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nitive Science, Vol. 5 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pages 111“
131. Reprinted in Alva No¨ and Evan Thompson (editors), Vision and Mind:
e
Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2003), pages 459“479.
38. Rodney Brooks, “Intelligence Without Representation,” modi¬ed version
reprinted in John Haugeland (editor), Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychol-
ogy, Arti¬cial Intelligence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); and Cambrian
Intelligence: The Early History of the New AI (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
For his claim about representations and Creatures, see “Intelligence Without
Representation,” pages 404“406.
39. On questioning the conceptual integrity, see Egan, “In Defense of Narrow
Mindedness.” On individuals as the largest units, see Segal, “Defence of a
Reasonable Individualism,” page 492. And on problems with wide compu-
tation interpretations, see Gabriel Segal, review of R.A. Wilson, “Cartesian
Psychology and Physical Minds,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 48
(1997), pages 151“156.


8: The Embedded Mind and Cognition
1. On cognition as the ¬lling, see Susan Hurley, Consciousness in Action (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), page 401.
2. George Miller, “Informavores,” in F. Machlup and U. Mans¬eld (editors),
The Study of Information: Interdisciplinary Messages (New York: Wiley, 1984).
3. Ulric Neisser, “Memory: What Are the Important Questions?” reprinted in
his Memory Observed: Remembering in Natural Contexts (San Francisco: W.H.
Freeman, 1981).
4. For Neisser™s views, see the work cited above as well as “The Ecological Ap-
proach to Perception and Memory,” New Trends in Experimental and Clinical
Notes to Pages 189“199 325

Psychiatry, 4 (1988), pages 153“166; and “Remembering as Doing,” Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 19 (1996), pages 203“204.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979),
5.
Book II, Chapter x, section 2, page 150.
Asher Koriat, and Morris Goldsmith, “Memory Metaphors and the Real-Life /
6.
Laboratory Controversy: Correspondence versus Storehouse Conceptions of
Memory,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19 (1996), pages 167“188. See also
H.L. Roediger, “Memory Metaphors in Cognitive Psychology,” Memory and
Cognition, 8 (1980), pages 231“246.
See Neisser, “Remembering as Doing”; Frederic C. Bartlett, Remembering
7.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932); and Bradd Shore, Culture
in Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). The quotation is from
page 201 of Remembering, and it is in Part II of that work, especially pages 300
forward, that Bartlett broaches the relationship between individual and so-
cietal remembering.
Merlin Donald, The Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution
8.
of Culture and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991);
and A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness (New York: Norton,
2001). Donald discusses the external memory ¬eld in Chapter 8 of Origins.
Mark Rowlands, The Body in Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press,
9.
1999), Chapter 6.
Susan Savage-Rumbaugh and Roger Lewin, Kanzi: The Ape at the Brink of the
10.
Human Mind (New York: Wiley, 1994); and Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, Stuart
Shanker, and T.J. Taylor, Apes, Language, and the Human Mind (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998). See also Irene Pepperberg, “Some Cognitive
Capacities of an African Grey Parrot (Psittacus erithacus),” Advances in the Study
of Behavior, 19 (1990), pages 357“409; and The Alex Studies: Cognitive and
Communicative Abilities of Grey Parrots (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1999).
Michael Cole, Cultural Psychology: A Once and Future Discipline (Cambridge,
11.
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
On the concept of number, see Karen Wynn, “Children™s Understanding of
12.
Counting,” Cognition, 36 (1990), pages 155“193; and “Origins of Numerical
Knowledge,” Mathematical Cognition, 1 (1995) pages 35“60. On the concept
of physical objects, see Elizabeth Spelke, “Principles of Object Perception,”
Cognitive Science, 14 ( 1990), pages 29“56; and Rene Baillargeon, “The Object
Concept Revisited: New Directions in the Study of Infants™ Physical Knowl-
edge,” in C. Granrud (editor), Perception and Cognition in Infancy (Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum, 1993).
For biology, Frank C. Keil, Concepts, Kinds and Cognitive Development
13.
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). For social relationships, Lawrence
Hirschfeld, Race in the Making: Cognition, Culture, and the Child™s Construction of
Human Kinds (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). For minds, Simon Baron-
Cohen, Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1995). Much of the work here was pioneered by Susan Carey
in her Conceptual Change in Childhood (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985).
Notes to Pages 200“212
326

