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Filter, Medical Design, Vol. 6, No. 10, p. 42 (December 1, 2006).
6. Patricia L. Meinhardt, Water and Bioterrorism, 26 Annual Review of Pub. Health
213 (April 2005); See also, Jennifer B. Nuzzo, The Biological Threat to U.S. Water Sup-
plies, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science,
Vol. 4, p. 147 (2006).
7. Wayne Clark et al., Advanced UV Source for Biological Agent Destruction (2006),
available at http://www.natick.army.mil/soldier/JOCOTAS/ColPro Papers/Stumpf
.pdf.
8. Bush Issues Medical Emergency Directive, New York Times (February 8, 2007).
9. Jennifer L. Brower, The Terrorist Threat and its Implications for Sensor Technologies,
presented at Advances in Sensing with Security Applications (July, 2005), available
at http://www.nato-asi.org/sensors2005/papers/brower.pdf.
10. See David L. Buckeridge et al., Evaluating Detection of an Inhalational Anthrax
Outbreak, Emerging Infectious Diseases (December 1, 2006).
11. See Joseph Doedert, The Biosurveillance Evolution, Health Data Management,
Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 50 (February 2007).
12. Incentives for the Use of Health Information Technology and Establishing the Position
of the National Health Information Technology Coordinator, Executive Order 13335
(April 27, 2004).
13. See generally, Creating a Nation-wide Integrated Biosurveillance System, Hearing of
the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack Subcommittee of the House Home-
land Security Committee (May 11, 2006).
14. Early Efforts Initiated but Comprehensive Privacy Approach Needed for National
Strategy, GAO REPORT, GAO-07-238 (January 10, 2007).
15. David Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions on Treaty Veri-
fication in the United States, 63 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 229, 324 (May 1988).
16. Ryan McDonald, Juries and Crime Labs: Correcting the Weak Links in the DNA Chain,
24 Am. J.L. & Med. 345 (1998); See also, Smith v. State, 677 So. 2d 1240, 1245 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1995).
17. Paul Keim, Microbial Forensics: A Scientific Approach, American Academy
of Microbiology, p. 12 (2003), available at http://www.asm.org/ASM/¬les/
CCPAGECONTENT/doc¬lename/0000018026/FOREN%20REPORT BW.pdf.
18. Andrew J. Grotto & Jonathan B. Tucker, Biosecurity: A Comprehensive Action
Plan, Center for American Progress (June 2006), available at http://www.
mericanprogress.org/kf/biosecurity a comprehensive action plan.pdf.
19. See Jane Gross, A Nation Challenged: The Doctors, New York Times, p. B1 (Oct-
ober 17, 2001); See also, John Schwartz, The Truth Hurts, New York Times, Section 4,
p. 1 (October 28, 2001); See also, Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Nation Challenged: Steps
Against Anthrax, New York Times, p. A13 (January 8, 2002).
20. Robert A. Fowler et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Defending against Bioterrorism, Annals
of Internal Medicine, Vol. 142, No. 8, p. 601 (2005).
21. Update: Adverse Events Following Civilian Smallpox Vaccination, Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention,Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report,Vol. 53,
p. 106 (2003).
22. J. Michael Lane & Joel Goldstein, Evaluations of 21st-century Risks of Smallpox
Vaccination and Policy Options, Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 138, p. 488
(March 18, 2003).
272 NOTES TO PAGES 177“180

