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288 400th ASA Special Operations Unit (Provisional): In September
1961 its name was changed to the 82nd Special Operations Unit. By
mid-1966 the organization had grown considerably; it was thereafter
named the 509th ASA Group.
289 "Cryptography must be secret, swift, and accurate"; "During the
decades past": NSA, Essential Matters: A History of the Cryptographic
Branch of the People's Army of Viet-Nam, 1945-1975 (translated and
edited by David W. Gaddy, NSA, 1994), pp. xiii-xiv.
289 "destroyed the entire set of [cryptographic] materials": ibid, p.
106.
290 "As a civilian from NSA": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, "Deployment
of the First ASA Unit to Vietnam" (undated), p. 80.
290 James T. Davis: For this account, I have relied on Army
Intelligence and Security Command, "Biographical Data on Specialist
Four James T. Davis" (undated).
292 "Many of us who knew about the 34A operations": Robert S.
McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and
Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), p. 130.
292 "By midsummer of 1964 the curtain was going up": NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra, "On Watch" (September 1986), p. 41.



589
293 DeSoto patrols: ibid., p. 43.
293 another DeSoto mission was scheduled: Unless otherwise noted,
details of the Gulf of Tonkin incident come from Edwin E. Morse's
excellent study, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); and NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra, "On Watch" (September 1986), Chapter 6, "The Gulf of
Tonkin Incident, the DeSoto Patrols and OPLAN 34A," pp. 43-50.
297 "It seems likely that": Department of State, Top Secret
memorandum, Forre-stal to Secretary of State (August 3, 1964)
(Department of State, FRUS 1964-1968, vol. 1, p. 599).
299 "Everybody was demanding the Sigint": Morse, Tonkin Gulf, pp.
197, 199.
300 "I must address the suggestion": U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations
Committee, "The Gulf of Tonkin: The 1964 Incidents," Hearings (February
20,1968), p. 19.
300 Operation Northwoods: JCS, Top Secret/SpecialHandling/Noforn,
Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Northwoods, Annex
to Appendix to Enclosure A, "Pretexts to Justify U.S. Military Intervention
in Cuba" (March 12, 1962), p. 8. Details of the operation are covered in
more detail in chapter 4, "Fists."
300 to send the Sigint ship Banner: See chapter 8, "Spine."
301 "At the time there's no question": Michael Charlton and Anthony
Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why: The American Involvement in Vietnam
(New York: Hill & Wang, 1989), p. 108.
301 number of cryptologic personnel: 1,322 were from ASA; 246 from
the Air Force; and 179 from NSA and the Navy. NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra/Noforn, "In the Shadow of War" (June 1969), p. 118.
302 "U.S. personnel with the ability to read Vietnamese": ibid., p. 55.
302 "We found that we had adequate": interview with a former senior
NSA B02 Group official.
303 "And of course there was always": interview with another former
senior NSA B Group official.
303 "There was no blotter large enough": NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra/Noforn, "Working Against the Tide," part one (June 1970),
p. 14.
303 "Through interrogation of these men": NSA, Secret/Noforn,
"Deadly Transmissions" (December 1970), p. 4.
304 "The inescapable conclusion from the captured documents":
ibid., p. 5.
304 "The enemy might disappear from a location": Lieutenant General
Charles R. Myer, "Viet Cong Sigint and U.S. Army Comsec in Vietnam,"
Cryptologia. (April 1989), pp. 144-45.
305 "Even as late as the spring of 1969": NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra/Noforn,
"Working Against the Tide," part one (June 1970), p. 14. 305 "It was



