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4, 1963, pp. 2, 28 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University).
113 Kennedy addressed: text of President Kennedy's radio/television
address to the nation, October 22, 1962 (JFKL).
113 "I had the first watch": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral
History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982), p. 64.
115 "I was thinking": interview with Keith Taylor, May 2000.
113 "After the president's announcement": Brown interview.
114 listening post intercepted: NSA, Secret/Sabre intercept (DTG:
0516Z), October 23, 1962.
114 Kara: NSA, Secret/Sabre intercept (DTG: 0636Z), October 23,
1962.
114 Nikolaevsk NSA, Secret/Sabre intercept (DTG: 1326Z), October
23, 1962.
114 more than half spoke Russian: NSA, Secret/Kimbo intercept
(DTG: 2115Z), October 23, 1962.
115 "A Flash precedence message": Pete Azzole, "Afterthoughts,"
NCK4 Cryptolog (Summer 1993), p. 13.
115 A Pentagon official told him: CIA, Top Secret/Eyes Only,
Memorandum for the Files, "John McCone meeting with the President,"
October 23, 1962 (FRUS, Vol. XI, #51).
115 Details on the Urgenck NSA, Secret/Sabre intercept (DTG:
1638Z), October 24, 1962.



567
115 Harry Eisenbeiss: Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball (New York:
Random House, 1991), p. 391.
116 "has altered course and is probably": NSA, Secret/Sabre
intercept (DTG: 1917Z), October 24, 1962.
116 "HFDF ... fix on the Soviet cargo ship": NSA, Secret/Sabre
intercept (DTG:
1533Z), October 24, 1962. 116 passed the note to McCone: White
House, Top Secret/Sensitive, Third Meeting
of the Executive Committee of the NSC, October 24, 1962 (JFKL,
National
Security Files, Meetings and Memorandum Series, Executive
Committee,
Vol. I). 116 "Mr. President, we have a preliminary report": Robert F.
Kennedy, Thirteen
Days (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 71. 116 "no ships ... be stopped":
ibid., pp. 71”72. 116 "Have you got the word": Department of State,
Memorandum of Telephone
Conversation, Bundy to Ball, October 24, 1962 (FRUS, Vol. XI, #58).
116 "desperate signals": U.S. Mission to the UN, Confidential/Limited
Distribution memorandum, Schlesinger to Stevenson, October 25, 1962
(JFKL, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General).
117 "In view of these signals": ibid.
117 "Although no additional missiles": JCS, Top Secret report,
"Chronology of the JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis," January
4, 1963, p. 36 (Lem-nitzer Papers, National Defense University).
118 "DF line bearings indicate": NSA, Secret/Sabre intercept (DTG:
0645Z), October 27, 1962.
118 "One mission aborted for mechanical": White House, Top
Secret/Sensitive, "Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting of the
Executive Committee of the NSC," October 27, 1962 (JFKL, National
Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee,
Vol. I, Meetings 6”10).
118 "If our planes are fired on": ibid.
118 "The wreckage of the U-2 was on the ground": ibid.
119 "Any time the Cubans scrambled": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels
Only, Oral
History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982), pp. 40-41. 119 "You'd
debrief in the airplane": ibid.
119 "The plan was to lure": Bruce Bailey, "The RB-47 & RB-135 in
Vietnam," web posting at <http://www.55srwa.org/55_vietnam.html>
(May 1, 2000).
120 "In the last two hours": Department of Justice, Top Secret
memorandum, Robert Kennedy to Rusk, October 30, 1962 (JFKL,
President's Office Files, Cuba Missile Crisis, Khrushchev
Correspondence) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #96).
120 "I said that he had better understand": ibid.


