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promised to put the exiled Bosch back into power. The United States sent in 23,000
troops to help crush it.

Cuba, 1959 to present

The motto of the CIA: "Proudly overthrowing Fidel Castro since 1959."21

Castro came to power at the beginning of 1959. As early as March 10, a US National
Security Council meeting included on its agenda the feasibility of bringing "another
government to power in Cuba". There followed 40 years of terrorist attacks, bombings,
full-scale mili-tary invasion, sanctions, embargoes, isolation, assassinations...Cuba had
carried out The Unforgivable Revolution, a very serious threat of setting a "good
example" in Latin America.

The saddest part of this is that the world will never know what kind of society Cuba
could have produced if left alone, if not constantly under the gun and the threat of
invasion, if allowed to relax its control at home. The idealism, the vision, the talent, the
internationalism were all there. But we'll never know. And that of course has been the

The Cuban government, its critics claim, sees the CIA behind every problem. In actuality,
the CIA is behind only half of the problems. The problem is, the Cuban government can't
tell which half.

Indonesia, 1965

A complex series of events, involving a supposed coup attempt, a counter-coup, and
perhaps a counter-counter-coup, with American fingerprints apparent at various points,
resulted in the ouster from power of Sukarno and his replacement by General Suharto and
the Indonesian military, which was very closely tied to the US military. The massacre
that then began immediately”of communists, communist sympathizers, suspected
communists, suspected communist sympathizers and none of the above”was called by
the New York Times "one of the most savage mass slayings of modern political history".
The estimates of the number killed in the course of a few years begin at half a million and
go above a million.

It was later learned that the US embassy had compiled lists of "communists", from top
echelons down to village cadres, as many as 5,000 names, and turned them over to the
army, which then hunted those persons down and killed them. The Americans would then
check off the names of those who had been killed or captured. "It really was a big help to
the army," said one US diplomat. "They probably killed a lot of people, and I probably
have a lot of blood on my hands. But that's not all bad. There's a time when you have to
strike hard at a decisive moment."

Ghana, 1966

When Kwame Nkrumah tried to lessen his country's dependence on the West by
strengthening economic and military ties to the Soviet Union, China and East Germany,
he effectively sealed his fate. A CIA-backed military coup sent the African leader into
exile, from which he never returned. A CIA document, declassified in 1977, revealed that
the Agency was in close contact with the military plotters and had been reporting to
Washington for a year on the military's plans to oust Nkrumah; the last such report was
the day before the coup. There is no indication that the CIA ever informed Nkrumah of
any of these plots.22
Uruguay, 1969-72

The 1960s was the era of the Tupamaros, perhaps the cleverest, most resourceful, most
sophisticated, least violent, Robin-Hood-like urban guerrillas the world has ever seen.
They were too good to be allowed to endure. A team of American experts arrived, to
supply the police with all the arms, vehicles, communications gear, etc. they needed, to
train them in assassination and explosives techniques, to teach methods of interrogation
cum torture, to set up an intelligence service cum death squad. It was all-out war against
the Tupamaros and any suspected sympathizers. The Tupamaros lost.

In 1998, Eladio Moll, a retired Uruguayan Navy rear admiral and former intelligence
chief, testifying before a commission of the Uruguayan Chamber of Deputies, stated that
during Uruguay's "dirty war" (1972-1983), orders came from the United States
concerning captive Tupamaros. "The guidance that was sent from the U.S.," said Moll,
"was that what had to be done with the captured guerrillas was to get information, and
that afterwards they didn't deserve to live."23

Chile, 1964-73

Salvador Allende was the worst possible scenario for the Washington power elite, who
could imagine only one thing worse than a Marxist in power”an elected Marxist in
power, one who honored the constitu-tion, and became increasingly popular. This shook
the very foundation stones upon which the anti-communist tower was built: the doctrine,
painstakingly cultivated for decades, that "communists" can take power only through
force and deception, that they can retain that power only through terrorizing and
brainwashing the population.

After sabotaging Allende's electoral endeavor in 1964, and failing to do so in 1970,
despite their best efforts, the CIA and the rest of the American foreign policy machine
left no stone unturned in their attempt to destabilize the Allende government over the
next three years, paying particular attention to undermining the economy and building up
military hostility. Finally, in September 1973, the military, under General Pinochet,
overthrew the government, Allende dying in the process.