590
... likely that they could gain": ibid., p. 5.
305 "some tortuous evolutions": Myer, "Viet Cong Sigint and U.S.
Army Comsec in Vietnam," p. 147.
306 "Signal security, particularly in voice": ibid., p. 150.
306 During 1967, Comsec monitors eavesdropped on: NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra/Noforn, "Working Against the Tide," part one (June 1970),
p. 35. 306 "it was shot at the whole way": ibid., p. 19.
306 "capstone of the enemy's Sigint operations": ibid., p. 9.
307 estimated to be around $15 million: ibid.
307 "All of our primary operational communications": ibid., p. 16.
307 "Walker is not responsible for your failures": Pete Early,
"Interview with the
Spy Master," Washington Post Magazine (April 23, 1995). 307 "We
certainly provided": interview with Oleg Kalugin, unpublished CBS
News transcript (undated), pp. 15-16. 310 "compromising cipher-
signal anomalies": Details on the Izmeritel and Guam:
NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn, "Working Against the Tide," part two
(June
1970), p. 202.
310 "The communications were in plain language": ibid.
311 "Comsec monitors and analysts had an advisory": NSA,
Top Secret/ Umbra/Noforn, "Working Against the Tide," part one (June
1970), p. 16.
311 "35 kilometers north of here tomorrow;" "On landing, the assault
force": ibid., p. 35.
312 "a veritable flood": ibid., p. 38.
312 "Most U.S. commanders in Vietnam": ibid., p. 50.
313 orders were transmitted to the ship on May 26: USS Oxford,
"Command History" (January 6, 1966), Enclosure 1.
313 "In Africa we were looking at some of the local links": interview
with George A. Cassidy (January 2000).
314 "They tried to keep the Oxford movements very highly classified":
interview with John De Chene (February 5, 2000).
315 "I was on the back of a flat pickup truck": interview with Ray
Bronco (February 17, 2000).
315 "There was always a rivalry between our sister ship": e-mail from
Richard E. Kerr, Jr., to author (January 26, 2000).
316 "a world of their own": Bronco interview.
318 "The operators hung a long wire out the back": This and other
details of the RU-6A Beaver and the RU-8D Seminole aircraft are drawn
from NSA, "Army Security Agency Aerial Reconnaissance: Mission and
Sacrifice" (undated), pp. 2-6; NSA, "National Vigilance Park RU-8 Aircraft
Dedication Ceremony" (May 12, 1998).
318 "Whoever controlled the shipping channel": This and Richard
McCarthy's other comments come from his e-mail to author (February
25, 2000). McCarthy served in Vietnam from December 1965 to August


591
1967 and was awarded aircrew wings and the air medal with twenty-
seven oak-leaf clusters. 519 "Naturally, that particular flight element":
Major General Doyle Larson, "Direct Intelligence Combat Support in
Vietnam: Project Teaball," American Intelligence Journal (Spring/Summer
1994), pp. 56”58.
320 "MiG-21s would streak out": This and Bruce Bailey's other
remarks are from "The RB-47 & RC-135 in Vietnam," his web posting at
55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing Association web site
<http://www.55srwa.org/ 55_vietnam.html> (May 1, 2000).
321 "They were designed to intercept": Details on the drones are
from Bruce Bailey, "Drones in Southeast Asia," web posting at 55th
Strategic Reconnaissance Wing Association web site
<http://www.55srwa.org/55_bruce.html> (May 1, 2000).
322 the planes were soon assigned exclusively to Sigint: The CIA
conducted a photo mission over North Vietnam on August 15, 1961.
Between 1962 and 1964, CIA U-2s staged a total of thirty-six
photographic missions over North and South Vietnam. By April 1964,
however, photographic requirements were changing from strategic
reconnaissance to tactical support as the Vietcong became more active.
As a result of the increasing level of combat in Indochina, the U.S.
Intelligence Board gave responsibility for aerial reconnaissance of the
areas where fighting was taking place to the Strategic Air Command.
Following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Air Force assumed
responsibility for all of Indochina (CIA, "The CIA and the U-2 Program,
1954-1974" [1998], pp. 222-31).
322 "All I had to do was throw a switch": Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos,
Skunk Works (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1994), p. 185.
322 "The pilot did not operate the receivers": Bailey's comments and
details of the U-2 come from Bruce Bailey, "The View from the
Top," web posting at 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing
Association web site <http://www.55srwa.org/55_bruce.html> (May 1,
2000).
323 "Throttles to Max A/B"; details on March 21, 1968, SR-71 flight:
Paul F. Crickmore, Lockheed SR-71: The Secret Missions Exposed
(London: Osprey Aerospace, 1995), pp. 1-8.
324 "The SR-71 was excellent for 'stimulating' ": Richard H. Graham,
SR-71 Revealed: The Inside Story (Osceola, Wise.: Motorbooks
International, 1996), pp. 83-84.
325 "As a member of the Army Security Agency": This and David L.
Parks's other remarks are from his e-mail to author (February 15, 2000).
326 the 199th Light Infantry Brigade: This was composed of a
headquarters company and three battalions (three thousand men, more
or less) of infantry troops.
330 "If SD and SSD are included": CIA report, Harold P. Ford, "CIA
and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968" (1998), p. 85.
531 "MACV used mainly Confidential-level documents": ibid., p. 93.


