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pages 714“744; and Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others: The
Evolution and Psychology of Unsel¬sh Behavior (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1998).
3. See my Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences
of the Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), especially
Chapter 10.
4. For Fodor™s original views, see his “Methodological Solipsism Considered as
a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
3 (1980), pages 63“73. Reprinted in his Representations (Sussex: Harvester
Press, 1981).
5. See Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of
Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), Chapter 2; Tim Crane, “All the Dif-
ference in the World,” Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (1991), pages 1“25; Michael
Devitt, “A Narrow Representational Theory of Mind,” in William G. Lycan,
(editor), Mind and Cognition: A Reader (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell,
1990); and Frances Egan, “Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Con-
tent,” Mind, 101 (1992), pages 443“459.
6. See the works cited earlier in notes 1 and 2, as well as George C. Williams,
Adaptation and Natural Selection (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1966); and David Sloan Wilson, “A Theory of Group Selection,” Proceedings

309
Notes to Pages 11“23
310

of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 72 (1975), pages 143“146; and “The
Group Selection Controversy: History and Current Status,” Annual Review of
Ecology and Systematics, 14 (1983), pages 159“187.
For a formulation of methodological individualism in terms of superve-
7.
nience, see Daniel Little, Varieties of Social Explanation (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1991), Chapter 9.
For classic defenses of methodological individualism, see Karl Popper, The
8.
Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2nd
edition, 1952); and J.W.N. Watkins, “Historical Explanation in the So-
cial Sciences,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 8 (1957), pages
104“117.
Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1951),
9.
originally published in 1897; and Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International
Publishers, 1967), originally published in 1867.
Richard Lewontin, Biology as Ideology (New York: Harper Collins, 1993
10.
edition); and his It Ain™t Necessarily So: The Dream of the Human Genome and
Other Illusions (New York: New York Review of Books, 2000).
I discuss genetics and development more generally, particularly the sense in
11.
which genetics is individualistic, in Part Three of my Genes and the Agents of
Life (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Adam Kuper, Culture: The Anthropologists™ Account (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
12.
University Press, 1999).
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, “The Psychological Foundations of Cul-
13.
ture,” in Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby (editors), The
Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992); Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Syn-
thesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975); Steven Pinker, The
Language Instinct (New York: Morrow, 1994); How the Mind Works (New York:
Norton, 1997); and The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (New
York: Viking, 2002).
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973),
14.
pages 12“13.
Since a number of people have asked me about “smallism,” a brief note.
15.
I ¬rst coined “smallism” in the mid-1990s in unpublished work and talks
characterizing the views of Jaegwon Kim and David Lewis in the philosophy
of the mind. The term makes a brief appearance in my “The Individual in
Biology and Psychology,” in V. Hardcastle (editor), Biology Meets Psychology:
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). See also Owen Flanagan,
The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them (New
York: Basic Books, 2002).
For atomism and corpuscularianism in general, see Daniel Garber, John
16.
Henry, Lynn Joy, and Alan Gabbey, “New Doctrines of Body and its Pow-
ers, Place, and Space,” in Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (editors), The
Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1998), Volume 1. For an attempt to make sense of Locke™s view
of primary qualities, see my “Locke™s Primary Qualities,” Journal of the History
of Philosophy, 40 (2002), pages 201“228.
Notes to Pages 25“35 311

17. For earlier efforts here, see Ron McClamrock, Existential Cognition: Computa-
tional Minds in the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Mark
Rowlands, The Body in Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999);
and my Cartesian Psychology, Chapters 3 and 4.
18. On group minds, see David Sloan Wilson, “Incorporating Group Selection
into the Adaptationist Program: A Case Study Involving Human Decision
Making,” in Jeffrey A. Simpson and Douglas T. Kendrick (editors), Evolution-
ary Social Psychology (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1997) and Darwin™s Cathedral:
Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2002); Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse
University Press, 1986); and Ludwig Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scien-
ti¬c Fact (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), originally published
in German in 1935.


