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feasible": TICOM, vol. 8, p. 52. 10 "take over and exploit": TICOM, vol. 1,
p. 3.
10 suburban location was chosen: Gordon Welchman, The Hut Six
Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 9.
10 "was brilliantly conceived": TICOM, vol. 2, p. 1.
10 "Allied Cornint agencies had been exploiting": NSA, Robert J.
Hanyok, "Defining the Limits of Hell: Allied Communications Intelligence
and the Holocaust During the Second World War, 1939-1945" (1999).
This paper was presented at the Cryptologic History Symposium at NSA
on October 27, 1999.
11 "One day we got this frantic call": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels
Only, oral history of Paul E. Neff (January 26, 1983).
12 "Apparently they had": ibid., p. 45.
12 At thirty-eight: Background information about Whitaker is drawn
from an interview with Dr. Paul K. Whitaker (January 1999); diary of
Paul K. Whitaker, copy in author's collection.
13 Selmer S. Norland: Information about his background is drawn
from Thomas Parrish, The Ultra Americans: The U.S. Role in Breaking the
Nazi Codes (Bri-arcliff Manor, NY: Stein & Day, 1986), p. 102.
13 Arthur Levenson: Background information comes from ibid., pp.
86”87.
13 British policy had forbidden: Signal Security Service, secret report
by William F. Friedman, "Report on E Operations of the GC & CS at
Bletchley Park" (August 12, 1943), p. 9.
14 "I eventually got my commission": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels
Only, Oral History of Dr. Howard Campaigne (June 29, 1983), pp. 2”3.
14 Swordfish: NSA, "The Docent Book" (January 1996). Among the
variations of the "Fish" were machines nicknamed by American
codebreakers "Tunny" and "Sturgeon." The Tunny (better known in
English as the tuna) was the Schlusselzusatz 40 (SZ40). It was
manufactured by the German firm Lorenz and was used by the German
army for upper-echelon communications. The Sturgeon, actually a
Siemens T-52, was developed at the request of the German navy, with
the first units manufactured in 1932. The German air force began using
it in 1942. Unlike the Enigma, the Sturgeon did not use wired rotors. The
rotors have a series of cogs that open and close on electrical contacts.
Unless otherwise noted, all details of the hunt for the Fish machine
are from Paul K. Whitaker's personal diary (unpaginated), a copy of
which is in the author's possession.
14 "The impressions were": Whitaker diary.
14 "The roads were lined": ibid.
15 "How are things down there?": ibid.
16 "They were working": ibid.
17 Dustbin: TICOM, Top Secret/Ultra report, "Narrative and Report
of the Proceedings of TICOM Team 6, 11 April-6 July 1945" (September



551
5, 1945).
17 Among those clandestinely brought: ibid. 17 "It is almost certain":
TICOM, vol. 3, p. 8.
17 "We found that the Germans": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels
Only, Oral History of Dr. Howard Campaigne (June 29, 1983), pp. 2-3.
18 "European cryptanalysts were unable": TICOM, vol. 1, p. 6. Other
systems-solved by Germany included between 10 and 30 percent of
intercepted U.S. Army M-209 messages. Except where keys were
captured, it was usually read too late to be of tactical value, Almost 100
percent of messages sent by the U.S. Army in Slidex, Codex, bomber
code, assault code, aircraft movement code, map coordinate codes, and
cipher device M-94 where employed, were read regularly (TICOM, vol. 1,
p. 5).
18 SIGABA: NSA, "The Docent Book" (January 1996). The Army
SIGABA was
designated M134C and the Navy SIGABA was the CSP 888. 18 It was
finally taken out of service: ibid.
18 "practically 100% readable": TICOM, vol. 1, Appendix: "Results of
European Axis Cryptanalysis as Learned from TICOM Sources" (88
pages, unpaginated).
19 "cryptanalytic attack had been": ibid. See also Army Security
Agency, Top Secret/Ultra report, "The Achievements of the Signal
Security Agency in World War II" (February 20, 1946), p. 31.
19 more than 1 million decrypted messages: NSA, Top Secret/Umbra,
"On Watch" (September 1986), p. 11.
19 "Overnight, the targets that occupied": ibid., p. 13.
19 Gone were the army intercept stations: Prior to the war, intercept
stations were located at Fort Hancock, New Jersey; the Presidio, San
Francisco, California; Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Corozal, Panama Canal
Zone; Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii; Fort McKinley, Philippine Islands;
and Fort Hunt, Virginia. During the war additional intercept stations
were added at Indian Creek Station, Miami Beach, Florida; Asmara,
Eritrea; Amchitka, Aleutian Islands; Fairbanks, Alaska; New Delhi, India;
Bellmore, New York; Tarzana, California; and Guam (Army Security
Agency, Top Secret/Ultra report, "The Achievements of the Signal
Security Agency in World War II" (February 20, 1946), pp. 11-12).
19 Vint Hill Farms Station: In 1999 the station was taken over by the
Federal Aviation Administration as the new home of a consolidated radar
operations center for the Washington-Baltimore area's four major
airports”Dulles, Reagan National, Baltimore-Washington, and Andrews
Air Force Base. The system is known as TRACON (Terminal Radar
Approach Control).
20 At war's end: By V-J Day 7,848 people were working at Arlington
Hall (Army Security Agency, "The Achievements of the Signal Security
Agency in World War II" (February 20, 1946), p. 3. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 457, Box 107, SRH-349.)