592
331 "frustratingly unproductive": ibid.
332 "I was frequently and sometimes tendentiously interrupted": ibid.
332 NSA began reporting that two North Vietnamese Army divisions:
U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, General William C.
Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., et al (82 Civ. 7913), Stipulation of Facts, p. 2;
hereinafter, Westmoreland v. CBS.
332 "also told MACV headquarters personnel": William E. Rowe,
"Defending Long Binh," Vietnam (February 1995), pp. 47-52.
332 NSA issued the first in a series: Westmoreland v. CBS, exhibit
518, "Treatment of Indications in Finished Intelligence: NSA."
333 "A 'we are winning' consensus pretty much": CIA report, Harold
P. Ford, "CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968"
(1998), p. 108.
333 "It would seem to us that there is a relationship": James J. Wirtz,
The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press,
1991), p. 213. 333 the Oxford sailed to Bangkok: USS Oxford,
Confidential, 1968 "Command
History" (March 19, 1969), p. 2. 333 "Coordinated Vietnamese
Communist Offensive Evidenced": Westmoreland v.
CBS, exhibit 64, p. 26.
333 "Evening missions were usually very quiet": McCarthy e-mail to
author (February 25, 2000).
334 Westmoreland finally saw: The following account is from CIA,
Harold P. Ford, "CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes
1962-1968" (1998), p. 115.
334 "At twelve midnight": e-mail from David L. Parks to author
(February 18, 2000).
334 "They had been hiding in tunnels and foxholes": Rowe,
"Defending Long Binh."
335 "They've hit the embassy and palace": NSA, account by Gary
Bright, NSA Cryptologic Museum.
336 the Oxford's crew: USS Oxford, Confidential, 1968 "Command
History" (March 19, 1969), p. 2.
336 "The National Security Agency stood alone": CIA, Harold P. Ford,
"CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968" (1998),
pp. 116, 141.
337 "The National Security Agency extends its heartiest": NSA,
telegram, Carter to Truman (May 8, 1968) (Carter Papers, George C.
Marshall Library, Box 40, Folder 36).
337 Lyndon Johnson was being compared in the press to General
George Custer:
Art Buchwald, Washington Post (February 6, 1968). 337 "Nothing had
been done to attend to their wounds": e-mail from David L.
Parks to author (February 12, 2000).



593
339 "My opinion of 1969 on Oxford": Kerr e-mail to author (January
26, 2000). 339 95,000 people: testimony of Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger, U.S.
House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on
Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for
1975, Part
1, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 598.
339 In Southeast Asia alone: NSA, audiotape in the agency's
Cryptologic Museum.
339 "monstrous": interview with Lieutenant General Marshall S.
Carter (July 17-18, 1980).
340 "you couldn't tell whether": ibid.
340 "termite level": letter, Carter to William D. Pawley (May 19, 1997),
Carter Papers, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Ky., Box 59, Folder
3.
340 "I am not winning": Letter, Carter to McCone (January 13, 1969),
Carter Papers, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Ky, Box 37, Folder
8.
340 the sixth NSA director: NSA, "Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, USN,
Becomes Agency's New Director," NS4N (August 1969), p. 2; Navy
biography.
341 "At the end of World War II": Department of the Army, Major
Commanders' Annual Report to Headquarters of the Army, Command
Presentation, United States Army Security Agency (October 7, 1971), p.
19.
341 "declaration of war": interview with Richard P. Floyd, former chief,
Procurement Support Division, Office of Procurement, NSA (January 19,
1981).
341 "The strategy paper": ibid.
342 "He wasn't a ballplayer": ibid.
342 Lieutenant General Samuel C. Phillips: NSA, "General Samuel
Phillips Receives Thomas D. White Space Trophy," NSAN (September
1972), pp. 4-5.
342 "It came on thirty seconds after the missile's launch": interview
with John Arnold (July 2000).
343 "They dumped": ibid.
343 Guardrail: The system is scheduled to be replaced by forty-five
new intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance planes by 2006 under
a new program codenamed Common Sensor. Defense News On-Line
(March 1, 1999).
343 "From A-4 you could see the middle": interview with a former
intercept operator (February 2000).
344 Earlier in March: Col. G. H. Turley, USMC, The Easter Offensive.-
The Last American Advisors, Vietnam 1972 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval



594
Institute Press, 1985), p. 43.

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