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8 The Embedded Mind and Cognition 183
1 Representation and Psychology
2 Life and Mind: From Reaction to Thought
3 The Embeddedness and Embodiment of Higher Cognition
4 Memory
5 Cognitive Development
6 Folk Psychology and the Theory of Mind
7 The Mind Beyond Itself

9 Expanding Consciousness 214
1 The Return of the Conscious
2 Processes of Awareness and Phenomenal States
3 Expanding the Conscious Mind: Processes of Awareness
4 Arguing for Expanded Consciousness
5 Global Externalism and Phenomenal States
6 TESEE and Sensory Experience
7 Individualistic Residues
8 Global Externalism and the TESEE View

10 Intentionality and Phenomenology 242
1 The Relationship Between Intentionality and Phenomenology
2 Dimensions of the Inseparability Thesis
3 De¬‚ating the Inseparability Thesis

4 Phenomenal Intentionality
5 Individualism and Phenomenal Intentionality
6 How to Be a Good Phenomenologist

part four
the cognitive metaphor in the biological
and social sciences

11 Group Minds in Historical Perspective 265
1 Group Minds and the Cognitive Metaphor in the Biological
and Social Sciences
2 Two Traditions
3 The Collective Psychology Tradition
4 The Superorganism Tradition
5 Group Minds and the Social Manifestation Thesis
6 Collective Psychology, Superorganisms, and Socially
Manifested Minds
7 From the Past to the Present

12 The Group Mind Hypothesis in Contemporary Biology
and Social Science 286
1 Reviving the Group Mind
2 On Having a Mind
3 Minimal Minds, Consciousness, and Holism
4 The Contemporary Defense of the Group Mind Hypothesis
5 The Social Manifestation Thesis
6 The Cognitive and the Social
7 From Group Minds to Group Selection
8 Groups, Minds, and Individuals

Notes 309
References 335
Index 355
List of Tables and Figures

6.1 Realization in Psychology, Biology, and Chemistry page 127
8.1 Locus of Control and Representational Type 187
8.2 Higher Cognition and Its Realizations 188

Nativism and Cognition
1.1 16
Nativism and Inheritance and Development
1.2 19
Culture and the Individual Mind
1.3 21
Psychology amongst the Fragile Sciences
2.1 29
Nativism and Cognition
3.1 59
Nativism and the Theory of Mind
3.2 61
Nativism, Genetics, and Development
3.3 71
(a) Constitutive Decomposition Involving Entity-bounded
Realization and (b) Integrative Synthesis Involving Wide
Realization 112
Standard Computationalism
7.1 165
Wide Computationalism
7.2 166
Rush Hour: A Problem
8.1 193
(a) and (b) Rush Hour: A Solution
8.2 194


I began thinking about some of the material in this book in the mid-1990s
as work on three distinct projects progressed. Some of the metaphysical
issues concerning the mind, particularly what I think of as the hard-
nosed physicalist challenges to nonreductionist views posed by Jaegwon
Kim and David Lewis, had been passed by too quickly in my ¬rst book,
Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds. These called for further re¬‚ection.
I had also started developing, slowly and through trial-and-error teaching,
some background in biology and the philosophy of biology. Finally, I was
being forced to think about the diversity of views within cognitive science
through my role as general editor for The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive
Sciences. It took a few years for these interests and issues to coalesce, and
for the project of which this book is a part to be articulated.
The project itself was initiated while I held a fellowship at the Center
for Advanced Study at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, in
the spring of 1998. The center also played a broader supportive role for
me throughout my time at Illinois, for which I am grateful. Rough ver-
sions of the ¬rst chapter and those in Part Two were drafted in the fall
of 1999 while holding a fellowship courtesy of the Program for Liberal
Arts and Sciences Study in a Second Discipline at Illinois. During this
period, the Cognitive Science Group at the Beckman Institute at Illinois
provided a stimulating intellectual home that regularly transgressed dis-
ciplinary boundaries of all kinds. I thank my colleagues there and in
the Department of Philosophy “ especially Gary Dell, Gary Ebbs, Steve
Levinson, Patrick Maher, Greg Murphy, and Fred Schmitt “ for fostering a
constructive and welcoming academic environment in which a somewhat
open-ended project could be undertaken.

