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13.
Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); and Edwin Hutchins,
Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
Steven Quartz and Terence Sejnowski, “The Neural Basis of Cognitive
14.
Development: A Constructivist Manifesto,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
20 (1997), pages 537“596. For neural selection theory, see Jean-Pierre
Changeux, Neuronal Man (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985); and Gerald
Edelman, Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (New York:
Basic Books, 1987). For Quartz™s own recent analysis of innateness, see his
“Innateness and the Brain,” Biology and Philosophy, 18 (2003), pages 13“40.
On concepts, Greg Murphy, The Big Book of Concepts (Cambridge, MA: MIT
15.
Press, 2002). On word meanings, Paul Bloom, How Children Learn the Mean-
ings of Words (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). On syntax and other aspects
of language, Ray Jackendoff, Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Gram-
mar, Evolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Alan Leslie, “Pretense and Representation: The Origins of ˜Theory of
16.
Mind,™” Psychological Review, 94 (1987), pages 412“426; Simon Baron-
Cohen, Mindblindness; Peter Hobson, “The Grounding of Symbols: A Social-
Developmental Account,” in P. Mitchell and K.J. Riggs (editors), Chil-
dren™s Reasoning and the Mind (New York: Psychology Press, 1999); Michael
Notes to Pages 60“69 315

Tomasello, The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999). See also Michael Tomasello and Hannes Rakoczy,
“What Makes Human Cognition Unique: From Individual to Shared to Col-
lective Intentionality,” Mind and Language, 18 (2003), pages 121“147; and
J.I.M. Carpendale and C. Lewis, “Constructing an Understanding of Mind:
The Development of Children™s Social Understanding within Social Interac-
tion,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in press.
See Alison Gopnik, “How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-
17.
Person Knowledge of Intentionality,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16 (1993),
pages 1“14; Josef Perner, Understanding the Representational Mind (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1991); Jay Gar¬eld, Candida C. Peterson, and T. Perry, “Social
Cognition, Language Acquisition and the Development of the Theory of
Mind,” Mind and Language, 16 (2001), pages 494“541.
See the references in note 1.
18.
The quotation is from his “Innateness and Domain-Speci¬city,” page 193.
19.
Steve Stich articulates the triggering view in his introduction to his edited
collection Innateness (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975).
The quotation is on page 247 of “Nativism in Cognitive Science.” What I am
20.
calling “step two” can be found on page 246.
On intuitive mechanics, see Elizabeth Spelke, “Principles of Object Percep-
21.
tion,” Cognitive Science, 14 (1990), pages 29“56; and “Initial Knowledge: Six
Suggestions,” Cognition, 50 (1995) pages 433“447. On intuitive mathemat-
ics, see Karen Wynn, “Children™s Understanding of Counting,” Cognition, 36
(1990), pages 155“193; and “Origins of Numerical Knowledge,” Mathemati-
cal Cognition, 1 (1995), pages 35“60.
Samuels, “Nativism in Cognitive Science,” page 234.
22.
See Frank C. Keil, “Nativism,” in R.A. Wilson and F.C. Keil (editors), The
23.
MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999),
pages 583“586; and “Nurturing Nativism,” A Field Guide to the Philosophy of
Mind. Fall 1999“2000. E-journal at http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/
¬eld/cowiesymp.htm. Fiona Cowie, What™s Within, Chapter 7. See especially
her Figure 7.1 on page 159.
See also Peter Godfrey-Smith, Complexity and the Function of Mind in Na-
24.
ture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) for a broad treatment
of externalist views in epistemology and the philosophy of biology and
mind.
Patrick Bateson, “Are There Principles of Behavioural Development?,” in
25.
P. Bateson (editor), The Development and Integration of Behaviour (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pages 19“39, at page 21; Paul Grif¬ths,
“What is Innateness?,” Monist, 85 (2002), pages 70“85. The quotation is on
page 70.
On canalization, see Andre Ariew, “Innateness and Canalization,” Philoso-
26.
phy of Science, 63 (1996), pages S19“S27; and “Innateness is Canalization:
In Defense of a Developmental Account of Innateness,” in V.G. Hardcastle
(editor), Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1999), pages 117“138. On generative entrenchment, see
William Wimsatt, “Generativity, Entrenchment, Evolution, and Innateness:
Notes to Pages 69“85
316

