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destroy the armed services, Soviet plans to establish a submarine base in Chile, North
Korea setting up a training base, and so forth. The papers stirred up hatred against the
government in the ranks, and in some cases entire columns were published which were
calculated to change the opinion of a single officer, in one case an officer's wife.52
The Agency also subsidized a number of books and other kinds of
publications in Chile. One was a short-lived anti-government newsletter directed at the
military.53 Later the CIA made use of a weekly humor and political magazine, SEPA,
aimed at the same audience. The covet of the 20 March 1973 issue featured the
headline: "Robert Moss. An English Recipe for Chile”Military Control." Moss was
identified by the magazine as a British sociologist. A more relevant description would have
been that he was a "news" specialist associated with known CIA media fronts. One of
these. Forum World Features of London (see Western Europe chapter), published Moss's
book, Chile's Marxist Experiment, in 1973, which was widely circulated by the junta to
justify its coup.54
Moss was associated with a CIA-funded think-tank in Santiago which went by the
supremely innocuous name of the Institute of General Studies. The IGS, amongst other
activities, conducted seminars for Chilean military officers in which it was explained, in
technical, apolitical terms, why Allende was a disaster for the economy and why a laissez-
faire system offered a solution to Chile's ills. There is no way of measuring to what extent
such lectures influenced future actions of the military, although after the coup the junta did
appoint several IGS people to top government posts.55
The CIA's Santiago station was meanwhile collecting the operational intelligence
necessary in the event of a coup: "arrest lists, key civilian installations and personnel that
needed protection, key government installations which need to be taken over, and
government contingency plans which would be used in case of a military uprising."56 The
CIA later asserted that this information was never passed to the Chilean military, a claim
that does not give one the feeling of having been united with the probable. It should be
noted in this context that in the days immediately following the coup the Chilean military
went directly to the residences of many Americans and other foreigners living in Santiago
who had been sympathetic to the Allende government.57
The government contingency plans were presumably obtained by the Agency
through its infiltration of the various parties which made up Allende's Unidad Popular
(UP) coalition. CIA agents in the upper echelons of Allende's own Socialist Party were
"paid to make mistakes in their jobs".58 In Washington, burglary was the Agency's tactic of
choice for obtaining documents. Papers were taken from the homes of several
employees of the Chilean Embassy; and the embassy itself, which had been bugged for
some time, was burgled in May 1972 by some of the same men who the next month
staged the Watergate break-in.59

In March 1973, the UP won about 44 percent of the vote in congressional elections,
compared to some 36 percent in 1970. It was said to be the largest increase an incumbent
party had ever received in Chile after being in power more than two years. The opposition
parties had publicly expressed their optimism about capturing two-thirds of the congres-
sional seats and thus being able to impeach Allende. Now they faced three more years
under him, with the prospect of being unable, despite their best and most underhanded
efforts, to prevent his popularity from increasing even further.
During the spring and summer the destabilization process escalated. There was a
whole series of demonstrations and strikes, with an even longer one by the truckers. Time
magazine reported: "While most of the country survived on short rations, the truckers
seemed unusually well equipped for a lengthy holdout." A reporter asked a group of


214
truckers who were camping and dining on "a lavish communal meal of steak, vegetables,
wine and empanadas" where the money for it came from. "From the CIA," they answered
laughingly.60

There was as well daily sabotage and violence, including assassination. In June,
an abortive attack upon the Presidential Palace was carried out by the military and
Patria y Libertad.
In September the military prevailed. "It is clear," said the Senate investigating
committee, "the CIA received intelligence reports on the coup planning of the group
which carried out the successful September 11 coup throughout the months of July,
August, and September 1.973."61
The American role on that fateful day was one of substance and shadow. The
coup began in the Pacific coast port of Valparaiso with the dispatch of Chilean naval
troops to Santiago, while US Navy ships were present offshore, ostensibly to participate
in joint maneuvers with the Chilean Navy. The American ships stayed outside of
Chilean waters, but remained on the alert. A US WB-575 plane”an airborne
communications control system”piloted by US Air Force officers, cruised in the Chilean
sky. At the same time, 32 American observation and fighter planes were landing at the
US air base in Mendoza, Argentina, not far from the Chilean border.62
In Valparaiso, while US military officers were meeting with their Chilean
counterparts, a young American, Charles Horman, who lived in Santiago and was
stranded near Valparaiso by the coup, happened to engage in conversation with several
Americans, civilian and military. A retired naval engineer told him: "We came down to
do a job and it's done." One or two American military men also gave away clues they
shouldn't have. A few days later, Horman was arrested in his Santiago residence. They
knew where to find him. He was never seen again.63