Thus it was that they closed the country to the outside world for a week, while the tanks
rolled and the soldiers broke down doors; the stadiums rang with the sounds of execution
and the bodies piled up along the streets and floated in the river; the torture centers
opened for business, dogs trained to sexually molest female prisoners were set loose; the
subversive books were thrown to the bonfires; soldiers slit the trouser legs of women,
shouting that "In Chile women wear dresses!"; the poor returned to their natural state; and
the men of the world in Washington and in the halls of international finance opened up
their checkbooks. In the end, more than 3,000 had been executed, thousands more had
disappeared, tens of thousands tortured.24
The FBI accommodated the new government by trying to track down Chilean leftists in
the United States, while Secretary of State Henry Kissinger assured Pinochet that "In the
United States, as you know, we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do here...We
wish your government well."25

Greece, 1967-74

A military coup took place in April 1967, just two days before the campaign for national
elections was to begin, elections which appeared certain to bring the veteran liberal leader
George Papandreou back as prime minister. The coup had been a joint effort of the Royal
Court, the Greek military, the CIA and the American military stationed in Greece, and
was followed immediately by the traditional martial law, censorship, arrests, beatings and
killings, the victims totaling some 8,000 in the first month. This was accompanied by the
equally traditional declaration that this was all being done to save the nation from a
"communist takeover". Torture, inflicted in the most gruesome of ways, often with
equipment supplied by the United States, became routine.

George Papandreou was not any kind of radical. He was a liberal anti-communist type.
But his son Andreas, the heir-apparent, while only a little to the left of his father, had not
disguised his wish to take Greece out of the Cold War, and had questioned remaining in
NATO, or at least as a satellite of the United States.

Andreas Papandreou had been arrested at the time of the coup and held in prison for
eight months. Shortly after his release, he and his wife Margaret visited the American
ambassador, Phillips Talbot, in Athens. Papandreou related the following:

I asked Talbot whether America could have intervened the night of the coup, to prevent
the death of democracy in Greece. He denied that they could have done anything about it.
Then Margaret asked a critical question: What if the coup had been a Communist or a
Leftist coup? Talbot answered without hesitation. Then, of course, they would have
intervened, and they would have crushed the coup.

South Africa, 1960s-1980s

The CIA collaborated closely with South African intelligence, one of the principal
focuses being the African National Congress, the lead-ing anti-apartheid organization
which had been banned and exiled. The Agency cooperated in suppressing internal
dissent, provided specific warnings of planned attacks by the ANC and information about
ANC members residing in neighboring countries; on at least one occasion, in
Mozambique in 1981, this led to South Africa sending an assassination squad to wipe out
the fingered individuals. The CIA was also responsible for the capture of ANC leader
Nelson Mandela. Additionally, for a number of years in the 1970s and 1980s, the US
supported South Africa in the UN, and the CIA violated the UN's arms embargo against
South Africa (of which the US was a declared supporter) by covertly providing the
country with weapons and supporting its efforts to militarily determine the political
makeup of Southern Africa.26

Bolivia, 1964-75

An armed popular revolt in 1952 had defeated the military and reduced it to a small,
impotent and discredited force. But under US guidance and aid, there was a slow but
certain rejuvenation of the armed forces. By 1964, the military, with the indispensable
support of the CIA and the Pentagon, was able to overthrow President Victor Paz, whom
the United States had designated a marked man because of his refusal to support
Washington's Cuba policies. The US continued to dictate who should lead Bolivia long

In 1967, a CIA operation, employing some of the Agency's Cuban exile agents, tracked
down Che Guevara, resulting in his summary execution.

Australia, 1972-75

The CIA channeled millions of dollars to the Labor Party's opposition, but failed to block
Labor's election. When the party took power in December 1972, it immediately rankled
Washington by calling home Australian military personnel from Vietnam and denouncing
US bombing of Hanoi, among other actions against the war. The government also
displayed less than customary reverence for the intelligence and national security games
so dear to the heart of the CIA. Edward Gough Whitlam, the new prime minister, was
slowly but surely sealing his fate. Through complex supra-legal maneuvering, the US, the
British and the Australian opposition were eventually able to induce Governor-General
John Kerr”who had a long history of involvement with CIA fronts”to "legally" dismiss
Whitlam in 1975.