2: Individuals, Psychology, and the Mind
1. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences
(New York: Vintage Books, 1994 edition); Discipline and Punish: The Birth
of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995 edition); and The History of
Sexuality: Volume 1, An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1990 edition).
These were ¬rst published in English in 1970, 1975, and 1978, respectively.
2. For some recent discussion of the demarcation of psychology, see Gary
Hat¬eld, “Psychology, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science: Re¬‚ections on the
History and Philosophy of Experimental Psychology,” Mind and Language, 17
(2002), pages 207“232; and Edward S. Reed, From Soul to Mind: The Emer-
gence of Psychology from Erasmus Darwin to William James (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1997).
3. Gustav Fechner, Elemente der Psychophysik (Leipzig: Breitkopf and Hartel,
1860); Wilhelm Wundt, Grundz¨ ge der physiologischen Psychologie (Leipzig: W.
u
Engelmann, 3rd edition, 1887), originally published in 1874; and William
James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover, 1950), originally pub-
lished in 1890. The quote from James comes from the ¬rst sentence of The
Principles.
4. On physiology™s relation to anatomy, see J. Schiller, “Physiology™s Struggle
for Independence in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century,” History of
Science, 7 (1968), pages 64“89, especially pages 73“74.
5. My views of Wundt here are in¬‚uenced by the writings of Arthur Blumen-
thal. See his “A Reappraisal of Wilhelm Wundt,” American Psychologist, 30
(1975), pages 1081“1088; “The Founding Father We Never Knew,” Contem-
porary Psychology, 24 (1979), pages 547“550; and “Leipzig, Wilhelm Wundt,
and Psychology™s Gilded Age,” in G.A. Kimble and M. Wertheimer, Por-
traits of Pioneers in Psychology, Volume 3 (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1998),
pages 31“50.
6. Beitr¨ ge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung (Leipzig/Heidelberg: C.F. Winter,
a
1862); Vorlesungen uber die Menschen- und Tierseele (Leipzig: Voss, 1863); and
¨
V¨lkerpsychologie: Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetzen, Mythus und Sitte
o
(Leipzig: Engelmann, ten volumes, 1900“1920).
Notes to Pages 36“45
312

7. On social cognition, see Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1999). For the revival of the work of Mead and Goffman, see for
example: Rom Harr´ , Social Being (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979); J.D. Baldwin,
e
George Herbert Mead: A Unifying Theory for Sociology (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publications, 1986); and Sheldon Stryker, “The Vitalization of Social In-
teraction,” Social Psychology Quarterly, 50 (1987), pages 83“94. See also G.
Collier, H.L. Minton, and G. Reynolds, Currents of Thought in American Social
Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
8. See Roger Smith, The Norton History of the Human Sciences (New York: Norton,
1997), Chapter 12, for discussion of Comte. The quotation appears on
page 427 and is taken from A. Comte, The Essential Comte: Selected from the
Course de philosophie positive edited by S. Andreski (New York: Barnes and
Noble, 1974), page 32.
9. Apart from Smith, The Norton History of the Human Sciences, see also Gordon
Allport, “The Historical Background of Modern Social Psychology,” in G.
Lindzey and E. Aronson (editors), The Handbook of Social Psychology (Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley, 2nd edition, 1968). The quotation is taken from August
Comte, System of Positive Polity, Second Volume (New York: Franklin, 1875),
page 357.
10. Edward A. Ross, Social Psychology: An Outline and Source Book (New York:
Macmillan, 1908). The quotations are taken from pages 1 and 2, with “sug-
gestions” appearing on page 12.
11. Emile Durkheim, Rules of Sociological Method (New York: Free Press, 1938),
at page 145, originally published in 1895. On collective representations, see
his “Individual and Collective Representations,” reprinted in his Sociology and
Philosophy (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1953), originally published in 1898.
For a recent example of work that picks up this thread, see Bradd Shore,
Culture in Mind (New York: Oxford University Press).
12. Kurt Danziger, Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
13. The quotations are from Constructing the Subject, pages 48 and 58 respectively.
14. Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences
(London: Macmillan. 2nd edition, 1892), originally published in 1869; and
Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development (London: Macmillan, 1883).
15. Danziger, Constructing the Subject, page 77. Chapter 5 provides a more general
discussion of the notion of a collective subject.
16. Constructing the Subject, page 56.
17. In¬‚uential early expressions of the continuity thesis include Noam Chomsky,
Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought (New York:
Harper and Row, 1966) and Jerry Fodor, “The Present Status of the Innate-
ness Controversy,” in his Representations (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1981). For
more recent expressions of it, see Fiona Cowie, What™s Within? Nativism Re-
considered (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Frank Keil, “Cog-
nitive Science and the Origins of Thought and Knowledge,” and Elizabeth
Spelke and Elissa Newport, “Nativism, Empiricism, and the Development
of Knowledge,” both in W. Damon and R.M. Lerner (editors), Handbook of
Child Psychology, Volume 1: Theoretical Models of Human Development (New York:
Notes to Pages 45“53 313

Wiley, 5th edition, 1998). For some discussion of this general issue in the
context of theories of spatial perception, see Gary Hat¬eld, The Natural and
the Normative: Theories of Spatial Perception from Kant to Helmholtz (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1990).
18. For Locke™s focus on ideas, see An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), Book II, Chapters ii“xi. Locke discusses
combination, association, and abstraction in the following chapter.
19. Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), page 20.


