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for Special Operations and Low Intensity Con¬‚ict (August 1996), Comparing the
1980s™ 80 percent ¬gure to that of the noncombatant fatalities in 1950, which is
estimated at one-half of worldwide casualties during war.
16. David Koplow, Non-Lethal Weapons: The Law and Policy of Revolutionary Tech-
nologies for the Military and Law Enforcement. Cambridge University Press.
p. 28 (2006).
17. Margaret-Anne Coppernoll, The Nonlethal Weapons Debate, Naval War Col-
lege Review, Vol. LII, No. 2 (Spring 1999), available at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/
press/Review/1999/spring/art5-SP9.htm.
18. James C. Duncan, A Primer on the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons, Naval Law
Review, XLV (1998).
19. Joseph Siniscalchi, Nonlethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy, Occa-
sional Paper No. 3, Center for Strategy and Technology, p. 12 (March 1998), citing
Richard L. Garvin, an eminent United States weapons expert, quoted in Malcolm
Dando, A New Form of Warfare,p. 9 (1996).
20. See generally, Mark Wheelis, Biotechnology and Biochemical Weapons, The Non-
proliferation Review. Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 2002), available at http://cns.miis.edu/
pubs/npr/vol09/91/91whee.htm. See also, U.S. Special Forces Seek Genetically Engi-
neered Bioweapons, The Sunshine Project, News Release (August 12, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pr120802.html.
21. See Nonlethal Weapons Research in the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material
Weapons, The Sunshine Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 3 (March
2002), available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/ bk/pdf/bk9en.
pdf.
22. U.S. Special Forces Seek Genetically Engineered Bioweapons, The Sunshine
Project, News Release (August 12, 2002), available at http://www.sunshine-
project.org/publications/pr/pr120802.html, citing a May 1999 document by the
Future Technology Working Group.
23. See Michael Kohler & Wolfgang Fritzsche, Nanotechnology: An Introduction to
Nanostructuring Techniques (2004); See also, Michael Fumento, BIOEvolution “
How Biotechnology Is Changing Our World,Encounter Books (2003).
24. See Laura H. Kahn, Biodefense Research: Can Secrecy and Safety Coexist? Biosecurity
and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2004).
25. See Nonlethal Weapons Research in the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material
Weapons, The Sunshine Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 3 (March 2002),
available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/ bk/pdf/bk9en.pdf.
277
NOTES TO PAGES 202“204

26. United States Patent No. 6,287,844, Szafranski, et al., (September 11, 2001), avail-
able at the United States Patent and Trademark Of¬ce at http://www.uspto.gov/
patft/index.html.
27. U.S. Special Forces Seek Genetically Engineered Bioweapons, The Sunshine Project,
News Release (August 12, 2002), available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/
publications/pr/pr120802.html.
28. Nonlethal Weapons Research in the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material
Weapons, The Sunshine Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 5 (March 2002),
available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/ bk/pdf/bk9en.pdf.
29. Nonlethal Weapons Research in the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material
Weapons, The Sunshine Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 4 (March 2002),
available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/pdf/bk9en.pdf.
30. See Statement of NRL microbiologist Dr. Joanne Jones-Meehan quoted in Nonlethal
Weapons Research in the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material Weapons, The
Sunshine Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 4 (March 2002), available at
http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/pdf/bk9en.pdf.
31. J. Campbell, Defense Against Biodegradation of Military Material, Nonlethal
Defense III Conference, p. 2 (February 1998), quoted in Nonlethal Weapons
Research in the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material Weapons, The Sun-
shine Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 5 (March 2002), available at
http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/pdf/bk9en.pdf.
32. J. Campbell, Defense Against Biodegradation of Military Material, Nonlethal
Defense III Conference, p. 3 (February 1998), quoted in Nonlethal Weapons
Research in the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material Weapons, The Sunshine
Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 5 (March 2002), available at http://
www.sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/pdf/bk9en.pdf.
33. According to a Sunshine Project paper,
The Army™s suicide systems have been developed by Boston University scientists
working with a biotechnology research unit at Natick Laboratories (near Boston,
Massachusetts), a division of the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Com-
mand (SBCCOM). Natick™s terminator system uses a lethal gene from the bacteria
Streptomyces avidinii transferred into other organisms.
Nonlethal Weapons Research in the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material
Weapons, The Sunshine Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 5 (March 2002),
available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/pdf/bk9en.pdf.
34. Nonlethal Weapons Research in the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material
Weapons, The Sunshine Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 5 (March 2002),
available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/pdf/bk9en.pdf.
35. J. Campbell, Defense Against Biodegradation of Military Material, Nonlethal De-
fense III Conference, p. 1 (February 1998), quoted in Nonlethal Weapons Research in
the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material Weapons, The Sunshine Project,
Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 5 (March 2002), available at http://www.
sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/pdf/bk9en.pdf.
36. Nonlethal Weapons Research in the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material
Weapons, The Sunshine Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 5 (March 2002),
available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/pdf/bk9en.pdf.
37. Nonlethal Weapons Research in the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material
Weapons, The Sunshine Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 4 (March 2002),
available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/pdf/bk9en.pdf. The
278 NOTES TO PAGES 204“211

