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(May 11, 2000).
233 "After many years I finally believe": oral history of William L.
McGonagle (November 16, 1998).
233 McGonagle died: Michael E. Ruane, "An Ambushed Crew Salutes
Its Captain," Washington. Post (April 10, 1999).
233 "Frankly, there was considerable skepticism": letter, Christian to
James M. Ennes, Jr. (January 5, 1978).
234 "Exculpation of Israeli nationals": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra,
"Attack on a Sigint Collector, the USS Liberty" (1981), p. 61.
234 "Though the pilots testified to the contrary": ibid., p. 41.
234 "The fact that two separate torpedo boat commanders": ibid.
235 "A persistent question relating to the Liberty": ibid., pp. 63”64.
235 "I believed the attack": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, Dr. Louis
Tordella memorandum for the record, June 20, 1967.
235 "It was not an official policy": From "Israel Reportedly Killed POWs
in '67," Washington Post (August 17, 1995).
235 "To speculate on the motives of an attack group": Lieutenant
Commander Walter L. Jacobsen, JAGC, USN, "A Juridical Examination
of the Israeli Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty" Naval Law Review (Winter
1986), pp. 1-52. The quoted text appears on p. 51.
237 "I have to conclude that it was Israel's intent to sink the Liberty":
Memorandum, Moorer to AMEU (June 8, 1997).
237 a CIA report: CIA, FOIA release of documents and television
transcript (January 28, 1985).
237 "The Israelis have been very successful": CIA,
Secret/Noforn/Nocontract/ Orcon, "Israel: Foreign Intelligence and
Security Services" (March 1979), p. 32.
238 "The principal targets of the Israeli intelligence": ibid., p. 9.
238 "Congress to this day": Memorandum, Moorer to AMEU (June 8,
1997). 238 "I saw Abed lurch out": Details of the killing were reported by
William A.
Orme, Jr., "BBC Says Unprovoked Israeli Fire Killed an
Employee in
Lebanon," New York Times (June 22, 2000).

CHAPTER 8: Spine
Page
240 "The Navy was very interested in having a trawler program": NSA,
Top Secret/Umbra, oral history of Eugene Sheck (December 16, 1982), p.
2.
241 "We talked once": Oral History of Admiral David Lamar
McDonald, USN (Ret.) (November 1976) (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis,
Maryland).
242 "We were operating": Sam Tooma, "USS Banner Anecdotes," USS
Pueblo web site



584
<http://www.usspueblo.org/v2f/incident/incidentfrarne.html> (April 15,
2000).
242 The most serious incident took place: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Reconnaissance Center, Top Secret, "The Pueblo Index: Experience of
Harassment" (January 24, 1968), pp. 1-2.
243 "There were some touchy situations": Oral History of Vice
Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret.) (1978) (U.S. Naval Institute,
Annapolis, Maryland). Hooper was commander, Service Force, Pacific
Fleet, based in Hawaii.
243 "The Liberty[-size] ships were owned by NSA": interview with
Stephen R. Harris (February 2000).
244 "The location of the first mission hadn't been decided upon":
Trevor Arm-brister, A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the
Pueblo Affair (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), p. 154; NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra, Oral History of Eugene Sheck, December 16, 1982.
244 "would do one patrol in response": Sheck oral history.
245 "I want to sell you top secrets": Pete Early, Family of Spies: Inside
the John Walker Spy Ring (New York: Bantam, 1988), p. 63.
245 Starting in May: This account of increasing North Korean activity
draws on CIA, Secret, "North Korean Intentions and Capabilities with
Respect to South
Korea" (September 21, 1967), p. 1. 246 "We were about": Details of the
attack on the RB-47 are from George V. Back,
"North Korean Attack on RB-47," web posting at
<http://www.55srwa.org/
55_back.html> (May 1, 2000). 248 "This young fellow": Sheck oral
history.
248 "The following information is provided to aid": U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee
on the U.S.S. Pueblo, Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane
Incidents, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st Sess, (1989).
249 "This was the first voyage": ibid.
249 "NSA has a pretty strong voice": Sheck oral history.
250 On January 2, 1968: Unless otherwise noted, all details of the
voyage of the USS Pueblo, as well as the prior approval process, come
from U.S. Navy, Top Secret/Limited Distribution/Noforn, "Findings of
Fact, Opinions and Recommendations of a Court of Inquiry Convened by
Order of Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to Inquire into
the Circumstances Relating to the Seizure of USS Pueblo (AGER-2) by
North Korean Naval Forces" (April 9, 1969). Details on General Steakley
and Captain Gladding: Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability: The
True Story of the Pueblo Affair (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), pp.
192-199.
251 "Determine the nature and extent of naval activity": U.S. House
of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee



585
on the U.S.S. Pueblo, Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane
Incidents, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), pp. 762-767.
251 "I was very upset when we found out": Harris interview.
252 "Out of Japan": E. M. Kisler, "Bucher's Bastards," written in
North Korea in September 1968.
253 "It... infiltrated scores of armed boats": FBIS Transcript,
Pyongyang KCNA International Service in English (November 27, 1967).
253 "Drawn into the spy ring": FBIS Transcript, Pyongyang KCNA
International
Service in English (November 10, 1967). 253 "As our side has declared
time and again": FBIS Transcript, Pyongyang KCNA
International Service in English (December 1, 1967). 253 quoted in a
Japanese newspaper: New York Times, January 27, 1968.
253 "The U.S. imperialist aggressor troops": FBIS Transcript,
Pyongyang KCNA International Service in English (January 11, 1968).
254 "Although the seas were calm": Stu Russell's remarks are quoted
from Stu Russell, "Cold and Getting Colder," U.S.S. Pueblo web site,
<http://www.usspueblo.org/ v2f/incident/incidentframe.html> (April
15, 2000).
255 "We had a crew meeting and we were told": interview with
member of ship's crew.
255 "In the New Year, the U.S. imperialist aggressors": FBIS
Transcript, Pyongyang KCNA International Service in English (January
10, 1968).
257 "We were close enough to see the crew": Russell, "Cold and
Getting Colder."
258 "Subchaser No. 35": Secret, "Chronology of Events Concerning
the Seizure of the USS Pueblo" (NSA, undated), pp. 1-4.
258 "A guy comes steaming back": Sheet oral history, p. 30.
260 SC-35 then instructed all North Korean vessels: Secret,
"Chronology of Events Concerning the Seizure of the USS Pueblo" (NSA,
undated), pp. 1”4.
261 "The Koreans requested from the United States": interview with
former U.S. Air Force F-4 pilot Bruce Charles (February 2000).
262 "in excess of that necessary or desired": Department of Defense,
Secret memorandum, "What Reaction Forces Were Available and What
Were Our Reaction Options?" (January 24, 1968).
262 That left Okinawa: For the F-105s on Okinawa, see Thomas C.
Utts, "After North Korea Seized USS Pueblo on the Eve of Tet, It Looked
Like the Communists Had Opened a Two-Front War," Vietnam magazine
(date illegible on author's copy).
262 Bucher's actions during the attack: See, generally, Lloyd M.
Bucher with Mark Rascovich, Bucher: My Story (New York: Doubleday,
1970).
263 "For ten days": Henry Millington, quoted in Sheck oral history.



586
263 "That happened around two o'clock": ibid.
267 "Each time the mike was keyed": Russell, "Cold and Getting
Colder."
268 "That's guys' lives": "Betrayal: The Story of the USS Pueblo,"
History Channel (1997).
268 "They were on their own": Sheck oral history.
269 "We were, it seemed": Russell, "Arrival in Wonsan," USS Pueblo
web site, <http://www.usspueblo.org/v2f/incident/incidentframe.html>
(April 15, 2000).
269 "General Carter read it, and then he got up": Sheck oral history.
270 Within hours of the incident: Details of McNamara's war council
come from Department of Defense, Top Secret, Memorandum for the
Secretary of Defense (January 25, 1968).
271 "We had F-4s lined up wingtip to wingtip": oral history of Gen.
Charles H. Bonesteel, III, Volume 1 (1973), p. 348 (U.S. Army Military
History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania). Bonesteel was
commanding general, 8th U.S. Army; commander-in-chief, United
Nations Command; and commander, U.S. Forces Korea.
271 "They wanted to provoke": This and the subsequent quotations
from Gene Sheck are from Sheck oral history.
273 "My first pass started off near Vladivostok": This and details on
the A-12 come from Paul F. Crickmore, Lockheed SR- 71: The Secret
Missions Exposed (London: Osprey Aerospace, 1993), pp. 31”33.
273 "Our mission was to support the captain": Rakfeldt's comments
and details concerning the USS Volador come from Harry O. Rakfeldt,
letter to author (April 17,2000).
275 "The KGB did not plan to capture": interview with Oleg Kalugin,
unpublished CBS News transcript (undated), p. 9.
276 "The Soviets had been allowed to inspect": ibid., pp. 12”13. 276
"The ciphers and codes are considered": ibid., pp. 8”9.
276 "perhaps the best operative" ... "read your cables!": Pete Early,
"Interview with the Spy Master," Washington Post Magazine, April 23,
1995.
277 Jerry Whitworth: Early, Family of Spies, p. 137.
277 "Using the keylists provided by John Walker": interview with Oleg
Kalugin, unpublished CBS News transcript (undated), pp. 13”14.
277 In some instances, classified information was passed on: The
Court of Inquiry reported that one crew member "cooperated with the
North Koreans during detention in that he amplified classified
information which the North Koreans had captured and provided
additional information which was not otherwise available." Other crew
members, said the Court, "may also have disclosed significant
classified information to a lesser degree, but the actual
. degree of such disclosure, over and above what was already available
to the North Koreans, could not be determined from the evidence." U.S.



