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Nonreductivist™s Troubles with Mental Causation,” reprinted in his Superve-
nience in Mind; in Jeffrey Poland, Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), Chapter 4; and in Stephen Yablo,
“Mental Causation,” Philosophical Review 101 (1992), pages 245“280.
For commitments to something like the constitutivity thesis, see Richard
5.
Boyd, “Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not
Entail,” page 100; David Lewis, “David Lewis: Reduction of Mind,” in Samuel
Guttenplan (editor), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell,
1994), pages 412“418; and Sydney Shoemaker, “Some Varieties of Func-
tionalism,” reprinted in his Identity, Cause, and Mind (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), page 265.
The long quotation and the short one that follows it are from “Multiple
6.
Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction,” pages 322 and 328, respec-
tively. The ¬nal quote is from Kim™s “Postcripts on Supervenience” in his
Supervenience and Mind.
See Shoemaker, “Some Varieties of Functionalism.”
7.
On homuncular decomposition, see Robert Cummins, The Nature of Psycho-
8.
logical Explanation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), Chapters 2 and 3;
Daniel C. Dennett, “Arti¬cial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology,”
reprinted in his Brainstorms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978); and William
G. Lycan Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), Chapter 4.
Notes to Pages 113“133
320

9. See my Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds, Chapters 3 and 4, and “The
Mind Beyond Itself,” in Dan Sperber (editor), Metarepresentations: A Multidis-
ciplinary Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
10. For Clark™s 007 Principle, see his Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Sci-
ence, and Parallel Distributed Processing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989),
at page 64. See also his “Reasons, Robots and the Extended Mind,” Mind and
Language, 16 (2001), pages 121“145; Natural-Born Cyborgs; and Andy Clark
and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis, 58 (1998), pages 10“
23. For Hutchins™s views here, see his Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1995), Chapter 9.


6: Context-Sensitive Realizations
1. See Paul Teller, “Relational Holism and Quantum Mechanics,” British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, 37 (1986), pages 71“81; and “Relativity, Relational
Holism, and the Bell Inequalities,” in James T. Cushing and Ernan McMullin
(editors), Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory (Notre Dame, IN: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1989).
2. David K. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Volume II (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), page xi.
3. The intrinsic view of dispositions is maintained by, amongst others: David
Armstrong, Belief, Truth, and Knowledge (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1973); Elizabeth Prior, Dispositions (Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen
Press, 1985); and David K. Lewis, “Finkish Dispositions,” Philosophical Quar-
terly, 47 (1997), pages 143“158.
4. For these characterizations of acids, see W.H. Nebergall, H. Holtzclaw, and
W. Robinson, General Chemistry (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 6th
ed., 1980), chapter 14.
5. Jennifer McKitrick, “A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions,” Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, 81 (2003), pages 155“174.
6. For token identity, see Donald Davidson, “Mental Events” and “Philoso-
phy as Psychology,” both reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1980). For compositional materialism, see
Richard Boyd, “Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does
Not Entail,” in Ned Block (editor), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
7. See in particular his “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism” and “Multi-
ple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction,” both reprinted in his
Supervenience and Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
8. This seems to me also the situation that John Stuart Mill faced in his landmark
discussion of causation in A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Vol-
ume 1 (London: John W. Parker, 2nd edition, 1846). See especially Book III,
Chapter 5.
9. See Terence Horgan, “Supervenience and Microphysics,” Paci¬c Philosophi-
cal Quarterly, 63 (1982), pages 29“43, for the introduction; and “From Su-
pervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material
World,” Mind, 102 (1993), pages 555“586, at page 571, for the christening.
Notes to Pages 133“147 321