Thus it was that they closed the country to the outside world for a week, while
the tanks rolled and the soldiers broke down doors; the stadiums rang with the sounds of
execution and the bodies piled up along the streets and floated in the river; the torture
centers opened for business; the subversive books were thrown to the bonfires; soldiers
slit the trouser legs of women, shouting that "In Chile women wear dresses!"; the poor
returned to their natural state; and the men of the world in Washington and in the halls of
international finance opened up their check-books.
One year later, President Gerald Ford was moved to declare that what the
United States had done in Chile was "in the best interest of the people in Chile and
certainly in our own best interest."64 The remark could have been punctuated with a pinch
of snuff.
What the United States had done in Chile, thought Gerald Ford, or so he said, "was
to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to
preserve opposition political parties."65 The reporters present were kind, or obsequious,
enough not to ask Ford what he thought of the junta's Chile where all opposition, of any
kind, in any form, in any medium, was forbidden.
It was of course de rigueur for some other officials and congressmen to assert that
what the United States had really done in Chile was repel the Soviet threat to the Western
hemisphere. But Soviet behavior toward the Allende government simply did not tally with
any such hypothesis; the language of US intelligence reports confirms that: "Soviet
overtures to Allende ... characterized by caution and restraint"; "Soviet desire to avoid"



215
another Cuba-type commitment; Russians "advising Allende to put his relations with the
United States in order ... to ease the strain between the two countries."66
A CIA study of 7 September 1970, three days after Allende's electoral victory,
concluded:
1. The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile. There would, however, be tangible economic losses.
2. The world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an Allende government.
3. An Allende victory would, however, create considerable political and psychological costs:
a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by the challenge that an Allende government would pose to
the OAS [Organization of American States], and by the reactions that it would create in other countries. ...
b. An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological set-back to the U.S and a definite psychological
67
advantage for the Marxist idea.


The "tangible economic losses" likely referred to the expected nationalization of US
copper-mining companies. This in fact occurred, with no compensation paid to the compa-
nies by the Unidad Popular, which calculated that due to "excess profits" over many years
the companies actually owed Chile money.
"The reactions that it would create in other countries" ... What can this mean but
that the people of other countries might be inspired to consider their own socialist
solution to the economic and social problems that beset them? Allende's Chile might thus
turn out to be that specter that haunted the corridors of official Washington: a successful
example of an alternative to the capitalist model.

Washington knows no heresy in the Third World but independence. In the case of
Salvador Allende independence came clothed in an especially provocative costume”a
Marxist constitutionally elected who continued to honor the constitution. This would
not do. It shook the very foundation stones upon which the anti-communist tower is built:
the doctrine, painstakingly cultivated for decades, that "communists" can take power
only through force and deception, that they can retain that power only through terrorizing
and brainwashing the population. There could be only one thing worse than a Marxist
in power”an elected Marxist in power.




216
Notes “ PART I
Introduction
1 Michael Parenti, The Anti-Communist Impulse (Random House, NY, 1369) p.4
2 Washington Post, 24 October 1965, article by Stanley Karnow.
3 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV, The Hinge of Fate (London,
1951), p. 428.
4 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis; The Aftermath (London, 1929), p. 235.
5 D.F. Fleming, "The Western Intervention in the Soviet Union, 1918-1920", New
World Review New York), Fall 1967; see also Fleming, The Cold War and its
Origins, 1917-1960 (New York, 1961), pp. 16-35.
6 Los Angeles Times, 2 September 1991, p. 1.
7 Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917 (New York,
1928), p. 125.
8 Ibid., p. 154.
9 San Francisco Chronicle, 4 October 1978, p. 4.
10 New Republic, 4 August 1920, a 42-page analysis by Walter Lippmann and Charles
Merz.
11 Life, 29 March 1943, p. 29.
12 New York Times, 24 June 1941; for an interesting account of how US officials laid
the groundwork for the Cold War during and immediately after World War 2, see the
first chapter of Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (New York,
1981), a study of previously classified papers at the Eisenhower Library.
13 This has been well documented and would be "common knowledge" if not for its
shameful implications. See, e.g., the British Cabinet papers for 1939, summarized
in the Manchester Guardian, 1 January 1970; also Fleming, The Cold War, pp. 48-
97.
14 Related by former French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau in a recorded interview
for the Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University Library; cited in Roger
Morgan, The United States and West Germany, 194S-1973; A Study in Alliance
Politics (Oxford University Press, London, 1974), p. 54, my translation from the
French.
15 Michail Parenti, The Anti-Communist Impulse (Random House, NY, 1969) p. 35.
16 John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies (New York, 1978), p. 101. The expressions
"CIA officer" or "case officer" are used throughout the present book to denote regular,
full-time, career employees of the Agency, as opposed to "agent", someone working
for the CIA on an ad hoc basis. Other sources which are quoted, it will be seen, tend
to incorrectly use the word "agent" to cover both categories.
17 Ibid., p. 238.
18 Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana (London, 1968), pp. 71-2.
19 The full quotation is from the New York Times, 11 January 1969, p. 1; the inside
quotation is that of the National Commission.
20 Mother Jones magazine (San Francisco), April 1981, p. 5.
21 San Francisco Chronicle, 14 January 1982, p. 2.
22 Richard F. Grimmett, Reported Foreign and Domestic Covert Activities of the United
States Central Intelligence Agency- 1950-1974, (Library of Congress) 18 February
1975.
23 The Pentagon Papers (N.Y. Times edition, 1971), p. xiii.
24 Speech before the World Affairs Council at the University of Pennsylvania, 13
January 1950, cited in the Republican Congressional Committee Newsletter, 20
September 1965.




