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79 "those employees on it": CIA, Secret, Richard Bissell memorandum
for the record, November 5, 1961 (FRUS, Vol. X, #272).
79 "The traditional civilian control of the military": Janson and
Eismann, The Far Right, p. 184. On April 10, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald,
who seven months later would assassinate President Kennedy, attempted
to assassinate Walker as he sat at his desk in his Dallas home. Using the
same rifle with which he killed Kennedy, Oswald shot at Walker through
a window but missed by inches. Walker died in relative obscurity in
Dallas on October 31, 1993.
79 "extreme right-wing, witch-hunting": ibid., p. 194.
80 Foreign Relations Committee ... warned: David Burnham, United
Press International wire report, July 20, 1961.
80 "thesis of the nature of the Communist threat": ibid. 80 "an
example of the ultimate danger": ibid.
80 "Concern had grown that a belligerent": Janson and Eismann, The
Far Right, p. 197.
81 "I had considered sending this information": Letter,
Personal/Confidential/Eyes Only, Lemnitzer to Norstad, February 28,
1961 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University).
81 "You and Charlie are probably wondering what": ibid.
81 "civilian hierarchy was crippled": Walter S. Poole, JCS, General
Lyman L. Lemnitzer Oral History (February 12, 1976) (U.S. Army Center
of Military History, Washington, DC.).
82 "The Bay of Pigs fiasco broke the dike": Janson and Eismann, The
Far Right, pp. 6-7.
83 "could think of manufacturing something": White House,
Top Secret, memorandum of meeting with the president, on January 3,
1961 (January 9, 1961).
83 Lansdale was ordered: Department of State, Top Secret/Sensitive
memorandum, "The Cuba Project," March 2, 1962 (FRUS, Vol. X, #309).
83 "World opinion": Joint Chiefs of Staff, Top Secret/Special
Handling/Noforn report, "Report by the Department of Defense and Joint
Chiefs of Staff Representative on the Caribbean Survey Group to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on Cuba Project," March 9, 1962 (ARRB).
84 "the objective is": Joint Chiefs of Staff, Top Secret/Special
Handling memorandum, Craig to Lansdale, February 2, 1962 (ARRB).
84 "a series of well coordinated": ibid.
84 "We could blow up a U.S. ship": JCS, Top Secret/Special
Handling/Noforn, Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
Northwoods, Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A, "Pretexts to Justify U.S.
Military Intervention in Cuba" (March 12, 1962), p. 8 (ARRB).
84 "We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign": ibid.,
pp. 8”9.
85 "Exploding a few plastic bombs": ibid., pp. 9”10.
85 "create an incident which will": The plan is in ibid., pp. 9”11. 86



562
"It is recommended": JCS, Top Secret/Special Handling/Noforn
memorandum, Lemnitzer to McNamara, March 13, 1962 (ARRB).
86 At 2:30 on the afternoon of ... March 13: Lemnitzer's official diary
for March 13, 1962 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University).
87 Kennedy told Lemnitzer: Department of State, Secret
memorandum, written by U. Alexis Johnson and dated March 16;
attached to "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose" (March 14, 1962)
(FRUS, Vol. X, #314). Ironically, President Gerald Ford in 1975 appointed
Lemnitzer to a blue-ribbon panel to investigate domestic activities of the
CIA. 87 "The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem must
be solved":
JCS, Top Secret/Special Handling/Noforn memorandum, Lemnitzer to
McNamara, April 10, 1962, pp. 1-2 (ARRB).
87 "The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States": ibid. 87
"[T]he Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend": ibid.
87 "I am the senior military officer": Binder, Lemnitzer, p. 279.
88 Lemnitzer ordered Gray to destroy all his notes: ibid., p. 273.
89 "A contrived 'Cuban' attack on an OAS": Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Top Secret/Sensitive policy paper, "War Between Cuba and
Another LA State" (1963), p. 1 (ARRB).
89 "Any of the contrived situations described above": ibid., p. 3. 89
"The only area remaining for consideration": ibid.
89 "a possible scenario": Department of Defense, Top
Secret/Sensitive memorandum, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Paul Nitze to Bundy, May 10, 1963 (JFKL,
National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing
Group Meeting) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #337).
90 "If the U.S. did institute": ibid.
90 About a month later: Department of State, Top Secret/Eyes Only,
Acting Secretary of State George Ball to the president, June 25, 1963
(JFKL, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba) (FRUS, Vol. XI,
#352).