The examples I use in the text can be found on page 33 of the earlier
paper.
See Denis Walsh, “Wide Content Individualism,” Mind, 107 (1998),
10.
pages 625“651. The quotation is taken from page 626 and the numbered
argument can be found on page 640.
“Wide Content Individualism,” page 627, footnote.
11.
See Denis Walsh, “Alternative Individualism,” Philosophy of Science, 66 (1999),
12.
pages 628“648.
Thanks to Gary Ebbs, Paul Teller, and Andy Clark, respectively, for the dis-
13.
cussions and exchanges that led to the following three sections.
On fear, see Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain (New York: Simon and
14.
Schuster, 1996); and Joseph LeDoux and Michael Rogan, “Emotion and the
Animal Brain,” in R.A. Wilson and F.C. Keil (editors), The MIT Encyclopedia
of the Cognitive Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), pages 268“270.
On motor imagery, see Marc Jeannerod, “The Representing Brain: Neural
Correlates of Motor Intention and Imagery,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
17 (1994), pages 187“245. On haptic perception, see R. Cholewiak and
A. Collins, “Sensory and Physiological Bases of Touch,” in M.A. Heller and
W. Schiff (editors), The Psychology of Touch (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1991);
and Roberta Klatzky, “Haptic Perception,” in The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cog-
nitive Sciences, pages 359“360.
For standard presentations of the Ramsey-Lewis view, see Ned Block, Intro-
15.
duction to his Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1980); and David K. Lewis, “Psychophysical and Theoretical
Identi¬cations,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50 (1972), pages 291“315.
See Andy Clark and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis, 58
16.
(1998), pages 10“23; Andy Clark, “Reasons, Robots and the Extended
Mind,” Mind and Language, 16 (2001), pages 121“145; and Natural-Born
Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003).


7: Representation, Computation, and Cognitive Science
1. Ray Jackendoff, “The Problem of Reality,” reprinted in his Languages of the
Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), at pages 159“161. Jackendoff offers
an extended approach to language within this framework in his recent Foun-
dations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002); see especially Part III.
2. Noam Chomsky, “Linguistics and Adjacent Fields: A Personal View” and
“Linguistics and Cognitive Science: Problems and Mysteries,” both in Asa
Kasher (editor), The Chomskyan Turn (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991);
“Language and Nature,” Mind, 104 (1995), pages 1“61; and New Horizons
in the Study of Language and Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2000).
3. Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, Foreword to Simon Baron-Cohen, Mind-
blindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1995), pages xi“xii.
Notes to Pages 148“155
322

4. On distributed representation, Geoff Hinton, Jay McClelland, and
David Rumelhart, “Distributed Representations,” in David Rumelhart, Jay
McClelland, and the PDP Research Group (editors), Parallel Distributed
Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, Volume 1: Founda-
tions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). On subsymbolic processing, Paul
Smolensky, “On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism,” Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 11 (1988), pages 1“74. And on dynamic approaches to cogni-
tion, Tim van Gelder and Robert Port (editors), Mind as Motion (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Tim van Gelder, “Dynamic Approaches to Cog-
nition,” in R.A. Wilson and F.C. Keil (editors), The MIT Encyclopedia of the
Cognitive Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
5. For a recent example, fashioned explicitly as a counter to the externalism
that John Haugeland has articulated, see Rick Grush, “In Defense of Some
Cartesian Assumptions Concerning the Brain and its Operation,” Biology and
Philosophy, 18 (2003), pages 53“93.
6. On computational symbols as conventional, see John Searle, The Rediscovery
of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); and Steven Horst, Symbols,
Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
7. For thermostats and fuel gauges, see Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow
of Information (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), and Explaining Behavior:
Reasons in a World of Causes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988). For hearts and
bee-dances, see Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological
Categories: New Foundations for Realism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), and
White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1993).
8. For a biographical sketch of Marr, see Whitman Richards, “Marr, David,” in
The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, pages 511“512. On Marr™s contin-
uing signi¬cance within vision research, see Stephen Palmer, Vision Science:
Photons to Phenomenology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), Chapter 4.
For a philosophically sensitive, introductory treatment, see Kim Sterelny, The
Representational Theory of Mind: An Introduction (New York: Blackwell, 1990),
Chapter 4.
9. Tyler Burge, “Individualism and the Mental,” in Peter French, Thomas
Uehling Jr., and Howard Wettstein (editors), Midwest Studies in Philosophy,
Volume 4, Metaphysics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979);
and “Individualism and Psychology,” Philosophical Review, 95 (1986), pages 3“
45.
10. Marr, Vision, page 19.
11. For Marr™s introduction of the three levels, see Vision, pages 24“25.
12. The quotation is from Vision, page 99.
13. “Individualism and Psychology,” page 34.
14. The long quotation is from Vision, page 43. For other places where Marr
talks like this, see pages 68, 103“105, and 265“266. Marr™s characterization
of blobs, lines, and so on is given on page 44.
15. Gabriel Segal, “Seeing What is Not There,” Philosophical Review, 98 (1989),
pages 189“214; Robert Matthews, “Comments on Burge,” in Robert Grimm
and David Merrill (editors), Contents of Thought (Tucson: University of
Notes to Pages 155“170 323