Iraq, 1972-75

As a favor to a very important ally, the Shah of Iran, President Nixon and National
Security Adviser Henry Kissinger provided military aid to the Kurds fighting for their
autonomy in Iraq, Iran's perennial foe. Though the military aid was to total some $16
million, the object”unknown to the Kurds”was not to win them their autonomy, but to
sap the Iraqi resources and distract them from Iran. Said a CIA memo of 1974: "Iran, like
ourselves, has seen benefit in a stalemate situation...in which Iraq is intrinsically
weakened by the Kurds' refusal to relinquish semi-autonomy. Neither Iran nor ourselves
wish to see the matter resolved one way or the other." The congressional Pike
Committee, later investigating the CIA, commented: "This policy was not imparted to
[the Kurds], who were encouraged to continue fighting. Even in the context of covert
action, ours was a cynical enterprise."
In 1975, oil politics brought Iraq and Iran together, and the latter, along with the United
States, abandoned the Kurds to a terrible fate. At a crucial point, the Kurds were begging
Kissinger for help, but he completely ignored their pleas. Kurd forces were decimated;
several hundred of their leaders were executed. Later, when questioned about this by the
Pike Committee, Kissinger responded: "Covert action should not be confused with
missionary work."27

Portugal, 1974-76

A bloodless military coup in 1974 brought down the US-supported 48-year fascist regime
that was the world's only remaining colonial power. This was followed by a program
centered on nationalization of major industries, workers' control, a minimum wage, land
reform and other progressive measures. Washington and multinational officials who were
on the board of directors of the planet were concerned. Destabilization became the order
of the day: covert actions; attacks in the US press; subverting trade unions; subsidizing
opposition media; economic sabotage through international credit and commerce; heavy
financing of selected candidates in elections; a US cut-off of Portugal from certain
military and nuclear information commonly available to NATO members; NATO naval
and air exercises off the Portuguese coast, with 19 NATO warships moored in Lisbon's
harbor, regarded by most Portuguese as an attempt to intimidate the provisional
government.28 The Portuguese revolution was doomed. The CIA-financed candidates
took and retained power for years.

East Timor, 1975-99

While East Timor was undergoing a process of decolonization from Portugal in 1975,
various political groupings were formed on the island. In August one of the parties, the
UDT, attempted a coup against Portuguese rule, which was almost certainly instigated by
Indonesia. A brief civil war broke out, in which a movement of the left, Fretilin, gained
the upper hand. By September, Fretilin had prevailed and in November declared East
Timor's independence from Portugal. Nine days later, Indonesia invaded East Timor. The
invasion was launched the day after US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger had left Indonesia after giving President Suharto permission to use
American arms, which, under US law, could not be used for aggression. Indonesia was
Washington's most valuable ally in Southeast Asia, and, in any event, the United States
was not inclined to look kindly on any leftist government.29

Indonesia soon achieved complete control over East Timor, with the help of American
arms and diplomatic support. Daniel Moynihan, who was US ambassador to the UN at
the time, later wrote that the "United States wished things to turn out as they did, and
worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations
prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me,
and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success."30
Amnesty International estimated that by 1989, Indonesian troops had killed 200,000
people out of a population of between 600,000 and 700,000. The United States stood
virtually alone in the world in its consistent support of Indonesia's claim to East Timor,
and downplayed the slaughter to a remarkable degree, at the same time supplying
Indonesia with all the military hardware and training it needed to carry out the job.
Despite denials to the contrary, Washington continued this military aid up to and
including the period of extensive massacres of pro-independence Timorese in 1999 by
Indonesian soldiers and their militia allies.31

In 1995, a senior official of the Clinton administration, speaking of Suharto, said: "He's
our kind of guy."32

Angola, 1975-1980s

The United States, China and South Africa supported one side of the civil war, while the
Soviet Union and Cuba supported the other side. It dragged on bloodily, horribly and
pointlessly for decades, and simmers yet, perhaps half a million lives lost, widespread
hunger and what is said to be the highest amputee rate in the world, caused by the
innumerable land mines. In the early years Henry Kissinger personally prevented what
might well have been a peaceful solution, but the man was wholly obsessed with
countering Soviet moves anywhere on the planet”significant or trivial, real or imagined,
fait accompli or anticipated. In the 1990s, Washington tried to rein in its client, Jonas
Savimbi, head of UNITA, to keep him from prolonging the war, but it would have been
immensely better for the people of Angola if the US had not intervened at all in Angolan
politics beginning in the early 1960s. The Russians would then have had no interest. Nor
Henry Kissinger.

Jamaica, 1976

Prime Minister Michael Manley got on Washington's bad side: by supporting the wrong
faction in Angola, by establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, and by going up


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