paper refers to an outdated website of the Department of Energy website, which has
since been updated and moved to another website (available at http://microbial-
genomics.energy.gov/brochure.pdf ), which no longer describes “super bugs.”
38. Livermore Lab proposed to build a biodefense lab last June. The BSL-3 permit
issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention would allow work on a
broad spectrum of biotoxins and agents including anthrax, botulism, and plague.
The safety Level-3 allows work on agents with the potential for respiratory trans-
mission “ diseases that can cause serious and lethal infection. The Energy Depart-
ment™s cursory Environmental Assessment says the biofacility would “ among other
things “ and I quote, “produce small amounts of biological material such as enzymes,
DNA, ribonucleic acid using infectious agents, and genetically modi¬ed agents.”
“The Livermore Lab proposal includes plans to aerosolize bioagents, which makes
those agents more dangerous. The lab will conduct small animal challenge tests “
which mean they can kill up to 100 small animals at a time with these bioagents. The
facility is allowed to work with up to one liter of a single agent and up to ten liters
total at the facility. To make these numbers more meaningful, let us take an example
of a likely experimental agent “ Coxiella burnetii. This agent causes Q fever, an infec-
tious disease in animals and humans. If you could evenly distribute one liter to every
person on earth “ if this were possible “ it would be roughly enough microorganisms
to potentially infect every living person.”

Inga Olson, Nuclear Labs Move into the “Biodefense” Business; Biodevastation 7,
Synthesis Regeneration, No. 34, p. 3 (March 22, 2004).
39. Nonlethal Weapons Research in the U.S.: Genetically Engineered Anti-Material
Weapons, The Sunshine Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 9, p. 4 (March 2002),
available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/pdf/bk9en.pdf.
40. See generally, Seven Good Reasons to Stand Up for Information Freedom on
Bioweapons Research: And What Agendas may be at Work to Squelch the Public™s
Right to Know, The Sunshine Project, News Release (October 30, 2001), available
at http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pdf/pr301001.pdf.
41. Laws and Regulations Governing the Protection of Sensitive but Unclassified Infor-
mation, A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
under an Interagency Agreement with the NASA Of¬ce of Inspector General, p. 3
(September 2004), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-¬les/sbu.pdf.
42. Judith Miller et al., Germs: Biological Weapons and America™s Secret War, p. 292
(2001).
43. Judith Miller et al., Germs: Biological Weapons and America™s Secret War,
pp. 308“310 (2001).
44. Ron Russell asserts, “The Bush administration is pursuing plans to build advanced
labs of its own to experiment with some of the deadliest pathogens known to
humankind, including anthrax, bubonic plague, botulism, and Q fever.” Russell
further explains:
DOE of¬cials say it makes sense to engage in germ research at high-security
nuclear labs, especially Lawrence Livermore, which already is involved in stud-
ies aimed at detecting and identifying biological weapons. They say the existing
Biotechnology Research Program at Livermore is helping to develop defenses
against biowar agents while undertaking health-related biotech research.
Ron Russell, A Question of Risk: Plans for a Biodefense “Hot Lab” at Lawrence
Livermore Have Ecologists, Disarmament Advocates, and Mainstream Scientists
Up in Arms, SF Weekly ( January 28, 2004).
279
NOTES TO PAGES 211“213

