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Array of Al-Qaeda Memos, Wall Street Journal (December 31, 2001).
82. Al-Qaeda Leader Calls for Scientists to Join Cause, WCBS (September 28, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.wcbs880.com/pages/93915.php?contentType=4&contentId=
214158.
83. James Dao, Muslim Cleric Found Guilty in the ˜Virginia Jihad™ Case, New York Times
(April 27, 2005).
84. Jerry Markon, Va. Terror Case Sent Back to Lower Court; Appeals Panel Cites
Eavesdropping Program, Washington Post (April 26, 2006); See also, Caryle Mur-
phy, Muslim Lecturer Fits Easily in Two Worlds, Washington Post (August 8,
2003).
85. Ross E. Getman, Vanguards of Conquest: The Sheik and the BioWeaponeers,
available at http://members.bellatlantic.net/∼vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthraxa.html#
SheikandtheBioweaponeers.
86. Timothy Dwyer, Prosecution Called ˜Overzealous™ Guilty Verdict in Terror Case Angers
Muslims Who Know Lecturer, Washington Post (April 27, 2005).
261
NOTES TO PAGE 79

87. Alan Cullison & Andrew Higgins, Files Found: A Computer in Kabul Yields a Chilling
Array of al Qaeda Memos, Wall Street Journal (December 31, 2001).
88. Barton Gellman, al-Qaida Near Biological, Chemical Arms Production, Washington
Post (March 23, 2003).
89. Allan Cullison & Andrew Higgins, Files Found: A Computer in Kabul Yields a Chilling
Array of Al-Qaeda Memos, Wall Street Journal (December 31, 2001).
90. Harold Kennedy, Military Officials Warn Al Qaeda to Attack with WMD, National
Defense (February 2005), available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
issues/2005/Feb/Military of¬cials.htm.
91. Translated from Arabic.
92. Al-Qa™ida™s WMD Activities, Chart prepared by the Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion Terrorism Research Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, avail-
able at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm cht.htm, citing Al Qaeda Tested Germ
Weapons, Reuters (January 1, 2002).
93. Al-Qa™ida™s WMD Activities, Chart prepared by the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terrorism Research Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm cht.htm, citing Guido Olimpio, Islamic Group
Said Preparing Chemical Warfare on the West, Corriere della Sera (July 8, 1998);
also citing Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America,
p. 326 (2001).
94. Al-Qa™ida™s WMD Activities, Chart prepared by the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terrorism Research Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, available
at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm cht.htm, citing Dominic Evans, U.S. Troops
Found Afghan Biological Lab, Reuters (March 22, 2002); also citing Michael R.
Gordon, U.S. Says It Found Qaeda Lab Being Built to Produce Anthrax, New York
Times (March 23, 2002).
95. Judith Miller, Lab Suggests Qaeda Planned to Build Arms, Officials Say, New York
Times (September 14, 2002).
96. Allan Cullison & Andrew Higgins, Files Found: A Computer in Kabul Yields a Chilling
Array of Al-Qaeda Memos, Wall Street Journal (December 31, 2001).
97. Al-Qa™ida™s WMD Activities, Chart prepared by the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terrorism Research Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm cht.htm, citing Al-Qaeda: Anthrax Found in al-
Qaeda home, Global Security Newswire (December 10, 2001); Judith Miller, Labs
Suggest Qaeda Planned to Build Arms, Officials Say, New York Times (September 14,
2002).
98. Al-Qa™ida™s WMD Activities, Chart prepared by the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terrorism Research Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm cht.htm, citing Terrorist Attacks in Iraq, pro-
gram transcript, NBC Nightly News (March 2, 2004).
99. Al-Qa™ida™s WMD Activities, Chart prepared by the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terrorism Research Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm cht.htm, citing U.S. Knew of Bioterror Tests in
Iraq, BBC News (August 20, 2002); also citing U.S. Monitors Kurdish Extremists, Fox
News (August 21, 2002); also citing Isma™il Zayir, Ansar al-Islam Group Accuses [Jalal]
Talabani of Spreading Rumors About Its Cooperation with al-Qa™ida, Al-Hayah
(August 22, 2002); Sammy Salama & Lydia Hansell, Does Intent Equal Capability?:
Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12,
No. 3, p. 623 (November 2005).
262 NOTES TO PAGES 82“110