23. See Review of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention™s Smallpox Vaccination
Program Implementation. Committee on Smallpox Vaccination Program Implemen-
tation, Board on Health Promotion and Disease Prevention, Institute of Medicine,
National Academy Press (2003).
24. Hillel W. Cohen et al., The Pitfalls of Bioterrorism Preparedness, American Journal
of Public Health, Vol. 94, No. 10, pp. 1667 (2004). The article also draws atten-
tion to “new secret research facilities that will store and handle dangerous materi-
als” and thus “increase [] the risk of accidental release or purposeful diversion.” It
also expresses concerns that such sites and programs concerned with “biodefense”
might spur a “biodefense race,” which would spread proliferation. Accidents can
occur that may release harmful biological agents into the environment. The article
also asserts, though without pinpointing exact cases, that “In short, bioterrorism
preparedness programs have been a disaster for public health. Instead of leading
to more resources for dealing with natural disease as had been promised, there are
now fewer such resources. Worse, in response to bioterrorism preparedness, public
health institutions and procedures are being reorganized along a military or police
model that subverts the relationships between public health providers and the com-
munities they serve.”
25. Frederick M. Burlke, Mass Casualty Management of a Large-scale Bioterrorist Event:
An Epidemiological Approach that Shapes Triage Decisions. Emergency Medicine
Clinics of North America, Vol. 20, p. 409“436 (2002).
26. N. Pesik, M. E. Keim, & K. V. Iserson, Terrorism and the Ethics of Emergency Medical
Care, Annals of Emergency Medicine, Vol. 37, pp. 642“646 (2001).
27. Frederick M. Burkle, MD, Population-based Triage Management in Response to
Surge-capacity Requirements during a Large-scale Bio-event Disaster, Academic
Emergency Medicine, Vol. 13, No. 11, pp. 1118“1129 (2006).
28. Frederick M. Burkle, MD, Population-based Triage Management in Response to
Surge-capacity Requirements during a Large-scale Bio-event Disaster, Academic
Emergency Medicine, Vol. 13, No. 11, pp. 1118“1129 (2006).
29. T. V. Inglesby, J. B. Nuzzo, T. O™Toole, & D. A. Henderson, Disease Mitigation Measures
in the Control of Pandemic Influenza, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense
Strategy, Practice, and Science, Vol. 4, pp. 366“375 (2006).
30. C. Lam, R. Waldhorn, E. Toner, T. V. Inglesby, & T. O™Toole, The Prospect of Using
Alternative Medical Care Facilities in an Influenza Pandemic, Biosecurity and
Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Vol. 4, pp. 384“390
(2006).
31. DHHS, Of¬ce of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, Of¬ce of
Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures, HHS Public Health Emergency
Medical Countermeasure Enterprise Implementation Plan for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear Threats, April 2007.
32. See David S. Fedson, Preparing for Pandemic Vaccination: An International Policy
Agenda for Vaccine Development, Journal of Public Health Policy, Vol. 26, No. 1,
pp. 4“29 (2005); See also, Julie B. Milstien et al., The Impact of Globalization on
Vaccine Development and Availability, Health Affairs,Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 1061“1069
(2006); See also, Jerome O. Klein & Martin G. Myers, Vaccine Shortages: Why They
Occur and What Needs to be Done to Strengthen Vaccine Supply, Pediatrics, Vol. 117,
No. 6, pp. 2269“2275 (June 2006).
33. The International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Reg-
istration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use harmonizes testing and registration
273
NOTES TO PAGES 180“185

procedures for new pharmaceuticals and disseminates information as to how
nations implement its guidelines.
34. See Gigi Kwik Gronvall & Luciana Borio, Removing Barriers to Global Pandemic
Influenza Vaccination, 4 Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy,
Practice, and Science, p. 168 (2006), available at http://www.liebertonline.com/
doi/pdf/10.1089/bsp.2006.4.168?cookieSet=1; See also, David S. Fedson, Preparing
for Pandemic Vaccination: An International Policy for Vaccine Development, Jour-
nal of Public Health Policy,Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 4“29 (2005).
35. Alan Melnick et al., Public Health Ethics in Action: Flu Vaccine and Drug Allocation
Strategies, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics 102 (2005).
36. Robyn Martin, The Exercise of Public Health Powers in Cases of Infectious Disease:
Human Rights Implications, 14 Med. L. Rev. 141, 142 (2006).
37. John D. Blum, Balancing Individual Rights versus Collective Good in Public Health
Enforcement, 25 Med. & L. 273, 278“79 (2006).
38. Wendy E. Parmet, Informed Consent and Public Health: Are They Compatible When
It Comes to Vaccines? 8 J. of Health Care L. & Pol™y 104 (2005).
39. This issue was litigated in Doe v. Rumsfeld, 297 F. Supp. 2d 119 (2003). Active duty
service members objected to inoculation with the anthrax vaccine, which, at the
time the case was brought, was still in an experimental stage and not approved. The
plaintiffs contended that because of its unlicensed status, they should not have to
submit to it. The court granted a preliminary injunction against the nonconsensual
administration of the drug on the grounds that it was both an investigational drug
and was being used for an unapproved purpose. A year later, in Doe v. Rumsfeld, 297
F. Supp. 2d 200 (2004), the court granted a stay on the injunction after the Food and
Drug Administration published a rule categorizing the anthrax vaccine as safe and
effective against inhalation anthrax.
40. Wendy E. Parmet, Informed Consent and Public Health: Are They Compatible When
It Comes to Vaccines? 8 J. Health Care L. & Pol™y 104 (2005).
41. Janlori Goldman, Balancing in Crisis? Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Privacy, 38 J.
Health L. 481 (2005).
42. Lawrence O. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far are Limitations on
Human Rights Justified, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 524, 526“527 (2003).
43. Peter Vasterman et al., The Role of the Media and Media Hypes in the Aftermath of
Disasters, Epidemiological Reviews,Vol. 27, pp. 107“114, at 109 (2005).
44. Thomas Glass & Monica Schoch-Spana, Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vacci-
nate a City against Panic, Clinical Infectious Diseases, Vol. 34, pp. 217, 221 (Jan-
uary 15, 2002).
45. Laurie Garrett, Understanding Media™s Response to Epidemics, Public Health
Reports,Vol. 116, pp. 87 (2001).
46. K. U. Menon & K. T. Goh, Transparency and Trust: Risk Communication and the
Singapore Experience in Managing SARS, Journal of Communication Manage-
ment,Vol. 9, p. 375 (2005).
47. Daniel Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative
Law, 115 Yale L.J. 1490, 1551 (2006).
48. Cecila Cheng, To Be Paranoid is the Standard? Panic Responses to SARS Outbreak
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, p. 67
(2004).
49. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029, 1047 (March 2004).
50. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029, 1052 (March 2004).
274 NOTES TO PAGES 185“190