Most of the writing for the project has been done while I have been at
the University of Alberta these past two or three years, and with generous
release time provided by grant SSHRC 410-2001-0061 from the Social Sci-
ences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. As the project devel-
oped, it became clear that it could not be completed within a single book.
Much of the last year has been spent making both this book and Genes
and the Agents of Life (Cambridge 2005), walk the line that independent
but related books must. I thank my departmental chair, Bernie Linsky,
for his ¬‚exibility in assigning my teaching load, giving me the whole of
calendar 2002 to concentrate on both books. My thanks also to my re-
search assistants over the last two years “ Ken Bond, Jennie Greenwood,
Li Li, and Patrick McGivern “ and to members of an upper-division and
graduate course in the spring of 2003 who grappled with, and usefully
critiqued, material from both books.
For feedback and encouragement along the way, I would like to thank
Karen Bennett, Paul Bloom, Andy Clark, Lesley Cormack, Gary Ebbs,
Frances Egan, John Heil, Terry Horgan, Frank Keil, the late David Lewis,
Patrick Maher, Robert McKim, Ruth Millikan, Alex Rueger, Robert Smith,
Andrea Scarantino, Gabe Segal, Larry Shapiro, Sydney Shoemaker, Bob
Stalnaker, Kim Sterelny, Paul Teller, John Tienson, J. D. Trout, Peter
Vallentyne, Steve Wagner, David Sloan Wilson, and Steve Yablo. Greg
Murphy and Larry Shapiro provided detailed written comments on the
penultimate manuscript, for which I am grateful, and Michael Wade
did the same for the material that comprises Part Four. The editorial
and production team at Cambridge “ Stephanie Achard, Jennifer Carey,
Shari Chappell, and Carolyn Sherayko “ have been a pleasure to work
with throughout, and have improved the ¬nal manuscript considerably.
I would also like to thank four reviewers for Cambridge University Press
who provided feedback and guidance on the overall shape of the project,
and Terence Moore at Cambridge for his editorial leadership.
Many of the chapters draw on and develop material that I have pub-
lished elsewhere. I would like to acknowledge publishers for permission
to include material drawn from the following publication sources:

Chapters 4 and 7: “Individualism,” in Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. War¬eld
(eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell Pub-
lishers, 2002, pp. 256“287.
Chapters 5 and 6: “Two Views of Realization,” Philosophical Studies, 104
(2001), pp. 1“30. C 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Acknowledgments xvii

Chapter 6: “Some Problems for ˜Alternative Individualism,™ ” Philosophy
of Science, 67 (2000), pp. 671“679. C 2000 Philosophy of Science As-
sociation. All rights reserved. The University of Chicago Press.
Chapters 7 and 8: “The Mind Beyond Itself,” in Dan Sperber (ed.),
Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. Volume 10, Vancouver
Studies in Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000,
pp. 31“52.
Chapter 8: “The Individual in Biology and Psychology,” in Valerie Gray
Hardcastle (ed.), Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999, pp. 357“374.
Chapter 10: “Intentionality and Phenomenology,” Paci¬c Philosophical
Quarterly, 84 (2003), pp. 413“431. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Chapter 12: “Group-Level Cognition,” Philosophy of Science, 68 (2001),
pp. S262“S273. C 2001 Philosophy of Science Association. All rights
reserved. The University of Chicago Press.

Edmonton, Alberta
June 2003
Boundaries of the Mind
The Individual in the Fragile Sciences
part one


The Individual in the Fragile Sciences

1 individuals and the mind
Where does the mind begin and end? We think of the mind as tied to
and delimited by individuals. Minds do not ¬‚oat free in the air or belong
to larger, amorphous entities, such as groups, societies, or cultures. No,
they are tightly coupled with individuals. Minds exist inside individuals,
and the particular mind that any individual has constitutes an important
part of what it is to be that individual. We may not know precisely when
during ontogenetic development the mind begins to exist and when it
ceases to exist. Indeed, we might think that there is no such precise time,
and that to think otherwise is to fall into some sort of conceptual muddle.
But that a particular mind™s temporal boundaries are delimited by the
life of the individual is re¬‚ected in both Western science and law.
Likewise, we might quibble about how far throughout the brain and
central nervous system the mind extends spatially. But again, the bound-
ary of the mind is no greater than the boundary of the individual. If it
doesn™t stop further in, in the brain, it at least stops at the skin.
There are ways in which these ideas about the mind may appear to
be challenged by pervasive systems of thought beyond science. For ex-
ample, on many religious views, at least something very like the mind is
neither temporally nor spatially bounded by the body by which we usually
identify an individual. Minds leave bodies when a person dies, and can
¬nd themselves in places beyond Earth, or in other bodies on Earth. This
sort of view is even accommodated within analytic discussions of personal


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