100. Harold Kennedy, Military Officials Warn Al Qaeda to Attack with WMD, National
Defense, (February 2005), available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
issues/2005/Feb/Military of¬cials.htm.
101. Al-Qa™ida™s WMD Activities, Chart prepared by the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terrorism Research Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm cht.htm, citing Statement given by Al Qaeda
operative Ahmad Rassam, in U.S. custody; also citing Bin Laden™s Biological Threat,
BBC (October 28, 2001).
102. Al-Qa™ida™s WMD Activities, Chart prepared by the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terrorism Research Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, available
at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm cht.htm, citing Sketches of Anthrax Bomb
Found in Pakistani Scientist™s Office, Rediff.com (November 28, 2001).

Chapter 4. Strategic Foundations
1. UN Secretary-General™s Message to Parties to Biological Weapons Convention,
United Nations Of¬ce at Geneva (November 20, 2006), available at http://www.
unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear en)/246D92BF4061C961C125722
C0037EA12?OpenDocument.
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7(2)(b), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99
corr/2.htm; See also, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity (1999).
3. The Kampala Compact: The Global Bargain for Biosecurity and Bioscience, Inter-
national Council for Science (October 1, 2005), available at http://www.icsu-
africa.org/Resource centre/KampalaCompactoct05.pdf.

Chapter 5. Complication: What Law Enforcers Should Stop
1. James Randerson, Synthetic Biology: Lax Laws, Virus DNA and Potential for Terror:
Loopholes Mean Anyone Can Order Gene Sequences: Scientists Back Voluntary Reg-
ulation as First Step, Guardian (June 14, 2006).
2. Statement of Bruce Alberts, quoted in Neil Monro, Securing Science, National Jour-
nal (September 6, 2003).
3. For laws of the United States, see Audit Report “ Adequacy of Controls to Prevent
the Improper Transfer of Sensitive Technology, Of¬ce of Inspector General, USDA,
Report No. 02601-1-Ch (September 2005); See also, Inspection Report “ Coordina-
tion of Biological Select Agent Activities at Department of Energy Facilities, Of¬ce of
Inspector General, Department of Energy, DOE/IG-0695 (July 2005).
4. Jennifer L. Bower, The Terrorist Threat and its Implications for Sensor Technologies,
available at http://www.nato-asi.org/sensors2005/papers/brower.pdf.
5. According to the WHO Guidance:
[T]he agent will need to be stable enough to resist degradation during handling
and storage, and during the energy-transfer processes, that will, in most scenar-
ios, be involved in disseminating it on its targets. Once disseminated, the agent
must be capable of establishing ¬eld dosages that are infective or toxic over a
particular area. It must also be relatively easy to produce from readily avail-
able precursor compounds or from naturally occurring or genetically modi¬ed
organisms.
Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Weapons: WHO Guidance, Sec-
ond Edition of Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Report of a
WHO Group of Consultants, World Health Organization, p. 25“26 (2004); avail-
able at http://www.who.int/csr/delibepidemics/chapter3.pdf.
263
NOTES TO PAGES 110“113

6. Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Weapons: WHO Guidance, Sec-
ond Edition of Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Report of a WHO
Group of Consultants, World Health Organization, pp. 18“19 (2004), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/9241546158 chap2.pdf.
7. International Health Regulations, 48th World Health Assembly, Article 1 (May 23,
2005), available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/IHRWHA58 3-en.pdf.
8. The OIE has recently revamped its world animal health information system to
include a single list of all animal diseases, both terrestrial and aquatic, of which
occurrence Member States must report immediately to the OIE. The list is available
at http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/en classi¬cation.htm.
9. The World Data Centre for Microorganisms (WDCM) Committee on Postal, Quaran-
tine, and Safety Regulations recommends increased vigilance with respect to dan-
gerous pathogens. See Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of Collections
of Cultures of Microorganisms, World Data Centre for Microorganisms (WDCM),
2nd edition (1999), available at http://wdcm.nig.ac.jp/. According to the Safety and
Quality Standards, paragraph 16.2: “Particular attention needs to be given to the
containment and security aspects of strains which are potentially harmful to man,
animals, or crops.” See Culture Collection Organization Statements on Biological
Warfare, World Federation for Culture Collections (April 24, 2002), available
at http://wdcm.nig.ac.jp/biowarfare.html.
10. Scientists at Cornell recently developed a new technique that could make both
detection and tracking of pathogens possible where small segments of inactive
DNA bind to the DNA of particular pathogens. As Cornell University News Ser-
vice reports, “Researchers make synthetic DNA ˜barcodes™ to tag pathogens, pro-
viding an inexpensive, off-the-shelf monitoring system.” See Bill Steele, Researchers
Make Synthetic DNA ˜Barcodes™ to Tag Pathogens, Providing an Inexpensive, Off-the-
Shelf Monitoring System, (June 13, 2005), available at http://www.news.cornell.edu/
stories/June05/Luo.barcodes.ws.html; See also, Yougen Li, Yen Thi Hong Cu, & Dan
Luo, Multiplexed Detection of Pathogen DNA with DNA-based Fluorescence Nano-
barcodes, Nature Biotechnology, Vol. 23, No. 7 (July 2005).
11. J. Gaudioso & R. M. Salerno, A Conceptual Framework for Biosecurity Levels, Paper
presented at BTR 2004: Unified Science and Technology for Reducing Biological
Threats and Countering Terrorism, Proceedings, (March 18“19, 2004).
12. Various smaller organizations have contributed expertise. The International Orga-
nization on Standards (ISO) has issued standards for laboratory operations per-
taining to testing apparatus and information technology. The International Fed-
eration for Biological Laboratory Safety (IFBLS) provides a forum for bioscien-
tists to train and exchange information. The IFBLS does not accredit facilities,
but it is linked with regional organizations that have that authority. The Global
Health Security Action Group (GHSAG) “ formed after the 2001 anthrax attacks
by the health ministers of the G-7 nations plus Mexico “ has the objective “to
improve linkages among laboratories, including Level Four laboratories, in those
countries which have them.” See Health Ministers Take Action to Improve Health
Security Globally, Ministerial Statements, Ottawa, (November 1, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.ghsi.ca/english/statementottawanov2001.asp; See also, WHO
Laboratory Biosafety Manual, Interim Guidelines 2nd ed. (2003), avail-
able at WHO21: http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/en/
Labbiosafety.pdf.
13. Laboratory Security and Emergency Response Guidance for Laboratories Working
with Select Agents, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Morbidity and
264 NOTES TO PAGES 113“127