552
20 "They intercepted printers at Vint Hill": NSA, Top Secret/Comint
Channels Only, Oral History of Colonel Russell H. Horton (March 24,
1982), p. 64.
20 "For a few months in early 1942": NSA/CIA, Cecil James Phillips,
"What Made Venona Possible?" in "Venona: Soviet Espionage and the
American Response, 1939-1957" (1996), p. xv.
21 Phillips estimated that between 1942 and 1948: David Martin,
"The Code War," Washington Post Magazine (May 10, 1998), p. 16.
21 Long black limousines: The description of the UN's founding
conference draws on Linda Melvern, The Ultimate Crime: Who Betrayed
the UN and Why? (London: Allison & Busby, 1995), p. 23.
22 the French delegation: Details on breaking French codes and
ciphers come from TICOM, vol. 1, Appendix: "Results of European Axis
Cryptanalysis as Learned from TICOM Sources."
22 "Our inclusion among the sponsoring": War Department, Top
Secret/Ultra report, "Magic" Diplomatic Summary (May 2, 1945), p. 8.
22 "Pressure of work": Signal Security Agency, Top Secret report,
Rowlett to Commanding Officer, SSA, "Semimonthly Branch Activity
Report, 1”15 June 1945."
23 "Russia's prejudice": War Department, Top Secret/Ultra report,
"Magic"
Diplomatic Summary (April 30, 1945), pp. 7”12. 23 Spanish
decrypts: ibid. 23 Czechoslovakian message: ibid. 23 "a situation that
compared": NSA, David A. Hatch with Robert Louis Benson,
"The Korean War: The Sigint Background" (June 2000), p. 4. 23 "a
remarkably complete picture": ibid. 23 "perhaps the most significant":
ibid., p. 5.
23 Black Friday: ibid., p. 4.
24 a gregarious Russian linguist: Details concerning William
Weisband are drawn from NSA/CIA, "Venona: Soviet Kspionage and the
American Response, 1939-1957" (1996), p. xxviii.
24 "three-headed monster": NSA, Top Secret/Codeword, Oral History
of Herbert
J. Conley (March 5, 1984), pp. 58, 59. 24 "He couldn't control": ibid.
24 Korea barely registered: Unless otherwise noted, details on Sigint
in Korea are from NSA, David A. Hatch with Robert Louis Benson, "The
Korean War: The Sigint Background" (June 2000), p. 4.
25 "AFSA had no Korean linguists": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Handle
via Talent and Keyhole Comint Control Systems Jointly, Dr. Thomas R.
Johnson, American Cryptology During the Cold War(1995) p. 36.
25 Buried in stacks of intercepted Soviet traffic: ibid., pp. 39”+0.
25 Joseph Darrigo, a U.S. Army captain: ibid., p. 40.
25 "AFSA (along with everyone else) was looking": ibid., p. 54.
25 arriving ten to twelve hours after intercept: NSA, Jill Frahm, "So
Power Can Be Brought into Play: Sigint and the Pusan Perimeter" (2000),
p. 6; see also NSA, Patrick D. Weadon, "Sigint and Comsec Help Save the


