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reprinted in his The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), where this sort of criticism is also made
of several in¬‚uential arguments of John Searle™s.


10: Intentionality and Phenomenology
1. Terence Horgan and John Tienson, “The Intentionality of Phenomenology
and the Phenomenology of Intentionality,” in David J. Chalmers (editor),
Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002). I thank Terry Horgan for sending me an advance
copy of this paper.
2. See John Searle, “Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion, and Cognitive Sci-
ence,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13 (1990), pages 585“642; and The Redis-
covery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); the quotation is from
page 156 of the book. Galen Strawson, Mental Reality (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1994), page 208.
3. Loar™s four terms for this form of intentionality are drawn, respectively,
from Brian Loar, “Subjective Intentionality,” Philosophical Topics (1987),
pages 89“124; “Social Content and Psychological Content,” in Robert
Grimm and David Merrill (editors), Contents of Thought (Tucson: University
of Arizona Press, 1988); “Transparent Experience and the Availability of
Qualia,” in Quentin Smith and Aleksandar Jokic (editors), Consciousness:
New Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and “Phenomenal
Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content,” in Martin Hahn and Bjorn
Ramberg (editors), Re¬‚ections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). I thank Brian Loar for sending me ad-
vance copies of the latter two papers.
4. See “The Intentionality of Phenomenology . . . ,” cited in note 1.
5. Fred Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995);
William Lycan, Consciousness and Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
Notes to Pages 245“261
330

1996) and “The Case for Phenomenal Externalism,” in James Tomberlin
(editor), Philosophical Perspectives 15: Metaphysics (Boston: Blackwell, 2001);
and Michael Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1995), and his Consciousness, Color, and Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2000).
The quotation is from “The Intentionality of Phenomenology . . . ,” page 521.
6.
For Harman™s report, see his “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience” in James
7.
Tomberlin (editor), Philosophical Perspectives 4: Metaphysics, (Atascadero, CA:
Ridgeview, 1990), pages 31“52.
See his “Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia” and “Phe-
8.
nomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content.” The quotation is
from the former paper, page 90.
“Transparent Experience . . . ,” page 92.
9.
Galen Strawson, Mental Reality, page 5. See also Horgan and Tienson, “The
10.
Intentionality of Phenomenology . . . ,” page 523.
“The Intentionality of Phenomenology . . . ,” page 522.
11.
See “Phenomenal Intentionality . . . ,” pages 186“189, for the build up.
12.
The quotation early in this paragraph is from “The Intentionality of Pheno-
13.
menology . . . ,” page 524, with the argument for this following on pages 524“
526.
See “The Intentionality of Phenomenology . . . ”, page 525 for the quotation,
14.
with the argument following on pages 528“529.
For Loar™s argument, see “Phenomenal Intentionality. . . . ” p. 186.
15.
“Phenomenal Intentionality,” page 186.
16.
Loar rules out appeals to “an introspective glance” on page 190.
17.
Colin McGinn, Mental Content (New York: Blackwell, 1989), pages 58“99. See
18.
also Gabriel Segal, A Slim Book About Narrow Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2000), who rests much on the signi¬cance of the same general sort of
case.
See Martin Davies, “Externalism and Experience,” in A. Clark, J. Ezquerro,
19.
and J.M. Larrazabal (editors), Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Con-
sciousness, and Reasoning (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995).
Reprinted in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere (editors),
¨ ¨
The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1997). See also Elizabeth Fricker, “Content, Cause, and Function,” (Critical
Notice of McGinn, Mental Content), Philosophical Books, 32 (1991), pages 136“
144.
See Greg McCulloch, The Life of the Mind: An Essay on Phenomenological Exter-
20.
nalism (New York: Routledge, 2003), Chapter 7, for an argument against the
coherence of brain-in-vatish thought experiments.
For discussion of these proposals of White, Fodor, Block, and Loar, see
21.
my Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1995), Chapter 9. For another appeal to the phenome-
nal to buttress individualism about intentionality, see Stephen White,
“Color and Notional Content,” Philosophical Topics, 22 (1994), pages 471“
503.
Notes to Pages 269“275 331

