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committed to it may try to claim that normative judgments are somehow
implicit in our actions, or are presupposed by them. But in order to argue
for such a claim they will have to provide criteria for attributing such
normative judgments: criteria that are distinct from the mere disposition
to be motivated by certain ends. For without such independent criteria,
normative judgments will collapse into desires, as they did in the case of
normative appearances. Nor will it be suf¬cient merely to provide these
sort of independent criteria. Proponents of the judgment thesis will also
have to establish that these judgments typically play an explanatory role in
the genesis of desire or action, and are not themselves to be explained by
the same facts that explain desire or action.

82 See Mackie (1977), ch. 1.


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ability, 141 belief
action, intentional, 186“87, 205“6 rationality of, 162
autonomous, 219 relativity of practical rationality to,
framework for theory of, 194“97 154“59
phenomenology of, 212, 218 bene¬t, 150
see also basing; explanation, action and compensating, 151
desire, of; intelligibility Blackburn, Simon, 148, 188 n.6
advice, see recommendation Brandt, Richard, 113 n.3, 121, 124
advisability, see rationality, objective Brink, David, 43 n.9
agency, ideal, 113, 120“21 Broome, John, 69“70, 73
agreement, 151“52 burden of proof, 36, 109, 124, 193
see also disagreement; majority,
overwhelming character, see personality
Akrasia, see weakness of will circularity, 140“41 n.4
allowing, 139 Cohen, G.A., 84
Alston, William, 192 color, 141, 148, 148“49 n.16
altruism consent, 32, 34
cruel, 144 competence to give, 5“6, 17, 153,
see also reasons, altruistic; self/other 155“56, 216
animals, 216“18 consequences, 140
appearance, 188“93 consequentialism, 12“13, 30, 31“32
normative properties as content of, rule-based vs. reason-based, 74“76


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