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the personal communications of citizens." And the Fourth Amendment had been changed
to read: "Persons shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, except in cases of national security, real or alleged."

The worst possible scenario

When pressed on moral, legal, privacy or any other grounds to justify their electronic
fishing expeditions, which are expanding like the universe after the Big Bang, the anti-
privacy police invariably fall back on some version of: "What if terrorists are planning a
terrible act and communicating the details to each other over the telephone (email/fax)?
Through tapping, we could find out their plans in advance and stop them."

If they can resort to the worst possible scenario”which in all likelihood has never
happened and never will unless the terrorists were all born yesterday, on Mars, and the
authorities are outrageously lucky in the extreme”then others can paint their own worst
scenarios. For example, in the course of the countless eavesdrops, information is bound to
be picked up about people cheating on their spouses. Imagine each time this leaks out”
great arguments at home, depression, spousal abuse, divorce, murder, suicide...and think
of the children. Not to mention the possibility of blackmail or forcing the person to
engage in espionage or treason. All it takes to flag a communication is for one of the
parties to use a couple or so of the key words in the ECHELON "dictionary"”"He lives
in a lovely old white house on Clinton Street, right near me. I can shoot over there in two

The greatest intelligence scam of the century

For decades, beginning in the 1950s, the Swiss company Crypto AG sold the world's
most sophisticated and secure encryption technology. The firm staked its reputation and
the security concerns of its clients on its neutrality in the Cold War or any war. The
purchasing nations, some 120 of them”including prime US intel' ligence targets such as
Iran, Iraq, Libya and Yugoslavia”confident that their communications were protected,
sent messages from their capitals to their embassies, military missions, trade offices and
espionage dens around the world, via telex, radio and fax. And all the while, because of a
secret agreement between the company and NSA, these governments might as well have
been hand deliver' ing the messages to Washington, uncoded. For their Crypto AG
machines had been rigged before being sold to them, so that when they used them the
random encryption key could be automatically and clandestinely transmitted along with
the enciphered message. NSA analysts could read the messages as easily as they could
the morning newspaper. German intelligence was in on it as well and may even have
been the actual owner of Crypto AG.

In 1986, because of US public statements concerning the La Belle disco bombing in West
Berlin, the Libyans began to suspect that something was rotten with Crypto AG's
machines and switched to another Swiss firm, Gretag Data Systems AG. But it appears
that NSA had that base covered as well. In 1992, after a series of suspicious
circumstances over the previous few years, Iran came to a conclusion similar to Libya's,
and arrested a Crypto AG employee who was in Iran on a business trip. He was
eventually ransomed, but the incident became well known and the scam began to unravel
in earnest.19

Microsoft Windows

NSA has done something similar with computers. In September 1999, leading European
investigative reporter Duncan Campbell revealed that NSA had arranged with Microsoft
to insert special "keys" into Windows software, in all versions from 95-OSR2 onwards.
An American computer scientist, Andrew Fernandez of Cryptonym in North Carolina,
had disassembled parts of the Windows instruction code and found the smoking gun”
Microsoft's developers had failed to remove the debugging symbols used to test this
software before they released it. Inside the code were the labels for two keys. One was
called "KEY". The other was called "NSAKEY". Fernandez presented his finding at a
conference at which some Windows developers were also in attendance. The developers
did not deny that the NSA key was built into their software, but they refused to talk about
what the key did, or why it had been put there without users' knowledge. Fernandez says
that NSA's "back door" in the world's most commonly used operating system makes it
"orders of magnitude easier for the US government to access your computer."20

In February 2000, it was disclosed that the Strategic Affairs Delegation (DAS), the
intelligence arm of the French Defense Ministry, had prepared a report in 1999 which
also asserted that NSA had helped to install secret programs in Microsoft software.
According to the DAS report, "it would seem that the creation of Microsoft was largely
supported, not least financially, by the NSA, and that IBM was made to accept the
[Microsoft] MS-DOS operating system by the same administration." The report stated
that there had been a "strong suspicion of a lack of security fed by insistent rumours
about the existence of spy programmes on Microsoft, and by the presence of NSA
personnel in Bill Gates' development teams." The Pentagon, said the report, was
Microsoft's biggest client in the world.21

CHAPTER 22 : Kidnapping and Looting

In 1962, the United States kidnapped about 125 people from the Dominican Republic,
and took them to the US and elsewhere.