11: Group Minds in Historical Perspective
1. For discussions of the collective psychology tradition, see Robert Nye, The
Origins of Crowd Psychology: Gustav LeBon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy in the
Third Republic (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1975); Susanna Barrows,
Distorting Mirrors: Visions of the Crowd in Late Nineteenth-Century France (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981); and Jaap van Ginneken, Crowds,
Psychology, and Politics 1871“1899 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1992).
2. For a precursor to the tradition, see Charles MacKay, Memoirs of Extraordi-
nary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (Boston: L.C. Page, 1932),
originally published in 1841.
3. These quotes are taken, respectively, from the Preface (page v) and page 2
of The Crowd.
4. This sort of point has been made by Clark McPhail, The Myth of the Madding
Crowd (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991).
5. These claims are made, respectively, in the Preface (page xxi), in Book III,
Chapter III, and in Book III, Chapter II, of The Crowd.
6. Both Barrows, Distorting Mirrors, Chapter 2, and Nye, The Origins of Crowd
Psychology, make the connection to Machiavelli. See also Nye™s Chapters 5“6
on the military endorsements and uses of Le Bon™s work.
7. On irrationalist theories of individual psychology, see Gordon Allport, “The
Historical Background of Modern Social Psychology,” in G. Lindzey and E.
Aronson (editors), The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd ed. (Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 1968).
8. For Barrows, see Distorting Mirrors, Chapter 5. The claims that Le Bon makes
referred to here can be found on pages 9“11 of The Crowd.
9. On crowds as feminine and primitive, see Barrows, Distorting Mirrors, Chap-
ter 2; and on fascistic appropriations, see Nye, Origins of Crowd Psychology,
Chapter 6.
10. See Emile Durkheim, “Individual and Collective Representations,” reprinted
in his Sociology and Philosophy, Translated by D.F. Pocock (Glencoe, IL: The
Free Press, 1953), originally published in 1898; and William McDougall, The
Group Mind (New York: Putnam, 1920).
11. McDougall, The Group Mind; William Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in War and
Peace (London: Fisher Unwin, 1916).
12. Edward O. Wilson, The Insect Societies (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971);
David Sloan Wilson, “The Group Selection Controversy: History and Current
Status,” Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 14 (1983), pages 159“187.
For an exception to the trend of sideline, internal histories by biologists,
see Gregg Mitman™s excellent The State of Nature: Ecology, Community, and
American Social Thought, 1900“1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1992), which focuses largely on the Chicago school of ecology.
13. Clements develops the idea of communities as complex organisms in his
Research Methods in Ecology (Lincoln, NE: University Publication Company,
1905), page 5, and that of a biome in his Plant Succession (Washington,
D.C.: Carnegie Institute, 1916). Thanks to Michael Wade for a prod about
Notes to Pages 275“287
332

the work of Park within the Chicago school that builds on the physiolog-
ical conception of populations. See Thomas Park, “Studies in Population
Physiology: The Relation of Numbers to Initial Population Growth in the
Flour Beetle Tribolium Confusum Duval,” Ecology, 13 (1932), pages 172“181;
and “Studies in Population Physiology. II. Factors Regulating Initial Growth
of Tribolium Confusum Populations,” Journal of Experimental Zoology, 65 (1933),
pages 17“42.
For general overviews, see F.E. Clements and V.E. Shelford, Bio-Ecology (New
14.
York: John Wiley, 1939), Chapters 1 and 2; and W.C. Allee, A.E. Emerson,
O. Park, T. Park, and K.P. Schmidt, Principles of Animal Ecology (Philadelphia,
PA: W.B. Saunders, 1949), Chapters 1“3 and 23“30.
See Mary Evans and Howard Evans, William Morton Wheeler, Biologist
15.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970) for an easy-reading bi-
ography of Wheeler that includes a year-by-year list of his publications.
E.O. Wilson, The Insect Societies, page 317. Wheeler™s appeals to individuality
16.
and regeneration are made on pages 8 and 19 of “The Ant-Colony as an
Organism.” The longer quote in the text is from page 26 of that essay.
For Wheeler™s nutritive, reproductive, and defensive societies, see pages 154“
17.
157 of his “Emergent Evolution and the Development of Societies,” modi-
¬ed version reprinted in his Essays in Philosophical Biology (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1939), originally published in 1926.
I discuss the levels of selection in some detail in Part Four of my Genes and
18.
the Agents of Life (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
McDougall, The Group Mind, pages 9“10.
19.
Wilhelm Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, translated by C.H. Judd. (Leipzig:
20.
Wilhelm Engelman, 3rd edition, 1907), page 355, emphasis in the original.
Le Bon, The Crowd, pages 5“6.
21.
On the transformation thesis, see Clark McPhail, The Myth of the Madding
22.
Crowd.
See Allee et al., Principles of Animal Ecology, Chapter 24. See especially
23.
pages 420“435; the quotation is taken from page 420. For Emerson, see
his “Social Coordination and the Superorganism,” American Midland Natu-
ralist, 21 (1939), pages 182“209; “Basic Comparisons of Human and Insect
Societies,” Biological Symposia, 8 (1942), pages 163“176; and “The Biologi-
cal Basis of Social Cooperation,” Illinois Academy of Science Transactions, 29
(1946), pages 9“18.


