. 1
( 62 .)



>>

Boundaries of the Mind
The Individual in the Fragile Sciences
Cognition


Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cogni-
tive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or
skin of the individual. Rob Wilson, in this provocative and challeng-
ing new book, provides the foundation for the view that the mind
extends beyond the boundary of the individual.
The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philo-
sophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and
the human sciences. There are highly accessible discussions of the ori-
gin of psychology, nativism about the mind, contemporary views of
computation, mental representation, consciousness, the metaphysics
of mind, the idea of group minds, and how to think about the indi-
vidual in the cognitive, biological, and social sciences, what Wilson
refers to as the fragile sciences. A companion volume Genes and the
Agents of Life explores this general theme in the biological sciences.
Written with verve and clarity, this ambitious book will appeal to
a broad swath of professionals and students in philosophy, psychol-
ogy, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioral and human
sciences.

Robert A. Wilson was born in Broken Hill, Australia, and lives in
Edmonton, Canada. He is the author or editor of ¬ve other books,
including the award-winning The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sci-
ences (1999).
Boundaries of the Mind
The Individual in the Fragile Sciences

Cognition




ROBERT A. WILSON
University of Alberta
cambridge university press
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521836456

© Robert A. Wilson 2004


This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of
relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place
without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published in print format 2004

isbn-13 978-0-511-21724-1 eBook (NetLibrary)
isbn-10 0-511-21724-2 eBook (NetLibrary)

isbn-13 978-0-521-83645-6 hardback
isbn-10 0-521-83645-x hardback

isbn-13 978-0-521-54494-8 paperback
isbn-10 0-521-54494-7 paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls
for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
For Selina
Contents in Brief




part one: disciplining the individual
and the mind
1 The Individual in the Fragile Sciences page 3
2 Individuals, Psychology, and the Mind 27
3 Nativism on My Mind 50
part two: individualism and externalism in the
philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences
4 Individualism: Philosophical Foundations 77
5 Metaphysics, Mind, and Science: Two Views of Realization 100
6 Context-Sensitive Realizations 120
7 Representation, Computation, and Cognitive Science 144
part three: thinking through and beyond the body
8 The Embedded Mind and Cognition 183
9 Expanding Consciousness 214
10 Intentionality and Phenomenology 242
part four: the cognitive metaphor in the biological
and social sciences
11 Group Minds in Historical Perspective 265
12 The Group Mind Hypothesis in Contemporary Biology
and Social Science 286
Notes 309
References 335
Index 355
vii
Contents




page xiii
List of Tables and Figures
xv
Acknowledgments

part one
disciplining the individual and the mind

1 The Individual in the Fragile Sciences 3
3
1 Individuals and the Mind
4
2 Individuals and Science
8
3 The Fragile Sciences
9
4 Individualism in the Cognitive, Biological, and Social Sciences
14
5 Inside the Thinking Individual
17
6 The Beast Within
19
7 Culture, Nature, and the Individual
22
8 The Metaphysical Picture: Smallism
24
9 A Path Through Boundaries of the Mind

2 Individuals, Psychology, and the Mind 27
27
1 Psychology amongst the Fragile Sciences
30
2 The Disciplining of Psychology
31
3 From Physiology to Philosophy: Wundt and James
36
4 Disciplining the Social Aspects of the Mind
40
5 Wundt™s Individuals
41
6 Galton™s Individuals
45
7 Nativism and the Continuity Thesis
48
8 Overlaying the Mind



ix
Contents
x

3 Nativism on My Mind 50
50
1 Nativist Threads
51
2 From Chomsky to Fodor to Pinker: A Thumbnail
54
3 Empiricist Alternatives to Nativism
56
4 The Two-Dimensional Approach
60
5 Making Do with Less?
65
6 Satisfying Some Desiderata
67
7 But Could Two Dimensions Be Enough?
68
8 Nativism about Cognition and Biology
72
9 Conceptual Analysis and Nativism

part two
individualism and externalism in the philosophy
of mind and the cognitive sciences

4 Individualism: Philosophical Foundations 77
77
1 Making Sense of the Individualism-Externalism Debate
79
2 Individualism, Taxonomy, and Metaphysical Determination
82
3 Getting to Twin Earth: What™s in the Head?
87
4 The Social Aspect to Having a Mind
90
5 Narrow and Wide Content
93
6 Functionalism, Physicalism, and Individualism
96
7 The Appeal to Causal Powers
98
8 Metaphysics and the Fragile Sciences

5 Metaphysics, Mind, and Science: Two Views
of Realization 100
100
1 The Metaphysics of Mind and the Fragile Sciences
101
2 Realization within the Philosophy of Mind
102
3 A Sketch of Two Views of Realization
103
4 The Standard View (I): Realizers as Metaphysically Suf¬cient
104
5 The Standard View (II): Realizers as Physically Constitutive
105
6 Smallism, the Standard View, and the Fragile Sciences
107
7 Context-Sensitive Realization and Metaphysical Suf¬ciency
111
8 Physical Constitutivity and Wide Realizations
114
9 Wide Realizations in the Biological and Social Sciences
117
10 Two Views Reconsidered

6 Context-Sensitive Realizations 120
120
1 Adjusting One™s Metaphysics
121
2 Microphysical Determinism, Relations, and Smallism
125
3 Dispositions and Science
128
4 Nonreductive Materialism
130
5 The Modi¬ed Standard View: Causation and Realization
Contents xi

133
6 Context Sensitivity within the Standard View
137
7 Keeping Realism A¬‚oat
139
8 Pluralism about Realization
141
9 Abandoning the Subject?
143
10 Putting Our Metaphysics to Work

7 Representation, Computation, and Cognitive Science 144
144
1 The Cognitive Science Gesture
145
2 Individualism in Cognitive Science
147
3 Mental Representation as Encoding
150
4 The Debate Over Marr™s Theory of Vision
155
5 Segal and Egan on Computation and Representation
162
6 Exploitative Representation and Wide Computationalism
172
7 Narrow Content and Marr™s Theory
174
8 Locational versus Taxonomic Externalism
178
9 Having It Both Ways?
179
10 Beyond Computation

part three
thinking through and beyond the body

. 1
( 62 .)



>>