A suspected drug smuggler was spirited out of Honduras and taken to the US in 1988,
although the Honduran constitution prohibits the extradition of Honduran citizens for trial
in other countries. Presumably, in this case, it was carried out with the approval of the
Honduran government under US pressure.

In December 1989, the American military grabbed Manuel Noriega in Panama and
hustled him off to Florida.
The following year, the Drug Enforcement Administration paid bounty hunters to abduct
Dr. Humberto Alvarez Machain from his medical office in Guadalajara, Mexico, fly him
to El Paso and turn him over to the DEA.

A Cypriot businessman, Hossein Alikhani, accused of violating US sanctions against
Libya, was lured on board a plane in the Bahamas in 1992 in a US Customs sting and
abducted to Miami.

Increasing numbers of Colombians, charged with drug offenses, are being shipped to the
US since Washington succeeded in forcing the government to remove a prohibition
against extradition in December 1997.1

In 1992, the US Supreme Court, ruling in the Alvarez Machain case, declared that
although it may be "shocking" in its violation of basic principles of international law,
kidnapping foreign citizens in their own country is a legally acceptable way to get them
to face charges in a US court for violating American law. Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist was willing to record for history his observation that the extradition treaty
between the United States and Mexico could be ignored because the treaty didn't
explicitly say "no kidnapping allowed".2

If memory serves, the United States fought a war in 1812 with Great Britain over this

If people can be taken with impunity, how much easier with papers and other material


In the dying days of World War II, the fascist leaders of Hungary escaped to the West
with a trainload of loot belonging to the Hungarian Jewish bourgeoisie”from furs and
stamp collections to artwork and oriental rugs, and at least one crate of wedding rings
confiscated from Holocaust victims. The train got as far as Austria, where American
Army forces stopped them. US officers, and likely the lower ranks as well, helped
themselves to all manner of goodies. After the war, despite repeated pleas from the
Hungarian Jewish community, very few of the valuables were returned to their original
owners. In 1949, Washington transferred 1,181 paintings of the Hungarian booty to
Austria in violation of international treaties stipulating that "cultural property" looted
during the Second World War should be returned to "the country of origin". The Truman
administration wished to prevent such treasures from falling into the hands of Communist
regimes in Eastern Europe; better in the hands of the Austrians, the willing accomplices
of Adolf Hitler.3

In the wake of the CIA-engineered coup of 1954, the United States confiscated a huge
amount of documents from the Guatemalan government, primarily in the hope of
uncovering the hand of the International Communist Conspiracy behind the government
of Jacobo Arbenz. This, after all, has been Washington's official rationale to this day for
overthrowing Arbenz. If this is what was indeed discovered in the documents, it has not
been made public.


In the midst of its completely illegal and destructive invasion of the island in October
1983, the United States found time to rifle through government files and take a large
quantity of documents back home. Washington officials then proceeded to give selected
documents to the press to publish”such as those dealing with meetings of Grenadian
government leaders and military cooperation agreements with foreign countries”hoping
that this would lend credence to the official US government position that Cuba and
Russia were planning to take over the island and use it as a springboard for destabilizing
the entire Caribbean. The documents, however, evidenced no such thing.3 Indeed, CIA
Director William Casey was later to admit that the documents "were not a real find".4


During their invasion of December 1989, the United States confis^ cated thousands of
boxes of government documents, which they refused to return.5 The occupying American
forces roamed the land free from the restraints of any higher power. Along the way they
helped themselves to all manner of other documents, files and archives from the offices
of the media, political parties (particularly those of the left), labor unions, etc.6

The US also seized more than 52,000 weapons, as well as armored personnel carriers and
rocket launchers. Panama later asked for compensation for the material.7

There has been no return of anything nor any compensation paid.8


Sometime shortly after the collapse of the East German government in 1990, the CIA
managed to spirit away the top-secret archives of the country's intelligence agency, the
Stasi. For the next nine years, the United States refused to return the material”with the
exception of some bits and pieces now and then”despite the repeated requests of the
German government. President Clinton for some time refused to even discuss the matter
with German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Finally, in October 1999, the CIA
announced that they would turn over what appears to be a substantial portion of the files,
but the Agency would still retain a large number of selected files. The Stasi files contain
information on numerous individuals whose identity the CIA would prefer not be
exposed, presumably including their own agents who were spying on West Germany,
whom the Stasi knew about; many other files might be valuable to the Agency because
the individuals would be highly vulnerable to blackmail, for whatever purpose they could
be used by the CIA.9


In the wake of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Kurdish groups captured some 18 tons of
Iraqi government documents, which the United States later took possession of. The
papers now reside at the University of Colorado at Boulder and are open to the public.10
Iraq has not asked for the return of the documents, perhaps realizing the utter futility and
groveling nature of such a request.