12: The Group Mind Hypothesis in Contemporary Biology
and Social Science
1. David Sloan Wilson, “Altruism and Organism: Disentangling the Themes of
Multilevel Selection Theory,” American Naturalist, 150 (1997), supplement,
pages S122“S134, at page S128. See also David Seeley, The Wisdom of the
Hive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Herbert H.T.
Prins, Ecology and Behaviour of the African Buffalo (London: Chapman and
Hall, 1996).
2. For the quote from Wilson, see “Altruism and Organism . . . ,” page S131.
Notes to Pages 287“298 333

3. Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
1986). The quotations I provide are from the Preface (page x) and page 8.
4. Richard A. Shweder, “Cultural Psychology: What Is It?,” in his Thinking
Through Cultures: Expeditions in Cultural Psychology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1991).
5. David Sloan Wilson, Darwin™s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), at page 33. For his ear-
lier work that bridges the biological and social sciences, see for example his
“Levels of Selection: An Alternative to Individualism in the Human Sciences,”
Social Networks, 11 (1989), pages 257“272; and his “On the Relationship be-
tween Evolutionary and Psychological De¬nitions of Altruism and Egoism,”
Biology and Philosophy, 7 (1991), pages 61“68.
6. On socially distributed cognition, see Edwin Hutchins, “The Technology of
Team Navigation” and Aaron V. Cicourel, “The Integration of Distributed
Knowledge in Collaborative Medical Diagnosis,” both in J. Galegher, R.
Kraut, and C. Egido (editors), Intellectual Teamwork: Social and Technologi-
cal Foundations of Cooperative Work (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1990). On dis-
tributed cognition in science, see Ronald Giere, “Scienti¬c Cognition as Dis-
tributed Cognition,” in Peter Carruthers, Stephen Stich, and Michael Siegal
(editors), The Cognitive Basis of Science (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2002).
7. For views of holism as an a priori constraint, see Daniel C. Dennett, The
Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); and Donald Davidson,
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
This sort of appeal to homeostatic mechanisms and constraints plays a central
role in the philosopher Richard Boyd™s account of natural kinds that I draw
on and develop in Part Two of my Genes and the Agents of Life (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
8. William McDougall, The Group Mind (New York: Putnam, 1920).
9. David Sloan Wilson, “Incorporating Group Selection into the Adaptationist
Program: A Case Study Involving Human Decision Making,” in Jeffrey A.
Simpson and Douglas T. Kendrick (editors), Evolutionary Social Psychology
(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1997). The quotes are from pages 358 and 359,
respectively.
10. The quotation is from “Incorporating Group Selection . . . ,” page 359.
11. Both quotations are from Darwin™s Cathedral, page 1.
12. For Wilson™s discussion of “groupthink,” see “Incorporating Group
Selection . . . ”, pages 363“366. See also Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychologi-
cal Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mif¬‚in, 1982),
2nd edition.
13. Ludwig Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scienti¬c Fact (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1979). The quotation is taken from page 39. See also
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scienti¬c Revolutions (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962); and W. Sady, “Ludwig Fleck “ Thought Collectives and
Thought Styles,” in W. Krajewski (editor), Polish Philosophers of Science and
Nature in the 20th Century. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences
and the Humanities, Vol. 74 (New York: Rodopi, 2001).
Notes to Pages 299“306
334

14. Kuhn™s quotation is from the Foreword to Fleck™s book (page x). See also
Douglas, How Institutions Think, pages 15“16.
15. How Institutions Think, page 128. The short preceding quotations are from
pages 2 and 11.
16. On evolutionary psychology, see John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, “The Psy-
chological Foundations of Culture,” in Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and
John Tooby (editors), The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Gen-
eration of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). On social intel-
ligence and the Machiavellian hypothesis, see Richard Byrne and Andrew
Whiten (editors), Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution
of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988)
and Andrew Whiten and Richard Byrne (editors), Machiavellian Intelligence
II: Extensions and Evaluations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
For research that departs further from an individualistic tradition, see Linda

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