CHAPTER 5: Eyes
Page
93 ADVA and GENS were combined; new organizational structure:
James Barn-ford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America's Most
Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 90-91.
93 U.S. intelligence budget reached $2 billion: White House, Top
Secret/Eyes Only memorandum, "Discussion at the 473rd Meeting of the
National Security Council, January 5, 1961," p. 3.
93 $1.4 billion: ibid., p. 2.
93 proclaimed that NSA was a ship: "An Old Timer Is One Who . . . ,"
NSA, Cryptolog (November 1982), p. 17.
93 Soviets had used a fleet: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint



563
Reconnaissance Center, Top Secret, The Pueblo Incident (January 24,
1968), p. 3.
93 "The Soviets had a vast intelligence program": interview with Oleg
Kalugin, CBS News transcript (undated), p. 35.
94 President Eisenhower authorized: U.S. Navy, Confidential
memorandum, CNO to Secretary of the Navy, April 26, 1960 (Naval
Operational Archives, U.S.S. Oxford File).
94 "Oxford" was chosen: U.S. Navy, memorandum, C.O., U.S.S.
Oxford, to CNO, February 5, 1962 (Naval Operational Archives, U.S.S.
Oxford File).
94 "Signaling another first in communications": ibid.
94 first operational cruise: U.S. Navy, memorandum, C.O., U.S.S.
Oxford, to CNO, January 25, 1963 (Naval Operational Archives, U.S.S.
Oxford File).
94 the moon-bounce antenna: For details, see NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra/Noforn, "In The Shadow of War" (June 1969), p. 108.
95 another four-month surveillance mission: U.S. Navy,
memorandum, C.O., U.S.S. Oxford, to CNO, January 25, 1963 (Naval
Operational Archives, U.S.S. Oxford File).
95 "in response to highest priority": U.S. Navy, Top Secret/Dinar,
"Memorandum
for the Secretary of the Navy," July 16, 1962. 95 "at least four, and
possibly five": NSA, Secret/Kimbo intercept, "Unusual
Number of Soviet Passenger Ships En Route Cuba," July 24, 1962, p.
1. 95 fifty-seven Soviet merchant ships: NSA, Top Secret/Dinar report,
"Status of
Soviet Merchant Shipping to Cuba," August 23, 1962, p. 1.
95 "In addition to the shipping increase": Oral History of Admiral
Robert Lee Dennison (August 1975), p. 407 (U.S. Naval Institute,
Annapolis).
96 "It is therefore believed": NSA, Secret/Sabre report, "New Soviet
Cargo Ship En Route Cuba with Possible Military Cargo," June 5, 1962,
p. 1.
96 first telltale sounds: NSA, Secret intercept, "First ELINT Evidence
of Scan Odd Radar in Cuban Area" (June 6, 1962), p. 1.
96 "Comint sources reveal Russian": NSA, Secret/Kimbo intercept,
"Reflection of Soviet Bloc Pilots/Technicians in Cuban Air Force Training
(1 May”4 August '62)," August 24, 1962, p. 1.
96 "I thought Frost was one of the": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels
Only, Oral History of Dr. Howard Campaigne (June 29, 1983), p. 126.
96 "I saw him chew out Frank Raven": Farley quoted in ibid.
96 "I hadn't been north of Minneapolis": NSA, Top Secret/Comint
Channels Only, Oral History of Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake
(April 19, 1984), p. 5.
97 "So all of a sudden": ibid., pp. 17”19.



564
97 "Jack Frost was under some nebulous": ibid., pp. 57”58.
99 "I left that one to Lou": ibid., p. 71.
99 "NSA has been directed": NSA, Top Secret/Comint Channels Only
message,
DIRNSA to CNO (July 19, 1962). 99 "From the ship we could look up":
NSA, Secret/Sensitive, Oral History of
Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982), p. 20. 100 an Elint operator on
the Oxford- NSA, Secret intercept, "Whiff Radar in
Cuba" (August 17, 1962). 100 "We were called down and told": NSA,
Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral
History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982), p. 3.
100 told one high-level group: CIA, "Chronology of John McCone's
Suspicions on the Military Build-up in Cuba Prior to Kennedy's October
22 Speech," August 17, 1962.
100 "It was for most of us our initial": ibid., pp. 36”37.
101 "We would recess for a few hours": NSA, Top Secret/Comint
Channels Only, Oral History of Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake
(April 19, 1984), p. 52.
101 "One collection facility ... against jr-hundred emitters": NSA,
Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral History of Harold L. Parish (October
12, 1982), pp. 87-89.
101 "Concentrated efforts have been made": NSA, Secret/Kimbo
intercept, "Reflection of Soviet Bloc Pilots/Technicians in Cuban Air
Force Training," August 24, 1962.
101 nighttime jet gunnery exercises: NSA, Secret/Kimbo intercept,
"Night Aerial Gunnery Exercises by Cuban Jet Aircraft," August 28,
1962.
101 NSA issued a dramatic report: NSA, Top Secret/Dinar report,
"Further Information on Soviet/Cuban Trade," August 31, 1962.
102 "Sigint evidence of Cuban acquisition": NSA, Top
Secret/Dinar/No-forn/Limited Distribution, Funnel Handling, September
11, 1962.
102 "This [equipment] is now operating": White House, Top
Secret/Sensitive memorandum, Carl Kaysen, Deputy Special Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, to President Kennedy,
September 1, 1962 (FRUS, Vol. X, #405).
102 "I feel that our first priority": NSA, Top Secret/Comint Channels
Only, DIRNSA to Klocko, October 10, 1962.
102 "shipborne collection platform"; "NSA is therefore commencing":
NSA, Top Secret message, DIRNSA to JCS, September 17, 1962.
103 "It was very difficult": NSA, Top Secret/Comint Channels Only,
Oral History of Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake (April 19, 1984), pp.
58-59.
103 326th ASA Company: The Army Security Agency's detachment at
Homestead eventually became permanent. In August 1967 the field
station's activities were consolidated with similar Air Force and Navy