51. Daniel Markovits, Quarantine and Distributive Justice, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics 323, 324
(2005).
52. Lieutenant Colonel Mark F. Gentilman, An Analysis to Determine Whether Quaran-
tine is an Effective Response to a Bioterrorist Attack in the United States, (June 3, 2005),
available at http://www.aameda.org/MemberServices/Exec/Articles/sum05/An
Analysis to Determine.pdf.
53. Troy Day et al., When Is Quarantine a Useful Control Strategy for Emerging Infectious
Diseases? American Journal of Epidemiology, Vol. 163, p. 479 (2006).
54. David Bishop, Lessons from SARS: Why the WHO Must Provide Greater Economic
Incentives for Countries to Comply with International Health Regulations, 26 Geo. J.
Int™l L. 1173, 1221 (2005).
55. Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Quarantine: Voluntary or Not?, 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics 83
(2004).
56. Lieutenant Colonel Mark F. Gentilman, An Analysis to Determine Whether Quaran-
tine is an Effective Response to a Bioterrorist Attack in the United States (June 3, 2005),
available at http://www.aameda.org/MemberServices/Exec/Articles/sum05/An
Analysis to Determine.pdf.
57. Edward P Richards et al., Quarantine Laws and Public Health Realities, 33 J.L. Med.
.
& Ethics 69, 70 (2005).
58. Constitution of the World Health Organization, Article 21, paragraph A (July 22, 1946),
available at http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who constitution en.pdf.
59. Jane Speakman et al., Quarantine in Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and
Other Emerging Infectious Diseases, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 83 (2003).
60. International Health Regulations, 48th World Health Assembly, Article 1 (May 23,
2005), available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/IHRWHA58 3-en.pdf.
61. International Health Regulations, 48th World Health Assembly, Article 6.2 (May 23,
2005), available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/IHRWHA58 3-en.pdf.
62. International Health Regulations, Core Capacity Requirements for Designated Air-
ports, Ports, and Ground Crossings. 48th World Health Assembly, Annex 1.B, para-
graph 2 (May 23, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/IHRWHA58 3-
en.pdf.
63. International Health Regulations, Core Capacity Requirements for Designated Air-
ports, Ports, and Ground Crossings. 48th World Health Assembly, Annex 1.B, para-
graph 2 (May 23, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/IHRWHA58 3-
en.pdf.
64. International Health Regulations, 48th World Health Assembly, Article 3 (May 23,
2005), available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/IHRWHA58 3-en.pdf.
65. David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security:
The New International Health Regulations, 4 Chinese J. Int™l L. 325 (2005).
66. Lawrence O. Gostin, Revision of the World Health Organization™s International
Health Regulations, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 291, No. 21,
pp. 2623, 2626 (June, 2004).
67. Robert J. Blendon et al., Attitudes Toward the Use of Quarantine in a Public Health
Emergency in Four Countries, Health Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 15“25 (2006).