45. Most biodefense research within HHS is performed by the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), whose biodefense budget has skyrocketed
from roughly $17 million in ¬scal 1998 to a requested $1.5 billion for ¬scal 2005.
NIAID™s mission, explained in February 2002, is “to carry out the research needed to
understand the pathogenesis of [agents of bioterrorism] . . . and the host response
to them, and to translate this knowledge into useful interventions and diagnostic
tools for an effective response.” To pursue research on highly dangerous organisms,
last year NIAID launched two Biosafety Level 4 national centers and nine Biosafety
Level 3 regional centers, in addition to several Level 4 and many Level 3 facilities
under construction elsewhere.
Susan Wright, Taking Biodefense Too Far: The United States is Developing a Costly
Bioumbrella to Protect its Citizens Against Biothreats that Do Not Now “ and May
Never “ Exist, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 60, No. 6, p. 58 (November 1,
2004), citing Judith Miller, New Biolabs Stir a Debate Over Secrecy and Safety, New
York Times, pp. D1, 4 (February 20, 2004).
46. For a more detailed discussion of such measures, see generally, Statement
of The Honorable Hans Mark, Director, Defense Research and Engineering,
before the House Armed Service Committee, (October 20, 1999), available at
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/1999 h/99-10-20mark.htm.
47. Judith Miller reported: Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, director of the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, announced that the institutes would grant $240
million to build two Level 4 National Biocontainment Laboratories at the Univer-
sity of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston and Boston University. Weeks later, the
infectious diseases agency issued an additional $120 million in grants ranging from
$7 million to $21 million to nine institutions to build Level 3 space at the Regional
Biocontainment Laboratories.” Judith Miller, New Biolabs Stir a Debate Over Secrecy
and Safety,New York Times (February 10, 2004). See also, Extramural Construction
of Biosafety Laboratories. Website of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases at http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/Biodefense/Research/rbl.htm.
48. Statement of William F. Raub Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Science and
Policy for the Department of Health and Human Services. Hearings on National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 “ H.R. 1401 and Oversight of Previ-
ously Authorized Programs before the Committee on National Security, House of
Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st Session (March 11, 1999), available at http://
commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has070010.000/has070010 0.HTM.
49. Testimony, Dr. Penrose C. Albright, Assistant Secretary for Science and Technol-
ogy, Department of Homeland Security, before The House of Representatives Com-
mittee on Select Homeland Security, (June 3, 2004), quoted in Dana Shea, The
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress, CRS
Report for Congress, (April 25, 2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/
marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL32891104252005.pdf.
50. Statement of The Honorable Hans Mark, Director, Defense Research and Engineer-
ing, before the House Armed Service Committee, (October 20, 1999), available at
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/1999 h/99-10-20mark.htm.
51. Statement of Dr. Ken Alibek, quoted in Secret Biodefense Activities Are Undermin-
ing the Norm Against Biological Weapons, Working Group on Biological Weapons,
Position Paper, Federation of American Scientists (January 2003).
52. See Annex on the Protection of Con¬dential Information, General Principles for the
Handling of Confidential Information, attached to the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and
280 NOTES TO PAGES 213“217

