar, Symposium on Security & Liberty: Essay:
Nunn-Lugar in the Second Term, 19 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol™y., 233
(2005).
14. George Post, Biotechnology and Terrorism, Prospect Magazine (April 25, 2002).

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