217
25 Robert Scheer, Los Angeles Times Book Review, 27 September 1992, review of
Georgi Arbatov, The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics (Times Books, New
York, 1992)
26 International Herald Tribune, 29 October 1992, p. 4.
27 The New Yorker, 2 November 1992, p. 6.
28 Los Angeles Times, 2 December 1988: emigration of Soviet Jews peaked at 51,330
in 1979 and fell to about 1,000 a year in the mid-1980s during the Reagan
administration (1981-89); in 1988 it was at 16,572.
29 a) Frank Kofsky, Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 194S: A Successful
Campaign to Deceive the Nation (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993), passim,
particularly Appendix A; the book is replete with portions of such documents
written by diplomatic, intelligence and military analysts in the 1940s; the war scare
was undertaken to push through the administration's foreign policy program,
inaugurate a huge military buildup, and bail out the near-bankrupt aircraft industry.
b) Declassified Documents Reference System: indexes, abstracts, and documents on
microfiche, annual series, arranged by particular government agencies and year of
declassification.
c) Foreign Relations of the United States (Department of State), annual series, internal
documents published about 25 to 35 years after the fact.
30 Los Angeles Times, 29 December 1991, p. Ml.
31 The Guardian (London), 10 October 1983, p. 9.
32 a) Anne H. Cahn, "How We Got Oversold on Overkill" Los Angeles Times, 23 July
1993, based on testimony before Congress, 10 June 1993, of Eleanor Chelimsky,
Assistant Comptroller-General of the General Accounting Office, about a GAO study;
see related story in New York Times, 28 June 1993. p.10
b) Los Angeles Times, 15 September 1991, p. 1; 26 October 1991.
c) The Guardian (London), 4 March 1983; 20 January 1984; 3 April 1986.
d) Arthur Macy Cox, "Why the U.S., Since 1977, Has Been Misperceiving Soviet Military
Strength", New York Times, 20 October 1980, p. 19; Cox was formerly an official with the
State Department and the CIA.
33 For further discussion of these points, see:
a) Walden Bello, Dark Victory: The United States, Structural Adjustment and Global Poverty
(Institute for Food and Development Policy, Oakland, CA, 1994), passim.
b) Multinational Monitor (Washington), July/August 1994, special issue on The World Bank,
c) Doug Henwood, "The U.S. Economy; The Enemy Within", Covert Action Quarterly
(Washington, DC), Summer 1992, No. 41, pp. 4.5-9.
d) Joel Bleifuss, "The Death of Nations", In These Times (Chicago) 27 June -10 July 1994, p. 12
(UN Code).



1. CHINA 1945 to 1960s

1. David Barrett, Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1944
(Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1970), passim; R. Harris Smith,
OSS: The Secret History of America's First CIA (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972),
pp. 262-3; New York Times, 9 December 1945, p. 24.
2. Chiang's policies during and after war: Smith, pp. 259-82; New York Times, 19 December
1945, p. 2.
3. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. Two: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953 (Great Britain,
1956), p. 66.
4. Smith, p. 2S2.
5. D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960 (New York, 1961), p. 570.
6. New York Times, September-December 1945, passim; Barbara W.Tuchman, Stilwell and
the American Experience in China 1911-45 (New York, 1972), pp. 666-77,


218
7. Congressional Record, Appendix, Vol. 92, part 9, 24 January 1946, p. A225, letter to
Congressman Hugh dc Lacy of State of Washington.
8. New York Times, 6 November 1945, p. 1; 19 December 1945, p. 2
9. Ibid., 9 December 1945, p. 24; 26 December 1945, p. 5.
10. Ibid., 26 December 1945, p. 5.
11. Fleming, p. 587.
12. Christopher Robbins, Air America (U.S., 1979), pp. 46-57; Victor Marchetti and John Marks,
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York, 1975), p. 149.
13. Hearings held in executive session before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee during
1949-50: Economic Assistance to China and Korea 1949-50, testimony of Dean Acheson, p. 23;
made public January 1974 as part of the Historical Series.
14. Tuchman, p. 676.
15. For some detail of the oppression and atrocities carried out by the Chiang regime against the
Taiwanese, see Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, inside the League (New York, 1986),
pp. 47-9, citing prominent American Generals and a State Department official who was in

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