on Their Destruction, (May 16, 1997), available at http://www.opcw.org/docs/cwc
eng.pdf (hereinafter cited as “Con¬dentiality Annex”).
53. These principles have been further explained in the Guidelines for Procedures on
the Release of Classified Information by the OPCW, OPCW C-I/Dec. 13, Part 1,
paragraph 2 (May 16, 1997) available at http://www.opcw.org/html/global/c
series/csp1/CI DEC13.html. (hereinafter “Guidelines”).
54. See Guidelines, Part V, paragraph 3.1.
55. Con¬dentiality Annex A.2; Guidelines, Part IV. 1.3.2(f).
56. See Guidelines, Part IX; See also, Con¬dentiality Annex, paragraph 23.
57. Judith Miller et al., Germs: Biological Weapons and America™s Secret War, p. 166
(2001).
58. Biological Science and Biotechnology in Russia: Controlling Diseases and Enhancing
Security, Committee on Future Contributions of the Biosciences to Public Health,
Agriculture, Basic Research, Counterterrorism, and Non-Proliferation Activities in
Russia, National Research Council of the National Academies p. 36 (2005).
59. Lauren Arestie, Issue Brief: The Russian Biological Weapons Complex, Russian
American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (March 2003) available at http://www
.ransac.org/Publications/Reports%20and%20Publications/Other%20RANSAC%
20Papers/index.asp. For an overview of the U.S. and West™s efforts to eliminate the
Soviet infrastructure of biological WMD, see Kenneth N. Luongo et al., Building a
Forward Line of Defense Securing Former Soviet Biological Weapons, Arms Control
Today (July/August 2004), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004 07-
08/Luongo.asp#notes2.
60. John V. Parachini et al., Diversion of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons
Expertise from the Former Soviet Union Understanding an Evolving Problem,
RAND Corporation, p. 26 (2005).
61. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate
U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, GAO Report GAO-03-482 (March 24,
2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/htext/d03482.html.
62. See generally, Advancing International Cooperation on Bio-Initiatives in Russia and
the CIS, Findings and Report from an International Conference April 26“27, 2005
(Spring 2006), available from the author.
63. Craig Thompson, Missing Links . . . Genetically Altered Biological Weaponry: A Gift
from the Biopreparat to the World Part One, Journal of Counterterrorism & Home-
land Security International, (Spring 2003).
64. Lauren Arestie, Issue Brief: The Russian Biological Weapons Complex, Russian Amer-
ican Nuclear Security Advisory Council (March 2003), available at http://www.
ransac.org/Publications/Reports%20and%20Publications/Other%20RANSAC%
20Papers/index.asp.
65. See Jonathan B. Tucker, Strengthening the BWC: A Way Forward, Disarmament
Diplomacy, Issue No. 78 (July/August 2004); See also, BWC Article 10.
66. According to Dr. Milton Leitenberg: On July 7, 1997, the Cuban government ¬led
an of¬cial request with the Russian government, in the latter™s role as one of the
original treaty depositories of the BTWC, requesting that consultation procedures
be initiated to examine Cuba™s charge that the United States had used biological
weapons against it, in the form of a crop destroying insect, Thrips Palmi. Cuba
had made roughly a dozen previous charges alleging U.S. bioweapons use involv-
ing pathogens against humans, domestic animals, and crop plants since the early
1970s, and had in earlier years addressed summaries of these to the United Nations
281
NOTES TO PAGES 217“224

Secretary General. This was the ¬rst occasion, however, in which Cuba requested
consultation under Article V of the BTWC, and it was also the very ¬rst time that
any nation had requested that the procedures appearing in Article V should be car-
ried out. However, Article VI of the BTWC affords the means for any state party to
the BTWC to ¬le a complaint with the UN Security Council if it believes that it is
the victim of bioweapons use, and the UN Security Council may then carry out an
investigation. On no previous occasion had Cuba ever ¬led a complaint with the UN
Security Council under Article VI and requested an investigation, and it did not do
so in this case either.
Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and
Analysis, Report prepared for the 7th International Symposium on Protection
against Chemical and Biological Warfare, Stockholm, Sweden, June 2001, Criti-
cal Reviews in Microbiology, Chapter 9 (2001), available at http://www.fas.org/
bwc/papers/bw20th.htm; See also, America Accused of Violating the Biological
and Toxins Weapons Convention, CBW Chronicle, Vol. II, No. 3 (October 1997),
available at http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?sn=cb20020113282; See also, Country
Overviews: Cuba: Biological Overview, Nuclear Threat Initiative, available at
http://www.nti.org/e research/pro¬les/Cuba/Biological/index.html#fnB34.


Chapter 9. The Challenge of Global Governance
1. Poverty, Infectious Disease, and Environmental Degradation as Threats to Collective
Security: A UN Panel Report; Population and Development Review, Vol. 31, No. 3,

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