568
120 "I said a letter had just been transmitted": ibid.
121 "Any steps toward easing tensions": ibid.
121 " 'Because of the plane' ": Dobrynin's cable to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, October 27, 1962.
121 "The most important thing": ibid.
122 "then we should take out the SAM sites": White House, Top
Secret/Sensitive, "Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting of the Executive
Committee of the National Security Council," October 27, 1962 (JFKL,
National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive
Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #97).
122 "unless irrefutable evidence of the dismantling": JCS, Top Secret
report, "Chronology of the JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis,"
January 4, 1963, p. 39 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University).
122 "When I reported in": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral
History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982), pp. 6-8.
122 "The Soviet government": message from Chairman Khrushchev to
President Kennedy, October 28, 1962 (JFKL, National Security Files,
Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence) (FRUS, Vol. XI,
#102).
122 "I remember during the period": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels
Only, Oral History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982), p. 60.
123 "All the communications that we had": NSA, Secret/Comint
Channels Only, Oral History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982), p. 6.
123 "After the offensive weapons were removed": ibid, pp. 15”16. 123
"very, very bad things": ibid., pp. 17”18. 123 "During the crisis": ibid., p.
22.
123 "There were times": Robert D. Farley, quoted in ibid.
124 "We had photographs of missile launchers": Robert McNamara,
interviewed on CNN Worldview, June 18, 1998.
124 Lourdes: According to the CIA, the exact location of the listening
post is 22 59 15N and 84 27 SOW.
125 vast area of twenty-eight square miles: President Ronald Reagan,
quoted in "President's Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense,"
New York Times, March 24, 1983.
125 "the general dissatisfaction of the President": CIA, Secret/Eyes
Only, Helms
Memorandum for the Record, October 16, 1962 (FRUS, Vol. XI, #19).
125 "I stated that we were prepared": ibid.
125 "We suggested to them": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only,
Oral History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982), pp. 38-39.
126 "The tubes would burn out": ibid.
126 "NSA will continue an intensive program": CIA, Top Secret
memorandum, McCone to Bundy (December 15, 1962) (JFKL, National
Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 208) (FRUS, Vol.
XI, #248).
126 "Duty station for the Mutter": Bill Baer, "USNS Joseph E. Muller,


569
TAG-171," web site http://www.asa.npoint.net/baer01.htm (January 3,
2000).
127 "We only had": ibid.
127 "Since they used microwave": Mike Sannes, "USNS Muller and the
ASA," at
web site http://www.asa.npoint.net/sannes01.htm (January 3,
2000). 127 "Often they sent": ibid.
127 "It would be a good idea to assassinate": NSA, Secret/Kimbo
intercept (DTG: 1551Z), January 16, 1963.
128 "Mr. McCone cabled me this morning": CIA, Secret letter, Carter
to Bundy, May 2, 1963 (JFKL, National Security Files, Countries Series,
Cuba, Intelligence Material) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #332).
129 "Lechuga hinted that Castro": Department of State, Secret
memorandum, Attwood to Gordon Chase of the NSC, November 8, 1963
(LBJL, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban
Leaders) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #374).
129 Major Rene Vallejo: ibid.
129 "Castro would go along": Department of State, Top Secret/Eyes
Only memorandum, Attwood to Gordon Chase of the NSC (November 22,
1963) (LBJL, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with
Cuban Leaders) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #379).
130 "At the President's instruction": White House, Secret/Sensitive,
Bundy Memorandum for the Record, November 12, 1963 (LBJL, National
Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders) (FRUS,
Vol. XI, #377).
130 "Vallejo's manner": Department of State, Top Secret/Eyes Only
memorandum, Attwood to Gordon Chase of the NSC, November 22, 1963
(LBJL, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban
Leaders) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #379).
130 "I believe that the approaching": NSA, Top Secret/Dinar, Report
on Cuba's Internal Problems with Rebels (November 22, 1963) (ARRB).
131 NSA Sigint Command Center: Details are in NSA, Top
Secret/Dinar, "Record of Events Log," November 22, 1963 (ARRB).
131 Don Gardiner: Details of what the Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, Taylor, and McNamara were doing at the time of the
assassination are in William Manchester, The Death of a President (New
York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 140-44, 190.
132 "When this monstrously terrible thing happened": CIA, Carter to
Judy Ei-thelberg, November 30, 1963 (Carter papers, George C. Marshall
Research Library, Lexington, VA).
132 "President Kennedy is dead": ibid.
132 "Thousands upon thousands of miles away": George Morton,
"Kami Seya”
1963," NCVA Cryptolog (Fall 1992), p. 9. 132 Valdez: Ron Briggs,
quoted at web site <http://www.geocities.com/swab-



