<<

. 98
( 118 .)



>>

Box 5). / 41 "It would be a complete mistake": White House Top Secret
memoranduni,
Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the National Security Council
(November
1, 1956), pp. 6-13. (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 8). 41
Harold Stassen objected: ibid. 41 "One thing at least was clear": ibid.
41 "As for crisis response": NSA, Top Secret Umbra/Talent/Keyhole/
Noforn report, "American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989.
Book 1: The Struggle for Centralization 1945-1989" (1995), p. 239.
42 consultants from McKinsey and Company: ibid.
42 "modified geographical concept": NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra/Talent/Key-hole/Noforn report, "American Cryptology
During the Cold War, 1945-1989. Book 1: The Struggle for Centralization
1945-1989" (1995), p. 239.
42 Internal organization: See James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A
Report on America's Most Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982),
pp. 90-91.
42 "Canine ... stands out": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral
History of Dr. Howard Campaigne (June 29, 1983), p. 125.
43 Details of Powers's wait on the airstrip come from Francis Gary
Powers with Curt Gentry, Operation Overflight: The U-2 Spy Pilot Tells His
Story for the First Time (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), p.
76.



556
43 "He would sometimes cut out": Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Oral
History (November 9, 1976), p. 11 (DDEL).
44 "the System-V unit worked well": CIA, Top Secret/Codeword
mission folder 4019 (December 22, 1956) (contained in CIA/U2P, p. 126).
44 "We usually flew from Turkey": Powers with Gentry, Operation
Overflight, pp. 46-47.
44 "The equipment we carried on such occasions": ibid.
45 Powers locked his canopy: His preparations for the U-2 flight are
described in Powers with Gentry, Operation Overflight, p. 78.
45 "Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky reporting": Strobe
Talbott, ed., Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp.
443, 444.
45 "Shoot down the plane": ibid.
45 "We were sick and tired": ibid.
45 A missile launch was considered: CIA, Colonel Alexander Orlov, "A
'Hot' Front in the Cold War," Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1998-1999),
web pages.
45 "An uncomfortable situation": ibid.
46 "Shame!": ibid.
46 "If I could become a missile": ibid.
46 "I was sure": Powers with Gentry, Operation Overflight, p. 80.
46 "In view of the improving": CIA, Top Secret/Talent report, "Annex
to the report of DCI Ad hoc Panel on Status of the Soviet ICBM Program,"
August 25, 1959 (DDEL, Office of Staff Secretary, Intelligence, Box 15).
47 "Evidence indicates": White House, Top Secret memorandum,
"Discussion at the 442nd Meeting of the National Security Council, April
28, 1960" (April 28,1960), p. 8. (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, National
Security Council series, Box 12).
47 "Destroy target": Orlov, "A 'Hot' Front," web pages.
47 "My God, I've had it now!": Powers with Gentry, Operation
Overflight, p. 82.
47 "Instinctively I grasped the throttle": ibid.
48 "I reached for the destruct switches": ibid., p. 83. Powers was
killed on August 1, 1977, at the age of forty-seven, in the crash of a
helicopter he was flying for a Los Angeles television station. He was
buried with honors in Arlington National Cemetery. A decade later the
U.S. Air Force awarded him posthumously the Distinguished Flying
Cross.
48 "The plane was still spinning": ibid., p. 84. 48 "It was a pleasant":
ibid.
49 "He's turning left!": Jack Anderson, "U.S. Heard Russians
Chasing U-2," Washington Post, May 12, 1960.
50 "the hideout": White House, Top Secret memorandum, "Notes for
Use in Talking to the Secretary of State about the U-2 and the NSC"
(June 14, 1960) (DDEL, White House Office, Box 18).