565
operations in a newly constructed operations building on Card Sound
Road, about fifteen miles south of Homestead Air Base. The operations
building was known as Site Alpha. U.S. Army Intelligence and Security
Command, "INSCOM and Its Heritage: An Organizational History of the
Command and its Units" (1985), pp. 98”100.
103 "What had been sort of a lazy tempo": Owen Englander, "A Closer
Look at the Early Days of NSG at Key West," NCKi Cryptolog (Winter
1997), pp. 3, 5.
104 World War I bunker: ibid. The original listening post was set up
in Key West in July 1961. In 1981 the Naval Security Group
Detachment, Key West, moved to the Naval Air Base at Truman Annex,
where it occupied a 40,000-square-foot building that once housed the
Navy Sonar School. It employed over 250 officers, enlisted and civilian
personnel. The station was closed in 1996. See Commander Thomas P.
Herlihy and CTR1 Gerard A. Bradman, "NSGA Key West, Florida," NCKi
Cryptolog (Spring 1996), p. 7.
104 "Collection at thirteen miles was pretty good": This and other
remarks are drawn from the author's interview with John Arnold, July
2000.
106 "Spoon Rest": NSA, Secret intercept, "New Radar Deployment in
Cuba," September 19, 1962.
107 "By smoothly varying the length": Details of Palladium are drawn
from Gene Poteat, "Elint and Stealth," The Intelligencer (December 1999),
pp. 12-13. The Intelligencer is published by the Association of Former
Intelligence Officers.
108 At the meeting: CIA, memorandum for the executive director
(prepared on February 28, 1965) (FRUS, Vol. X, #421).
108 Cuban air defense system: NSA, Secret/Kimbo intercept (DTG:
1649), October 10, 1962.
109 "Communications security has been": NSA, Secret/Sabre
intercept, "Cuban Air Force VHF Communications Procedure," May 17,
1962, p. 2.
109 Instead, NSA depended mostly on: NSA also depended to some
extent on "traffic analysis"”examination of the "externals" of encrypted
messages. These externals could give indications of the cargo's
importance because of the frequency or precedence of the messages sent.
Unable to read encrypted messages sent to the Soviet cargo ships
Khabarovsk and Mikhail Uritskij, for example, NSA nevertheless could
conclude that they were on important missions because of the "high
precedence" of the messages sent to it. Such intelligence, NSA noted,
"may indicate these two ships are engaged in other than routine
activities." NSA, Secret/Kimbo intercept, "Unusual Number of Soviet
Passenger Ships En Route Cuba," July 24, 1962, p. 2.
109 "electronic intelligence led to the photographic intelligence":
Department of the Navy, John Keppler, A Bumpy Road,- The United



566
States Navy and Cuba 1959-196) (Summer 1991), p. 37 (The Naval
Historical Center, Naval Operational Archives).
109 "They would send vessels out": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels
Only, Oral History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982), p. 21.
109 "We were all listening for Russian communications": interview
with Aubrey Brown (January 2000).
109 "Jesus Christ": interview with Max Buscher, May 2000.
110 McCone brought up: ibid.
110 "You kind of know": Aubrey Brown interview.
110 "The codebreakers were having a tough time": Buscher interview.
111 "We had constructed": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral
History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982), p. 5.
111 plotting board: information from former NSA official Vera Ruth
Filby, NSA Symposium (October 27, 1999).
112 "One of our T Branchers": Buscher interview.
112 McCone discussed the Terek: White House, Top Secret, Minutes
of the 507th Meeting of the National Security Council (October 22, 1962)
(JFKL, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC
Meetings) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #41); CIA, Top Secret/Eyes Only, "DCI Notes
for DCI Briefing," October 22, 1962 (CIA, Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp.
271-73).
112 At 1:00 P.M. the Strategic Air Command: JCS, Top Secret report,
"Chronology of the JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis," January

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