570
byctrl/MemoriesPage2. html>. 132 NSA continued: For NSA activities
immediately after the assassination, see
NSA, Top Secret/Comint Channels Only, Eugene F. Yeates
Memorandum for
the Record, June 15, 1978 (ARRB).
132 "A state of alert is ordered": NSA, Top Secret/Dinar/Noforn,
"SIGINT Daily Summary Number Twenty," November 23, 1963 (ARRB).
See also NSA, Top Secret/Dinar, Watch Report 0600 22 November-0600
23 November 1963 (ARRB).
133 "military units are being relocated": NSA, Top Secret/Dinar
intercept, "Cuba's Reaction to Kennedy's Murder," November 27, 1963
(ARRB).
133 Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia: NSA, Top Secret/Dinar
intercept, "Latin
American Countries Place Military Units on Alert," November 22,
1963
(ARRB). 133 "I got the immediate impression": NSA, Top
Secret/Dinar intercept,
"Comment on Castro's Reaction to Death of Kennedy," November 27,
1963
(ARRB). 133 "The assassination of Kennedy": NSA, Top Secret/Dinar
intercept, "Cuban
Statement on Visa for Oswald," November 25, 1963 (ARRB). 133 "were
unanimous in believing": NSA, Top Secret/Dinar intercept, "Cuban
Authorities State Views Concerning Death of Kennedy," November 27,
1963
(ARRB).
133 "In diplomatic circles": NSA, Top Secret/Dinar intercept, "Robert
Kennedy Viewed as Leading Contender to Succeed His Brother in 1964,"
November 22, 1963 (ARRB).
134 Egyptian diplomats: NSA, Top Secret/Dinar intercept, "Egyptian
Reaction to President Kennedy's Murder," November 23, 1963 (ARRB).
134 Dutch intercepts: NSA, Top Secret/Dinar intercept, "Information
Requested about Foreign Representatives' Attendance at Kennedy
Funeral," November 26, 1963 (ARRB).
134 "will considerably weaken": NSA, Top Secret/Dinar intercept,
"Kennedy's Death Felt to Weaken Foreign Policy," November 23, 1963
(ARRB).
134 "After signing the register": NSA, Top Secret/Dinar intercept,
"American Ambassador Believes Russia and Cuba Involved in Kennedy's
Death," November 25, 1963 (ARRB).
134 "Behind the mysterious crime": NSA, Top Secret/Dinar/Minimum
Distribution intercept, "President Kennedy's Assassination a Zionist
Conspiracy," November 25, 1963 (ARRB).
134 Italian ambassador to Syria: NSA, Top Secret/Dinar intercept,
"Syrians Claim Zionists Responsible for Death of President Kennedy,"


571
November 29, 1963 (ARRB).
134 "Certain ill-intentioned persons": NSA, Secret/Sabre intercept,
"Reaction to Kennedy's Assassination," November 25, 1963 (ARRB).
134 "were deeply touched": NSA, Top Secret/Dinar intercept,
"Hungarian Reaction to News of Assassination of President Kennedy,"
November 25, 1963 (ARRB).
135 "alarming... anti-Communist hysteria": NSA, Top Secret/Dinar
intercept, "Reactions to Kennedy's Death," November 27, 1963 (ARRB).
135 "In spite of the antagonism": NSA, Secret/Sabre intercept,
"Official Cuban Statement on Death of President Kennedy," November 23,
1963 (ARRB).
135 "The manner of perforating": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only,
Meredith K. Gardner Memorandum for the Record, June 15, 1964
(ARRB).
135 "the names appearing in Lee's and Marina's address books": ibid.
135 "The appearance of the term 'micro dots' ": ibid.
136 "I have eliminated two items": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels
Only memorandum, Rowlett to Tordella, June 16, 1964 (ARRB).
136 "I do not believe a statement": ibid.
136 "The ball is in our court": White House, Top Secret/Eyes
Only/Sensitive memorandum, Chase to Bundy, December 2, 1963
(LBJL, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban
Leaders) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #382).
137 "I assume you will want to brief the President": White
House, Top Secret/Eyes Only memorandum, Chase to Bundy,
November 25, 1963 (LBJL, National Security File, Country File, Cuba,
Contact with Cuban Leaders) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #378).
137 "Lechuga ... and the Cubans in general": White House, Top
Secret/Eyes Only memorandum, Chase to Bundy, December 11, 1963
(LBJL, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban
Leaders) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #387).
137 "He asked": CIA, "Memorandum of DCI Meeting with President
Johnson," November 28, 1963 (FRUS, Vol. XI, #381).
137 Johnson later approved: White House, Top Secret/Sensitive,
"Chase Memorandum of Meeting with the President," December 19, 1963
(LBJL, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings) (FRUS, Vol.
XI, #388).
138 "Until the tragic death of President Kennedy": NSA, Top
Secret/Dinar intercept, "Castro Interview on Relations with U.S.,"
January 3, 1964 (ARRB).

CHAPTER 6: Ears
Page
139 Nate Gerson: Nate Gerson, "Collaboration in Sigint: Canada-
U.S.," La Physique au Canada (November”December 1998), pp. 359”



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