553
Day at Pusan," pp. 1-2.
26 Father Harold Henry had spent a number of years: NSA,
"Korea," pp. 42-43.
26 "When we got into the ... Perimeter": Donald Knox, The Korean
War: An Oral History (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), p.
77.
26 provided him with such vital information as the exact locations:
NSA, "So Power Can Be Brought into Play: Sigint and the Pusan
Perimeter," p. 10.
26 "ground-return intercept": NSA, "The Korean War: The Sigint
Background," p. 12.
27 "One of our problems in Korea": NSA, Top Secret/Comint
Channels Only, Oral History of Paul Odonovich (August 5, 1983), p. 33.
27 low-level voice intercept (LLVI): NSA, "Korea," pp. 47-48.
27 A team set up in Nanjing. .. "poor hearability": NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra,
"Comint and the PRC Intervention in the Korean War," Cryptologic
Quarterly
(Summer 1996), p. 4.
27 the British had been secretly listening: ibid., p. 6.
28 "clear and convincing evidence": NSA, "Korea," p. 44.
28 Sigint reports noted that some 70,000 Chinese troops: NSA,
"Comint and the
PRC Intervention in the Korean War," p. 11. 28 "Very little": ibid., p.
15.
28 twenty troop trains were heading: ibid., p. 14. 28 "We are already
at war here": NSA, "Korea," p. 44.
28 intercepts during the first three weeks: NSA, "Comint and the PRC
Intervention in the Korean War," p. 18.
29 AFSA reports demonstrated clearly: ibid., p. 17.
29 "No one who received Comint product": ibid., p. 1.
29 "During the Second World War, MacArthur had disregarded": ibid.,
p. 21.
29 NSA later attributed this caution: NSA, "Korea," p. 55.
30 "The ... last three major": ibid., p. 36.
30 "It has become apparent": NSA, "The Korean War: The Sigint
Background"
(June 2000), p. 15. 30 A year later NSA director Ralph Canine: NSA,
"So Power Can Be Brought into
Play: Sigint and the Pusan Perimeter," p. 15. 30 "gravely concerned":
CIA, Top Secret/Codeword memorandum, "Proposed
Survey of Communications Intelligence Activities" (December 10,
1951)
(HSTL, President's Secretary's File, Intelligence, Box 250).
30 Truman ordered the investigation: National Security
Council, Top Secret/Codeword memorandum, "Proposed Survey of


554
Intelligence Activities" (December 13, 1951) (HSTL, President's
Secretary's File, Intelligence, Box 250).
31 put it together again: For the Brownell Report, see Committee
Appointed to Survey Communications Intelligence Activities of the
Government, Top Se-cret/Comint Channels Only, "Report to the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense" (June 13, 1952)
(National Archives, Record Group 457, Special Research History 123).
31 "step backward": ibid.
31 meeting with the president: White House, President's Appointment
Schedule for Friday, October 24, 1952 (HSTL, Files of Mathew J.
Connelly). Secretary of State Dean Acheson was giving a speech on Korea
at the UN General Assembly at the time of the meeting (HSTL, Secretary
of State Dean Acheson Appointment Book, Box 46).
31 leaving a voting booth: White House, President's Appointment
Schedule for Tuesday, November 4, 1952 (HSTL, Files of Mathew J.
Connelly).
31 "The 'smart money' ": NSA, Tom Johnson, "The Plan to Save NSA,"
in "In Memoriam: Dr. Louis W. Tordella" (undated), p. 6. In fact, only four
days before NSA opened its doors, the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover sent a
snippy letter to the National Security Council complaining about the new
agency: "I am concerned about the authority granted to the Director of
the National Security Agency" (FBI, Personal and Confidential letter,
Hoover to James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the NSC [October 31,
1952]) (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 194).

CHAPTER 3: Nerves
Page
33 "With all the electrical gear": Bruce Bailey, "From the Crow's Nest,"
Air & Space (September 1994), p. 33.
34 "an ugly, overweight": ibid.
35 Nicknamed Project Homerun: Details of the project are drawn
from R. Cargill Hall, "The Truth About Overflights," MHQ: The Quarterly
Journal of Military History, vol. 9, no. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 36-39.
37 "The stringent security measures imposed": CIA, Secret Noforn
report, "The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974" (1992), p. 2.
38 "The weather was gorgeous": Paul Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold
War (Gloucestershire, England: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1996), p. 84.
38 "The guns won't work": ibid., p. 85.
39 "the first major test": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn report, "The
Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History" (1988) (Special Series, Crisis
Collection, vol. 2), p. 1.
39 his long experience with pack mules: "Ralph J. Canine," The
Phoenician (Fall 1992), p. 12.
39 "People were scared of him": NSA, Secret Comint Channels Only,
"Oral History of Colonel Frank L. Herrelko" (November 8, 1982), pp. 31,



555
42.
40 agreed to by Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion, defense
minister Shimon Peres, and armed forces chief of staff Moshe Dayan:
Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1998), pp.
342-44.
40 intercepts from Spain and Syria: White House, Top Secret/Eyes
Only memorandum for the record (August 6, 1956), p. 3.
40 "communications between Paris and Tel Aviv": NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra/Noforn report, "The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History"
(1988) (Special Series Crisis Collection, vol. 2), p. 19.
41 To make matters worse: NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra/Talent/Keyhole/Noforn report, "American Cryptology
During the Cold War, 1945-1989. Book 1: The Struggle for Centralization
1945-1989" (1995), p. 236.
41 "1956 was a bad time": ibid.
41 "about as crude and brutal": Department of State, memorandum
of telephone
call to the president (October 30, 1956) (DDEL, Papers of John Foster
Dulles,
Telephone Calls, Box 11). 41 "It was the gravest": Department of
State, memorandum of telephone call from
Allen Dulles (October 30, 1956) (DDEL, Papers of John Foster Dulles,

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