587
Navy, Top Secret/Limited Distribution/Noforn, "Findings of Fact,
Opinions and Recommendations of a Court of Inquiry Convened by Order
of Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to Inquire into the
Circumstances Relating to the Seizure of USS Pueblo (AGER-2) by North
Korean Naval Forces" (April 9, 1969), p. 94.
278 "Americans were shocked": William J. Taylor, Jr., "Remembering
Seizure of the Pueblo," Washington Times (December 27, 1994).
278 "When a fourth-rate": "Betrayal," History Channel (1998).
278 "I will sign the document": New York Times (December 23, 1968),
p. 3.
278 "A determination": U.S. Navy, Top Secret/Limited
Distribution/Noforn, "Findings of Fact, Opinions and Recommendations
of a Court of Inquiry Convened by Order of Commander in Chief, United
States Pacific Fleet, to Inquire into the Circumstances Relating to the
Seizure of USS Pueblo (AGER-2) by North Korean Naval Forces" (April 9,
1969), p. 84.
279 "He should have persisted": ibid., p. 88.
279 "failed completely in the execution": ibid., p. 89.
279 "With few exceptions": ibid.
280 "You're surrounded": Sheck oral history.
280 Naval Security Group officers at Pacific Fleet Headquarters: The
court of inquiry recommended that Captain Everett B. Gladding,
Director, Naval Security Group Pacific, be given a letter of reprimand for
allegedly "failing to ensure the readiness of Pueblo's research
detachment" and "[failing] to provide intelligence support to Pueblo
during the mission." But Gladding's boss, Admiral Hyland, the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, vetoed the recommendation.
280 "Folks out there said": Sheck oral history.
280 "They had total incapacity": Bonesteel oral history.
281 "They have suffered": U.S. Navy, press release (May 6, 1969).
281 "The Pueblo incident": interview with Oleg Kalugin, unpublished
CBS News
transcript (undated), pp. 32-33, 24-25. 281 moved to a pier: AP World
News (October 26, 1999).
281 Led by a former NSA contractor; "The sooner, the better": "North
Korea Moves Pueblo," The Lonely Bull (newsletter of the crew of the
Pueblo) (November 1999), p. 1.

CHAPTER 9: Adrenaline
Page
284 "I believe that the enemy will attempt": Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV), Secret message, Westmoreland to General
Earle Wheeler, January 22, 1968. (LBJL, National Security File, Country
File, Vietnam, Box 68-69.)
285 "Japanese reports back to Tokyo": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, "On



588
Watch" (September 1986), pp. 33-41.
286 "Thus began the Indochina War": ibid.
286 "true autonomous self-government": Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A
History, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 148.
286 "would mean extremely adverse reactions": CIA, Secret
memorandum, "Intelligence Memorandum No. 231: Consequences of
Communist Control of French Indochina" (October 7, 1949), pp. 1-3.
(HSTL, President's Secretary's File, Intelligence File, Box 250.)
286 aid, weapons, and U.S. forces: On August 2, 1950, the first ten
U.S. officers arrived in Saigon. Sixty others soon followed, and before
Truman left office in January 1953, 200 more would be sent in to help
the French fight off Vietnamese opponents.
286 witless CIA officer: Sedgwick Tourison, Secret Army Secret War:
Washington's Tragic Spy Operation in North Vietnam (Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 7.
287 The operation began on March 13, 1954: CIA, William M. Leary,
"Supporting the 'Secret War': CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974,"
Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1999-2000).
287 "I recall very dramatically": interview with David W. Gaddy (May
2000).
287 "couldn't find any hard evidence": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, "On
Watch" (September 1986), p. 39.
288 "the current situation in South Vietnam": Director of Central
Intelligence Directive 6/3, quoted in NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn, "In
the Shadow of War" (June 1969), pp. 30-31.

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