3: Nativism on My Mind
1. For recent attempts that use just one dimension, see Muhammad Ali
Khalidi, “Innateness and Domain-Speci¬city,” Philosophical Studies, 105
(2001), pages 191“210, and “Nature and Nurture in Cognition,” British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53 (2002), pages 251“272; and Richard
Samuels, “Nativism in Cognitive Science,” Mind and Language, 17 (2002),
pages 233“265. For an account that draws on more than two dimensions,
see Fiona Cowie, What™s Within: Nativism Reconsidered (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1999).
2. Noam Chomsky, Re¬‚ections on Language (New York: Pantheon, 1975),
pages 10“11.
3. See also Noam Chomsky, “Linguistics and Adjacent Fields: A Personal View,”
in Asa Kasher (editor), The Chomskyan Turn (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991),
one place where Chomsky draws this comparison directly.
4. For the classic articulation and defense of ¬rst of these views, see Jerry Fodor,
The Language of Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).
For the second, see his The Modularity of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1983).
5. Fodor, Language of Thought, page 97.
6. Most recently in his Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998). See also Stephen Laurence and Eric
Margolis, “Radical Concept Nativism,” Cognition, 86 (2002), pages 25“55.
7. For the examples of the reach of the idea of modularity, see Jay Gar¬eld
(editor), Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Under-
standing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Lawrence Hirschfeld and Susan
Gelman (editors), Mapping the Mind: Domain-Speci¬city in Cognition and Cul-
ture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Simon Baron-Cohen,
Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1995). For Fodor™s criticisms of such extensions, particularly within
evolutionary psychology, see his The Mind Doesn™t Work That Way (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2000). I take a somewhat whimsical look at Fodor™s views here
in my “What Computations (Still, Still) Can™t Do: Jerry Fodor on Computa-
tion and Modularity,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, in press.
8. Leda Cosmides, “The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection
Shaped How Humans Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task,” Cog-
nition, 31 (1989), pages 187“276; and Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, “Cog-
nitive Adaptations for Social Exchange,” in Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides,
Notes to Pages 53“60
314

and John Tooby (editors), The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the
Generation of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
On the many modules, see Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, “Evolutionary
9.
Psychology,” in R.A. Wilson and F.C. Keil (editors), The MIT Encyclopedia of the
Cognitive Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). On the adapted mind
more generally, see their “Origins of Domain Speci¬city: The Evolution of
Functional Organization,” in L. Hirschfeld and S. Gelman (editors), Mapping
the Mind. For a popular, enthusiastic treatment, see Steven Pinker, How the
Mind Works (New York: Norton, 1997), and The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial
of Human Nature (New York: Viking, 2002).
For Chomsky™s critique, see his, “A Review of B. F. Skinner™s ˜Verbal behav-
10.
ior,™” Language, 24 (1959), pages 163“186.
The original Rumelhart and McClelland model is in their “On Learning the
11.
Past Tenses of English Verbs: Implicit Rules or Parallel Distributed Process-
ing?,” in David Rumelhart, James McClelland, and the PDP Research Group,
Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition,Vol. 1:
Foundations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). The quotation from Pinker
comes from his “Four Decades of Rules and Associations, or Whatever Hap-
pened to the Past Tense Debate?,” in Emmanuel Dupoux (editor), Language,
Brain, and Cognitive Development: Essays in Honor of Jacques Mehler (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2001), page 159. For hybrid models, see Gary Marcus, The
Algebraic Mind: Integrating Connectionism and Cognitive Science (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2001); and Steve Pinker, Words and Rules: The Ingredients of
Language (New York: Harper Collins, 1999).
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, “The Poverty of the Stimulus Argu-
12.
ment,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52 (2001), pages 217“276,
at page 219.
See Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on

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