14. Alexander Luria, The Making of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1979), at page 43. See also Lev Vygotsky, Thought and Language
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962); and Mind and Society: The Development
of Higher Psychological Processes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1978).
15. Mind and Society, page 30.
16. On literacy and augmentation, see David Olson, “Literacy,” The MIT En-
cyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, pages 481“482. See also his The World on
Paper (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Michael Cole, Cultural
Psychology; and Merlin Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind.
17. See Frank C. Keil and Robert A. Wilson (editors), Explanation and Cognition
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); R.A. Wilson and F.C. Keil, “The Shadows
and Shallows of Explanation,” modi¬ed version reprinted in Explanation and
Cognition; Leonid Rozenblit and Frank C. Keil, “The Misunderstood Limits of
Folk Science: An Illusion of Explanatory Depth,” Cognitive Science, 92 (2002),
pages 1“42; and Donna R. Lutz and Frank C. Keil, “Early Understanding of
the Division of Cognitive Labor,” Child Development, 73 (2002), pages 1073“
1084.
18. On modes of construal, see Frank C. Keil, “The Growth of Causal Under-
standings of Natural Kinds,” in Dan Sperber, David Premack, and Ann
Premack (editors), Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995). On rapprochement with a Vygotskyan slant,
see Patricia Green¬eld, “Culture and Universals: Integrating Social and
Cognitive Development,” in Larry Nucci, Geoffrey Saxe, and Elliott Turel
(editors), Culture, Thought, and Development (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2000);
and Rom Harr´ , “The Rediscovery of the Human Mind: The Discursive
e
Approach,” Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 2 (1999), pages 43“62.
19. Lev Vygotsky, “The Genesis of Higher Mental Functions,” in James Wertsch
(editor), The Concept of Activity in Soviet Psychology (Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe, 1981), as quoted by James Wertsch, Vygotsky and the Social Forma-
tion of Mind (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pages 60“
61.
20. See Alan Leslie, “Pretense and Representation: The Origins of ˜Theory of
Mind,™” Psychological Review, 94 (1987), pages 412“426 on the theory of mind
module; and Henry Wellman, The Child™s Theory of Mind (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1990) on the theory of mind.
21. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind
and its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Arthur
Glenberg, “What Memory is For,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20 (1997),
pages 1“19; and Rick Grush, “In Defense of Some Cartesian Assumptions
Concerning the Brain and its Operation,” Biology and Philosophy, 18 (2003),
pages 53“93.
22. For example, see Andy Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies,
and the Future of Human Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press,
2003), which concentrates on technology, and includes these examples. See
also Donald Norman, The Invisible Computer (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1999).
Notes to Pages 214“231 327

9: Expanding Consciousness
1. Thomas Nagel, “What is it Like to be a Bat?,” Philosophical Review, 83 (1974),
pages 435“450; Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quar-
terly, 32 (1982), pages 127“136; Joseph Levine, “Materialism and Qualia:
The Explanatory Gap,” Paci¬c Philosophical Quarterly, 64 (1983), pages 354“
361; David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996); David M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968). For a range of recent philosophical
thinking about consciousness, see Quentin Smith and Aleksandar Jokic,
Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
2. On temporally extended forms of consciousness, see Merlin Donald, A Mind
So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness (New York: Norton, 2001),
pages 195“204.
3. On culturally developed cognitive tools, see Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild;
Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs; and Ron McClamrock, Existential Cognition: Com-
putational Minds in the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). On
traditional seafaring navigation, David Lewis, We the Navigators (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1972) and The Voyaging Stars: Secrets of Paci¬c Island
Navigators (New York: Norton, 1978). And for the example of the road as a
cognitive resource, see John Haugeland, “Mind Embodied and Embedded,”
reprinted in his Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), at page 234.
4. For problems with the presumption of disembodied and disembedded cog-
nition, see Greg McCulloch, The Life of the Mind: An Essay on Phenomenological
Externalism (New York: Routledge, 2003), Chapter 7.
5. A useful recent collection of essays on nonconceptual content is York
Gunther (editor), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2003).
6. For Dretske™s argument, see his Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1995), especially page 141; and his “Phenomenal Externalism,”
in E. Villanueva (editor), Perception. Philosophical Issues 7 (Atascadero, CA:
Ridgeview, 1996).
7. For Dretske™s talk of phenomenal states in general, see Naturalizing the
Mind, page 103. See also William Lycan, Consciousness and Experience
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) and “The Case for Phenomenal Exter-
nalism,” in James Tomberlin (editor), Philosophical Perspectives 15: Metaphysics
(Boston: Blackwell, 2001); and Michael Tye, Consciousness, Color, and Content
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
8. For the proposals about narrow content, see Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit,
“Some Content is Narrow,” in John Heil and Alfred Mele (editors), Mental
Causation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) and Stephen White,
The Unity of the Self (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), especially Chapters 1
and 2; and “Color and Notional Content,” Philosophical Topics, 22 (1994),
pages 471“503.
9. The ¬rst of these proposals can be found in Jerry Fodor, “Cognitive Science
and the Twin-Earth Problem,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23 (1982),
Notes to Pages 231“236
328