Arizona Press, 1988); and Frances Egan, “Must Psychology be Individual-
istic?,” Philosophical Review, 100 (1991), pages 179“203; “Individualism, Com-
putation, and Perceptual Content,” Mind, 101 (1992), pages 443“459;
“Computation and Content,” Philosophical Review, 104 (1995), pages 181“
203; and “In Defense of Narrow Mindedness,” Mind and Language, 14 (1999),
pages 177“194.
“Seeing What is Not There,” page 207, my emphasis both times.
16.
“Seeing What is Not There,” page 197. For Segal™s three general points, see
17.
pages 194“197, and his comments on zero-crossings, page 199.
“Seeing What is Not There,” page 206.
18.
For this sort of point and broader discussion, see Lawrence Shapiro, “Con-
19.
tent, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr™s Theory of Vision”, Philosophical
Review, 102 (1993), pages 489“513, especially pages 489“503.
Noam Chomsky, New Horizons for the Study of Language, page 159; the quo-
20.
tation that follows is from the same page. For his endorsement of Egan™s
interpretation, see “Language and Nature,” page 55, footnote 25, and New
Horizons, page 203, footnote 9.
See also Thomas Polger, “Neural Machinery and Realization,” Philosophy of
21.
Science, in press.
For the knowledge level, see Alan Newell, “The Knowledge Level,” Arti¬-
22.
cial Intelligence, 18 (1982), pages 87“127. For the semantic level, see Zenon
Pylyshyn, Computation and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).
Egan, “Computation and Content,” page 191.
23.
Included here are Burge, “Individualism and Psychology,” page 28; and
24.
Shapiro, “Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr™s Theory of Vision,”
pages 499“500, and “A Clearer Vision,” Philosophy of Science, 64 (1997),
pages 131“153, at page 134. The table I draw the quotation from is Figure 1.4,
Vision, page 25.
For Shapiro™s point, see “A Clearer Vision,” page 149; and for Egan™s con-
25.
cession, “In Defense of Narrow Mindedness.”
On the rigidity assumption, see Shimon Ullman, The Interpretation of Visual
26.
Motion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979), page 146.
For brief discussions of exploitation and representation, see Larry Shapiro,
27.
“A Clearer Vision,” pages 135 and 143. See also Mark Rowlands, The Body in
Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
On the polar planimeter, see Sverker Runeson, “On the Possibility of
28.
˜Smart™ Perceptual Mechanisms,” Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 18
(1977), pages 172“179, a paper that Frank Keil shoved in my hands nearly
¬fteen years ago (much to my puzzlement at the time).
See Robert Cummins, The Nature of Psychological Explanation (Cambridge,
29.
MA: MIT Press, 1983), and Meaning and Mental Representation (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1989).
The three quotations in this paragraph are from Vision, pages 31, 68, and
30.
104, respectively. On how representative these quotations are, see pages 43,
68, 99, 103“115, and 265“266.
For my views here, see Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds, Chapter 3. For
31.
Marr™s relation to the multiple spatial channels theory, see Vision, pages 61“
64; and Palmer, Vision Science, pages 158“172.
Notes to Pages 170“189
324

32. On spatial coincidence, see Vision, pages 68“70; on stereopsis, pages 112“
114.
33. See Rowlands, The Body in Mind, Chapter 5 in general and page 104 in
particular for the continuum view. See also Edward Reed, Encountering the
World: Toward an Ecological Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
34. For Segal™s claim, see Gabriel Segal, “Defence of a Reasonable Individual-
ism,” Mind, 100 (1991), pages 485“494, at page 490.
35. On sneaking up on narrow content, see Jerry Fodor, Psychosemantics
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), page 52; on anchoring, see pages 50“
53 of the same. On realization conditions, see Brian Loar, “Social Content
and Psychological Content,” in Robert Grimm and David Merrill (editors),
Contents of Thought (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988).
36. Cognition in the Wild, page xiv.
37. See especially D. Ballard, M. Hayhoe, P.K. Pook, and R.P.N. Rao, “Deictic
Codes for the Embodiment of Cognition,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20
(1997), pages 723“767. See also Dana Ballard, “Animate Vision,” Arti¬cial
Intelligence, 48 (1991), pages 57“86; and “On the Function of Visual Rep-
resentation,” in Kathleen Akins (editor), Perception: Vancouver Studies in Cog-

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