While returning Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in 1994, the US military helped
themselves to an estimated 160,000 documents, audio and videotapes (some of torture
sessions), and "trophy photos" of mutilated victims, belonging to the Haitian military and
paramilitary organizations. The United States has refused to hand back its booty unless it
can select which ones to return, censoring any it wishes, and unless Haiti agrees to certain
detailed restrictions on use of the material. The decades4ong CIA involvement with
sundry Haitian dictatorships, armed forces, death squads, torturers, drug traffickers and
miscellaneous corruption gives Washington more than enough reason to keep the
material from wide dissemination. However, Haitian President Rene Preval has stated:
"Our position is we want all the documents back, unaltered, period."

The Haitian government has asked for the documents several times since 1995, in public
letters, private correspondence, press conferences and international arenas. Among the
supporters of its request have been the UN/OAS human rights mission to Haiti, scores of
present and former members of the US Congress, religious and solidarity groups in the
United States and abroad, three Nobel Peace Prize winners, Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch. The UN Human Rights Commission has demanded the return of
the documents so that the truth of "where the responsibility lies in each case" of human
rights violations could be determined. Even the British Foreign Office raised the issue
with the US State Department. Advocates for the return of the documents say that the
absence of evidence concerning some of those who took part in the 1991 coup that
overthrew the democratically^elected Aristide contributes to the insecurity and injustice
plaguing Haiti today.

For several years, Haiti and its supporters in the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights and in the General Assembly have tried to bring to a vote a resolution calling for
the United States to return the documents. But the US delegation has been able to
maneuver the proceedings to block such a vote.11
CHAPTER 23 : How the CIA Sent Nelson Mandela to Prison for 28

When Nelson Mandela was released from prison in February 1990, President George
Bush personally telephoned the black South African leader to tell him that all Americans
were "rejoicing at his release".1

This was the same Nelson Mandela who was imprisoned for almost 28 years because the
CIA tipped off South African authorities as to where they could find him.

And this was the same George Bush who was once the head of the CIA and who for eight
years was second in power of an administration whose CIA and National Security
Agency collaborated closely with the South African intelligence service, providing
information about Mandela's African National Congress.2 The ANC was a progressive
nationalist movement whose influence had been felt in other African countries;
accordingly it had been perceived by Washington as being part of the legendary
International Communist Conspiracy. In addition to ideology, other ingredients in the
cooking pot the United States and South Africa both ate from was that the latter served as
an important source of uranium for the United States, and the US was South Africa's
biggest supporter at the United Nations.

On August 5, 1962, Nelson Mandela had been on the run for 17 months when armed
police at a roadblock outside Howick, Natal flagged down a car in which he was
pretending to be the chauffeur of a white passenger in the back seat. How the police came
to be there was not publicly explained. In late July 1986, however, stories appeared in
three South African newspapers (picked up shortly thereafter by the London press and, in
part, CBS-TV) which shed considerable light on the question. The stories told of how a
CIA officer, Donald C. Rickard by name, under cover as a consular official in Durban,
had tipped off the Special Branch that Mandela would be disguised as a chauffeur in a car
headed for Durban. This was information Rickard had obtained through an informant in
the ANC. One year later, at a farewell party for him in South Africa, at the home of the
notorious CIA mercenary Colonel "Mad Mike" Hoare, Rickard himself, his tongue
perhaps loosened by spirits, stated in the hearing of some of those present that he had
been due to meet Mandela on the fateful night, but tipped off the police instead. Rickard
refused to discuss the affair when approached by CBS-TV.3

CBS-TV newsman Allen Pizzey did interview journalist James Tomlins on the air when
the story broke in 1986. Tomlins, who was in South Africa in 1962, stated that Rickard
had told him of his involvement in Mandela's capture.4

On June 10, 1990, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution reported that an unidentified,
retired US intelligence officer had revealed that within hours of Mandela's arrest, Paul
Eckel, then a senior CIA operative, had told him: "We have turned Mandela over to the
South African security branch. We gave them every detail, what he would be wearing,


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