557
51 "Following cover plan": Top Secret memorandum (No addressee;
May 2, 1960) (DDEL, White House, Office of Staff Secretary, Box 15).
52 the president huddled: This and other details of the events
following the U-2 shootdown are from White House, Top Secret/Limited
Distribution, "Chronological Account of Handling of U-2 Incident" (June
14, 1960) (DDEL, White House Office, Box 18).
52 "we had an understanding": Colonel William D. Johnson and
Lieutenant Colonel James C. Ferguson, Andrew J. Goodpaster Oral
History (January 9, 1976), p. 45 (U.S. Army Center for Military History).
52 Walter Bonney was forced: Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday:
Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row,
1986), pp. 51-52; David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The U-2 Affair (New
York: Random House, 1962), p. 83.
53 "Almost instantly": Richard Strout, "T.R.B.," New Republic, May
16, 1960. 53 "While the President": Department of State, telephone calls,
May 9, 1960
(DDEL, Papers of Christian A. Herter, Telephone Calls, Box 10). 53 "I
would like to resign": Ann Whitman diary, May 9, 1960 (DDEL).
53 Dulles, Eisenhower said: The account in this paragraph is from
Department of State, telephone calls, May 9, 1960 (DDEL, Papers of
Christian A. Herter, Telephone Calls, Box 10).
54 "Our reconnaissance was discovered": White House, Top Secret
memorandum, "Discussion at the 444th Meeting of the National Security
Council, May 9, 1960" (May 13, 1960), p. 2 (DDEL, Ann Whitman File,
National Security Council series, Box 12).
54 "extensive aerial surveillance": Department of State, Press
Announcement, May 9, 1960 (DDEL).
54 "Call off": The quotations in this paragraph come from Department
of State, memorandum of telephone conversation with General
Goodpaster, June 1, 1960 (DDEL, Christian A. Herter Papers, Telephone
Calls, Box 10).
54 "It was as though": Talbott, ed., Khrushchev Remembers, p. 451.
55 "We couldn't possibly": ibid., p. 452.
56 "It appeared": White House, Top Secret memorandum, Gordon
Gray meeting with the president, May 24, 1960 (DDEL, Office of the
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Box 4).
56 "The President": This and the preceding description of a typical
NSC meeting draw on Robert Cutler, No Time for Rest (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1965), p. 302.
56 The description of the NSC meeting draws on photos from DDEL.
56 "to play up the U-2 incident": White House, Top Secret
memorandum, "Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security
Council, May 24, 1960," p. 3 (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, National
Security Council Series, Box 12).
57 "It was clear": ibid., p. 5. 57 "Administration officials": ibid., p. 5.



558
57 "Some investigators": ibid., p. 17. 57 "No information": ibid., p. 8.
57 "What's more ... that's under oath": Thomas Gates Oral History,
Columbia University Oral History Project.
57 "The investigation, once started": White House, Top Secret
memorandum, "Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security
Council, May 24, 1960," p. 8 (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, National
Security Council Series, Box 12).
58 "Accordingly ... the investigation": ibid., p. 8. 58 "Mr. Dulles": ibid.
58 "The speech": ibid., p. 9.
58 "Congress could be told"-, ibid., p. 5.
58 "The impression": ibid.
59 "We handed Khrushchev": David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The
U-2 Affair (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 172.
60 "trace the chain": Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower,
Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 315.
60 "What the CIA": ibid.
60 "heartily approved of the inquiry": White House, memorandum of
Congressional breakfast meeting, May 26, 1960 (DDEL, Ann Whitman
File, Eisenhower diaries).
60 "just gobbledy-gook": Beschloss, Mayday, p. 314.
61 Dillon's boss went much further: U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Events Incident to the Summit
Conference: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th
Cong., 2d sess., May 27, 31, June 1, 2, 1960, p. 103.
61 "They were all sworn": Beschloss, Mayday, p. 314.
61 "You now stand": Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets:
Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), pp. 304-
305.
62 "very disturbed": Department of State, memorandum of telephone
conversation, June 1, 1960 (DDEL, Christian A. Herter Papers,
Telephone Calls, Box 10).
62 "At the present time": White House, Clark Clifford memorandum
for the record, January 24, 1961 (FRUS, Vol. X, #22).
63 "In the long run": Department of Defense, Robert S. McNamara
memorandum to President Kennedy, January 24, 1961 (FRUS, Vol. X,
#22).
63 The only answer: Lemnitzer's private summary, p. 6.

CHAPTER 4: Fists
Page
64 By daybreak: Details of the preparation for the Inauguration are
drawn from Department of Defense, General Order No. 1, Inaugural
Parade (January 20, 1961), pp. 1”84; JCS, Memorandum for General
Lemnitzer, "Summary of Inaugural Activities, 20 January 1961" (January
17, 1961) (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University). 65 Quarters