Philosophy, Evolutionary Biology, and Conceptual Foundations of Science,”
also in the Hardcastle collection.
27. For the challenges, see Evelyn Fox Keller, The Century of the Gene (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); and Lenny Moss, What Genes Can™t Do
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
28. Brian Goodwin, How the Leopard Got Its Spots (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1993), and Gerry Webster and Brian Goodwin, Form and Transformation:
Generative and Relational Principles in Biology (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1996).
29. For an introduction to developmental systems theory, see Susan Oyama, Paul
Grif¬ths, and Russell Gray (editors), Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Sys-
tems and Evolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). See also Eva Jablonka
and Marion Lamb, Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution: The Lamarckian Dimen-
sion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Susan Oyama, The Ontogeny of
Information (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2nd edition, 2000), origi-
nally published in 1985, and her Evolution™s Eye: A Systems View of the Biology-
Culture Divide (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); and Paul Grif¬ths
and Russell Gray, “Developmental Systems and Evolutionary Explanation,”
Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994), pages 277“304, and their “Darwinism and
Developmental Systems,” in Cycles of Contingency.


4: Individualism: Philosophical Foundations
1. Tyler Burge, “Individualism and the Mental,” in Peter French, Thomas
Uehling Jr., and Howard Wettstein (editors), Midwest Studies in Philosophy,
Volume 4, Metaphysics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), at
page 117.
2. For an insightful review see Tyler Burge, “Philosophy of Mind and Language:
1950“1990,” Philosophical Review, 101 (1992), pages 3“51. For some thoughts
on the in¬‚uence of ordinary language philosophy and logical positivism
on philosophy™s contribution to the cognitive sciences, see section 3 of my
“Philosophy” introduction in R.A. Wilson and F.C. Keil, The MIT Encyclopedia
of the Cognitive Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), pages xv“xxxvii.
3. Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ˜Meaning,™” in Keith Gunderson (editor),
Language, Mind and Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1975). Reprinted in Hilary Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical
Papers, Volume 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975). See also Gary
Ebbs, Rule-Following and Realism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1998), Chapters 7 and 8.
4. For Frege, see “On Sense and Reference,” reprinted in Peter Geach and
Max Black (editors), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd edition, 1960), originally published in 1892. For
Carnap, see Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd edition, 1956), originally pub-
lished in 1947.
5. Carnap™s Logical Construction of the World (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1967), originally published in German in 1928, was a key part of
Notes to Pages 85“89 317

that tradition, and is likely the source for Putnam™s use of “methodological
solipsism.” For continuing controversies, see for example Nathan Salmon,
Reference and Essence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981) and
Alan Sidelle, Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
This sort of point is made by Tyler Burge, both in passing in “Individualism
6.
and the Mental” (see his footnote 2) and in a more sustained way in “Other
Bodies” in Andrew Wood¬eld (editor), Thought and Object: Essays on Inten-
tionality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). The Putnam quotation is
from “The Meaning of ˜Meaning,™” page 227.
For “Individualism and the Mental,” see the full reference given in note 1.
7.
This contrast between physical and social externalism is drawn, for example,
8.
by Gabriel Segal, A Slim Book About Narrow Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2000), in Chapters 2 and 3. See also Chapter 7 of Gary Ebbs, Rule-
Following and Realism, for af¬nities between Putnam and Burge on the social
dimension to having a mind.
H.P. Grice, “Meaning,” Philosophical Review, 66 (1957), pages 377“388; David
9.
K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968); Noam
Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought
(New York: Harper and Row, 1966) and Knowledge of Language (New York:
Praeger, 1986); and Roger Schank and Peter Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals,
and Understanding (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1977).
For an anthology of signi¬cant papers on ¬rst-person knowledge and ex-
10.
ternalism, see Peter Ludlow and Nora Martin (editors), Externalism and
Self-Knowledge (Palo Alto, CA: CSLI Publications, 1998). I discuss the pu-
tative con¬‚ict between externalism and self-knowledge in the ¬nal section
of my “Individualism,” in Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. War¬eld, The Black-
well Companion to Philosophy of Mind (New York: Blackwell, 2003), pages 256“
287.
Andy Clark™s work over the past ten years re¬‚ects much in the embedded
11.
cognition movement. See in particular his Being There: Putting Brain, Body,
and World Together Again (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) and his recent
Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Donald Davidson, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning” and “Thought and Talk,”
12.
both reprinted in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1984); Daniel C. Dennett, “Intentional Systems,” reprinted
in his Brainstorms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978) and “True Believers:
The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works,” reprinted in his The Intentional
Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).
For Burge, see “Individualism and Psychology,” Philosophical Review, 95
13.
(1986) pages 3“45; “Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind,” Jour-
nal of Philosophy, 83 (1986), pages 697“720; and “Cartesian Error and the
Objectivity of Perception,” in R. Grimm and D. Merrill (editors), Contents of
Thought (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988). For Pettit, see his The
Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993), especially Chapter 2.
Notes to Pages 90“101
318

14. Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” Minnesota Studies
in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1956), pages 253“329; John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); and John Haugeland,
Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1998).
15. I have discussed these proposals previously in Chapter 9 of Cartesian Psy-
chology and Physical Minds. In addition, some recent attempts to develop a
phenomenological conception of narrow content are the subject of the ¬nal
chapter in Part Three.
16. Fodor™s original views on individualism and folk psychology are expressed
in his “Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem,” Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic, 23 (1982), pages 98“118, and in Psychosemantics; his change
on this front can be found in The Elm and the Expert (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1994). Stich™s eliminativism is developed in his From Folk Psychology
to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1983).
17. See Fodor, Psychosemantics, Chapter 2. For critiques, see Robert van Gulick,
“Metaphysical Arguments for Internalism and Why They Don™t Work,” in
Stuart Silvers (editor), Rerepresentation (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer,
1989); Frances Egan, “Must Psychology be Individualistic?,” Philosophical Re-
view, 100 (1991), pages 179“203; and my Cartesian Psychology and Physical
Minds, Chapter 2. For views that draw on the underlying intuitions, see Colin
McGinn, “Conceptual Causation: Some Elementary Re¬‚ections,” Mind, 100
(1991), pages 573“586; Tim Crane, “All the Difference in the World,” Philo-
sophical Quarterly, 41 (1991), pages 1“25; Joseph Owens, “Content, Causa-
tion, and Psychophysical Supervenience,” Philosophy of Science, 60 (1993),
pages 242“261; and Denis Walsh, “Wide Content Individualism,” Mind, 107
(1998), pages 625“651.
18. For criticism of the arguments of McGinn and Owens (cited in the previous
note), see Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds, Chapter 5. For a critique
of Walsh™s views, see my “Some Problems for ˜Alternative Individualism,™”
Philosophy of Science, 67 (2000), pages 671“679, and Part Three of my Genes
and the Agents of Life (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
19. See in particular the ¬rst half of “Individualism and Psychology”; much of
the last third of “Philosophy of Mind and Language: 1950“1990” (from
which the quotation is taken, page 39); “Individuation and Causation
in Psychology,” Paci¬c Philosophical Quarterly, 70 (1989), pages 303“322;
and “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice,” in John Heil and
Alfred Mele (editors), Mental Causation (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993).


5: Metaphysics, Mind, and Science: Two Views of Realization
1. For Putnam™s original discussion, see his “Minds and Machines,” originally
published in 1960. For Putnam™s arguments invoking multiple realization,
Notes to Pages 101“111 319

see his “The Mental Life of Some Machines” and “The Nature of Mental
States,” both from 1967. All of these papers are reprinted in his Mind, Lan-
guage, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2 (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1975).
Classic defenses of nonreductive materialism include Jerry Fodor, “Special
2.
Sciences,” reprinted in his Representations (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press,
1981); and Richard Boyd, “Materialism without Reductionism: What Phys-
icalism Does Not Entail,” in Ned Block (editor), Readings in the Philosophy
of Psychology ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). For Kim™s
views, see his “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism” and “Multiple Realiza-
tion and the Metaphysics of Reduction,” both reprinted in his Supervenience
and Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Horgan™s observa-
tion is made in his “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting
the Demands of a Material World,” Mind 102 (1993), pages 555“586, in a
footnote on page 573.
For recent work on realization, see Sydney Shoemaker, “Realization and
3.
Mental Causation,” reprinted in Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer (editors), Phys-
icalism and it Discontents (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Carl
Craver, “Saving Your Self: Dissociative Realization and Kind Splitting,” Philos-
ophy of Science, in press; Thomas Polger, “Neural Machinery and Realization,”
Philosophy of Science, in press; Larry Shapiro, “Multiple Realizations,” Journal of
Philosophy, 97 (2000), pages 635“654; and The Mind Incarnate (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2004). See also my “Realization: Metaphysics, Mind, and
Science,” Philosophy of Science, in press.
A commitment to something like the suf¬ciency thesis can be found in
4.
Kim™s, “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction” and his “The

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