Mortality Weekly Report, Vol. 51, pp. 1“8 (2002); See also, Jonathan B. Tucker,
Biosecurity: Limiting Terrorist Access to Deadly Pathogens, United States Institute
of Peace (2003).
14. Reynolds M. Salerno & Daniel P. Estes, Biosecurity: Protecting High Consequence
Pathogens and Toxins Against Theft and Diversion, Sandia National Laborato-
ries, Report SAND No. 2003-4274P p. 6“7 (2003); See also, Laboratory Security and
,
Emergency Response Guidance for Laboratories Working with Select Agents, Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report,Vol. 51, pp. 1“8 (2002), stating that threat assessment “identi¬es and eval-
uates each threat on the basis of different factors (e.g., the capability and intent
to attack an asset, the likelihood of a successful attack, and the attack™s probable
lethality).”
15. Jennifer Gaudioso, A Survey of Asian Life Scientists: The State of Biosciences, Labo-
ratory Biosecurity, and Biosafety in Asia, Biological Weapons Nonproliferation
Department, Sandia National Laboratories, Report SAND 2006“0842 (February
2006).
16. See, Helen E. Purkitt, Biowarfare Lessons, Emerging Biosecurity Issues, and Ways
to Monitor Dual-Use Biotechnology Trends in the Future, Institute for National
Security Studies, Occasional Paper 61 (September 2005).
17. Testimony of Shelton Young, Director Readiness and Logistics Support Directorate,
Of¬ce of The Inspector General Department of Defense, before the National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations Subcommittee of the House Govern-
ment Reform Committee (October 7, 2003).
18. Joseph S. Szyliowicz, International Transportation Security, The Review of Policy
Research, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 351 (May 1, 2004), (emphasis added); See also, Statement
of Michael Moodie, cited in, Smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs (June 23, 2004).
19. Samuel Watson, Joe Suyama, Stefanie Fiddner Junker & Michael Allswede, Connect-
ing the Dots: Characterizing Preparations for a Bio Attack, Unpublished Paper “ Final
Document (February 21, 2006).
20. Data Mining: Federal Efforts Cover a Wide Range of Uses, United States General
Accounting Of¬ce (May 2004). For a more expansive de¬nition, see Colleen McCue,
Emily S. Stone, & Teresa P. Gooch, Data Mining and Value-added Analysis, FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin (Nov. 1, 2003).
21. See, Michael J. Malinowski, Biotechnology: Law, Business, and Regulation, at
§ 1.05[D] (1999).
22. See Mandate of the Commission, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Jan-
uary 28, 2004), available at http://www.wmdcommission.org/.
23. “Introduction to the Transport of Infectious Substances,” in Laboratory Bio-
safety Manual, World Health Organization, 3rd ed., Ch. 15 (2004), available at
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/Biosafety7.pdf.
24. UN Model Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Committee of Experts
on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, United Nations Economic and Social
Council, 14th rev. ed., (2005), available at http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/
publi/unrec/rev14/14¬les e.html.
25. Convention on Civil Aviation, International Civil Aviation Organization, Annex
18 (9th ed. 2006). To similar effect, see European Agreement concerning the Interna-
tional Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe (4th ed. 2007).
265
NOTES TO PAGES 127“136

26. Martin Van de Voort et al., Improving the Security of the Global Sea-Container
Shipping System, RAND Corporation (2004), available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/monograph reports/MR1695/MR1695.pdf.
27. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, SOLAS/CONF.5/34, Annex 1 (Dec.
12, 2002).
28. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, SOLAS/CONF.5/34, Annex 1,
Part A, Sections 2.1.4, 9.1“9.8.1; Part B, Sections 9.1“9.53 (Dec. 12, 2002).
29. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, SOLAS/CONF.5/34, Annex 1,
Part A, Sections 14.1“14.6; Part B, Sections 15, 16, 18 (Dec. 12, 2002).
30. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 46 U.S.C.S. §§ 70101“117.
31. C-TPAT: Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, U.S. Customs and Bor-
der Protection, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial
enforcement/ctpat/, containing the C-TPAT Security Guidelines along with con-
tinually updated information on growth and improvements to the agreement.
32. CSI: Container Security Initiative, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, avail-
able at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border security/international activities/csi/,
containing an overview of the program along with information about its continual
expansion to new seaports.
33. ACE: Modernization Information Systems, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/modernization/.
34. Proliferation Security Initiative, U.S. Department of State, available at http://
www.state.gov/t/np/c10390.htm.
35. Mark R. Shulman, The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Evolution of the Law
on the Use of Force, 28 Houston J. Int™l L. 771 (2006).
36. Statement of John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and Inter-
national Security, U.S. Efforts to Stop the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, 108th Congress
(2003).


Chapter 6. Improving Resistance through Science
1. John Steinbruner, Elisa D. Harris, Nancy Gallagher, & Stacy Okutani, Controlling
Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype Protective Oversight System, Center for Inter-
national and Security Studies, p. 6“7 (December, 2005), available at http://www.
cissm.umd.edu/papers/¬les/pathogens project monograph.pdf.
2. Emilio Mordini, Conclusions of the International Conference on Ethical Implications
of Research into the Prevention of Bioterrorism, Bioethical Implications of Glob-
alization Processes, Policy Paper 1 (April, 2004).
3. Francis A. Boyle, Biowarfare and Terrorism, Clarity Press, Inc., (2005); See also,
William J Broad & Judith Miller, A Nation Challenged: The Investigation; U.S. Re-
cently Produced Anthrax in a Highly Lethal Powder Form, New York Times. (Decem-
ber 13, 2001).
4. See Peter Aldhous & Michael Reilly, Friend or Foe?; Efforts to Combat Killer Pathogens

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