Chapter 8. International Nonproliferation
1. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 26 U.S.T.
275
NOTES TO PAGES 190“198

583; T.I.A.S. 8062; 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, (Signed April 10, 1972; entered into force March
26, 1976), (hereinafter, BWC).
2. Al J. Venter, Biological Warfare: The Poor Man™s Atomic Bomb, Jane™s Intelligence
Review (March 1999).
3. See Case Study: Yellow Rain. Fact Sheet. Bureau of Veri¬cation, Compliance, and
Implementation. (October 1, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/57428.pdf.
4. For more information about the Review Conference, see Graham Pearson, The Bio-
logical Weapons Convention Sixth Review Conference, CBS Conventions Bulletin,
Issue No. 74 (December 2006).
5. These meetings will focus on: 1) domestic legislation to implement and enforce
the BWC (2007); 2) biosecurity and biosafety measures including scienti¬c codes
of conduct (2008); 3) enhancement of infectious disease surveillance and response
(2009); and 4) assistance in the event of a suspected attack (2010).
6. BWC Article 1.
7. Statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva. First Spe-
cial Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of
the Chemical Weapons Convention. First Review Conference, The Hague (April
28“May 9, 2003) available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/
5M4BGC.
8. DoD Directive 3000.3, Policy for Nonlethal Weapons, Article 3.1 (July 9, 1996), avail-
able at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d30003 070996/d30003p.
pdf.
9. Joseph Siniscalchi, Nonlethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy,
Center for Strategy and Technology (March 1998), available at http://www
.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/1998/03/occppr03.htm. According to the
Human Effects Advisory Panel (HEAP) established by the U.S. JNLWD, a weapon can
be classi¬ed as “nonlethal” if no more than 5 percent of victims suffer permanent
physical damage or are killed. See Mark Wheelis, “Nonlethal” Chemical Weapons: A
Faustian Bargain, Issues in Science and Technology (Spring 2003).
10. The relationship of information warfare to nonlethal technology is at once complex
and confusing. Part of this confusion stems from the fact that the scope of nonlethal
technology is so broad that some experts categorize information warfare as a sub-
set of nonlethal technology. . . . Although one might argue information warfare is a
subset of nonlethal technology, in reality this is not entirely accurate because both
lethal and nonlethal weapons systems are used for information warfare. James C.
Duncan, A Primer on the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons, Naval Law Review,
XLV, p. 8 (1998).
11. David P Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Nonlethal Weapons,” 21
.
Mich. J. Int™l L. 51 (Fall 1999), citing Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989,
18 U.S.C.S. § 175 (prohibitions with respect to biological agents) and 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 178 (de¬nition of biological agent) (1994).
12. As Margaret-Anne Coppernoll describes, “NLWs are not ˜required to have a zero
probability of producing fatalities or permanent injuries,™ but they are intended
to reduce these probabilities signi¬cantly.” The use of NLWs therefore does not
limit a commander™s authority to use all necessary means in self-defense, but
rather serves to “reinforce deterrence and expand the range of options available
to commanders.” Lieutenant Colonel Margaret-Anne Coppernoll, The Nonlethal
Weapons Debate, Naval War College Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1999), available
276 NOTES TO PAGES 198“201

at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1999/spring/art5-SP9.htm, citing DoD
Directive 3000.3 Policy for Nonlethal Weapons. Article 3.1 (July 9, 1996).
13. Margaret-Anne Coppernoll, The Nonlethal Weapons Debate, Naval War College
Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1999), available at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/
Review/1999/spring/art5-SP9.htm.
14. Margaret-Anne Coppernoll, The Nonlethal Weapons Debate, Naval War College
Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1999), available at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/
Review/1999/spring/art5-SP9.htm.
15. Joseph Siniscalchi, Nonlethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy. Occa-
sional Paper No. 3, Center for Strategy and Technology (March 1998), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/1998/03/occppr03.htm. cit-
ing Timothy Hannigan, Lori Raff, & Rod Paschall, Mission Applications of Nonlethal
Weapons, Jaycor Technical Study for the Of¬ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

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