pages 98“118; and the second in David K. Lewis, “David Lewis: Reduction of
Mind,” in Samuel Guttenplan (editor), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, The Visual Brain in Action (New York:
10.
Oxford University Press, 1998); see also their “The Visual Brain in Action,”
reprinted in Alva No¨ and Evan Thompson (editors), Vision and Mind: Selected
e
Readings in the Philosophy of Perception (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003),
pages 515“529; the quotation is from page 515 of this work. The origi-
nal what/where distinction was drawn by Leslie Ungeleider and Mortimer
Mishkin, “Two Cortical Visual Systems,” in D.J. Ingle, M.A. Goodale, and
R.J.W. Mans¬eld (editors), Analysis of Visual Behavior (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1982). The quotation from Dana Ballard is on page 466 of his “On the
Function of Visual Representation,” reprinted in Vision and Mind, pages 459“
479.
J. Kevin O™Regan and Alva No¨ , “What it is Like to See: a Sensorimotor
e
11.
Theory of Perceptual Experience,” Synthese, 129 (2001), pages 79“103; and
“A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness,” Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 24 (2001), pages 939“1031; the quotation is from page 943
of this paper. See also Alva No¨ , “Experience and the Active Mind,” Synthese,
e
129 (2001), pages 41“60; “On What We See,” Paci¬c Philosophical Quarterly, 83
(2002), pages 57“80; “Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual?,”
Philosophical Quarterly, 52 (2002), pages 185“194; and Action in Perception
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, in press).
No¨ , “Experience and the Active Mind.” For an earlier use of this analogy,
e
12.
see Donald MacKay, “Ways of Looking at Perception,” in W. Wathen-Dunn
(editor), Models for the Perception of Speech and Visual Form (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1967).
On left-right inverting lenses, see James G. Taylor, The Behavioral Basis of
13.
Perception (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962). On change blind-
ness, R.A. Rensink, J.K. O™Regan, and J.J. Clark, “On the Failure to Detect
Changes in Scenes Across Brief Interruptions,” Visual Cognition, 7 (2000),
pages 127“146.
Paul Bach-y-Rita, Brain Mechanisms in Sensory Stimulation (New York: Aca-
14.
demic Press, 1972); “Tactile Vision Substitution: Past and Future,” Interna-
tional Journal of Neuroscience, 19 (1983), pages 29“36; and “The Relationship
Between Motor Processes and Cognition in Tactile Vision Substitution,” in
A.F. Sanders and W. Prinz (editors), Cognition and Motor Processes (Berlin:
Springer, 1984).
Susan Hurley, Consciousness in Action (New York: Oxford University Press,
15.
1998), page 407.
The quotation is from Consciousness in Action, page 406. See also pages 30“32
16.
and 48“50 on temporal atomization in conceptions of consciousness.
On making sense of actual and hypothetical experiments, see Consciousness
17.
in Action, Chapters 7“10. See Ivo Kohler, The Formation and Transformation
of the Perceptual World (New York: International University Press, 1964) for
his inverting lens studies, and Susan Hurley and Alva No¨ , “Neural Plasticity
e
and Consciousness,” Biology and Philosophy, 18 (2003), pages 131“168.
Notes to Pages 238“245 329

18. See Ned Block, “Inverted Earth,” in James Tomberlin (editor), Philosophical
Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview,
1990). Reprinted in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere
¨ ¨
(editors), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1997); and Hurley, Consciousness in Action, pages 304“325, for
discussion.
19. On eliminativism about qualia, see Daniel C. Dennett, “Quining Qualia,”
reprinted in The Nature of Consciousness; and Consciousness Explained (Boston,
MA: Little, Brown, 1991).
20. See Sydney Shoemaker, “Functionalism and Qualia,” Philosophical Studies,
27 (1975), pages 291“315; and “The Inverted Spectrum,” Journal of Philos-
ophy, 74 (1981), pages 357“381. Both of these are reprinted in his Iden-
tity, Cause, and Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984). The
quotation comes from “Functionalism and Qualia,” as reprinted there, on
page 190.
21. See also Sydney Shoemaker, “The First-Person Perspective,” Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 68 (1994), pages 7“22,

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