559
1: What was then Quarters 1 is today Quarters 6.
65 "The presence of a benign and popular General of the Army":
Donald Janson and Bernard Eismann, The Far Right (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 6.
66 Warren should be hanged: ibid., p. 138.
66 One of those was Major General Edwin A. Walker... The Overseas
Weekly, charged that Walker: "President Kennedy and the Ultra Right
Extremists," web site
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/4035/disunity.htm.
67 "It seems in this Administration": Drew Pearson, "Another
Admiral's Speech Censored," San Francisco Chronicle, February 21, 1961.
67 "Studious, handsome, thoughtful-looking": Bill Henry, "Doughboy
Will Have His Day," Los Angeles Times, August 19, 1960.
67 "The most important military job": "Who Envies Gen. Lemnitzer?"
Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1960.
67 "He thoroughly enjoyed himself": personal letter, Lemnitzer to Lois
and Henry Simpson, January 14, 1961 (Lemnitzer Papers, National
Defense University).
67 "bordered on reverence": L. James Binder, Lemnitzer: A Soldier for
His Time (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1997), p. 239.
68 he ordered his Joint Chiefs Chairman: ibid., p. 242. 68 find a way
to secretly torpedo: ibid., p. 252.
68 "I have been involved in some very rugged": personal letter,
Lemnitzer to Ernest Lemnitzer, March 3, 1960 (Lemnitzer Papers,
National Defense University).
69 "The Certain Trumpet": Binder, Lemnitzer, p. 236.
69 "Here was a president with no military experience": General Lyman
L. Lemnitzer Oral History (March 3, 1982) (LBJL).
69 "Nearly all of these people were ardent": Admiral Arleigh A. Burke
Oral History (November 1972-January 1973) (U.S. Naval Institute,
Annapolis).
70 "I would offer the suggestion": Letter, Lemnitzer to Victor
Henderson Ashe II, August 22, 1961 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense
University).
70 Lemnitzer and the Chiefs knew: JCS, Top Secret report,
"Evaluation of Possible Military Courses of Action in Cuba," January 16,
1961 (FRUS Vol. X, #19).
71 passed the Secret Service booth: Frank M. Matthews, "Private
Citizen Ike at His Farm," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 21, 1961.
72 "This is the first known": NSA, Secret/Kimbo intercept, February
1, 1961. 72 "What is required is a basic expansion of plans": White
House, Top Secret
memorandum of conference with the president, January 25, 1961
(JFKL, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, JCS
Conferences with the President, Vol. I, drafted on January 27 by



560
Goodpaster) (FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. X, #26).
72 "I'm not going to risk": Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years:
Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-196} (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p.
114.
73 "We can confidently assert": CIA, Top Secret report, "Inspector
General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," October 1961, p. 60.
73 "the Agency was driving forward": ibid., p. 50.
73 elaborate instructions: Drew Pearson, "Merry-Go-Round,"
San Francisco
Chronicle, February 21, 1961. 73 eight-page biography: Lemnitzer
biography, prepared as part of his testimony
before the House of Representatives, Committee on Science and
Astronautics,
March 23, 1961.
73 "Planners are afunny lot": Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense
University.
74 "In view of the rapid buildup": Lemnitzer's private summary, p. 8.
74 "Evaluation of the current plan": ibid., pp. 10”11.
74 twenty-minute discussion: ibid., p. 36.
75 insisted that the choice of Zapata for a landing site: ibid., pp. 22”
23.
76 "The [NSA] effort was very small": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels
Only, Oral History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982).
77 "possibly arrived at a Cuban port": NSA, Secret/Sabre intercept,
April 10, 1961.
77 U-2s were crisscrossing: CIA, Secret/Noforn report, "The CIA and
the U-2
Program, 1954-1974" (1992), p. 198. 77 NSA voice-intercept
operators: CIA, Top Secret report, "An Analysis of the
Cuban Operation by the Deputy Director (Plans)," January 18, 1962,
Section
V, "The Assessment of the Adequacy of the Plan," p. 3. 77 "Arms
urgent": This and the other quotations in this paragraph come from
CIA, Top Secret report, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban
Operation,"
October 1961, p. 109.
77 "It wasn't much that was done": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels
Only, Oral History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982), p. 29.
78 "We are out of ammo": CIA, Top Secret report, "Inspector General's
Survey of the Cuban Operation" (October 1961), pp. 32-33.
78 "In water. Out of ammo": ibid.
78 scores of their comrades: A total of 114 brigade members were
killed and 1,189 were wounded.
78 "Am destroying all equipment"; convoy heading for the beach
reversed course: CIA, Top Secret report, "Inspector General's Survey of
the Cuban Operation" (October 1961), pp. 32-33.

<<

. 98
( 118 .)



>>